

COOPERATION AND COERCION: U.S. STRATEGIES FOR COALITION BUILDING
IN THE FIRST AND SECOND GULF WARS

By

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To my Dad in loving memory

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This dissertation seeks to contribute to understanding the theories of military coalition formation. This U.S. foreign policy study will examine, compare, and contrast the formation of the First Gulf War (1991) and Second Gulf War (2003) coalitions to understand U.S. strategies in coalition building. This study will explain how and why U.S.-led coalition formation for the First Gulf War is different from the recent Iraq conflict. Specifically, the research question is how did U.S. military coalition strategies in the post-Cold War era change? By examining traditional military partnerships and alliances, economic incentives, and rhetoric by U.S. senior leaders (i.e., president and national security establishment), it will be shown how the strategy with which the U.S. forms coalitions changed.

The last eight years have seen the U.S. conduct its war on terror with mixed results. It has attempted to work with its allies and friends on an *ad hoc* basis using coalitions of the willing. However, unlike the strategy used in building the First Gulf War coalition, the legitimacy of recent coalitions has suffered from a lack of support from America's traditional allies and from the U.S. relying too much on its military dominance. The strategy used to build an international coalition for the Second Gulf War relied less

on traditional allies and more on foreign assistance and fear-mongering rhetoric. The manner in which the U.S. builds coalitions now and in the future is an important research question to international relations. First, the current IR literature is woefully lacking in addressing military coalition formation. Second, this examination of coalition formation is important because the global war on terror will continue into the future. Finally, the examination of military coalition formation is important to the U.S. government, specifically to agencies such as the departments of state and defense. Acknowledging how coalitions have been formed could affect how traditional allies are approached, how future foreign assistance is used, and how rhetorical practices affect coalition building.

CHAPTER 1 MILITARY COALITION FORMATION

Introduction

The First and Second Gulf Wars¹ demonstrate U.S. resolve in forming military coalitions. The primary research question is how did the U.S. coalition building strategy change from the First Gulf War to the Second Gulf War? Specifically, this dissertation will explore what were the U.S. strategies for coalition formation in the Gulf wars? Were these formal strategies or based on *ad hoc* diplomatic/military efforts? Which U.S. government agency took the lead in forming these coalitions and who were the key players in the process? These questions inform the reasons why I chose this dissertation topic. This introductory chapter will address the dissertation research question and explain its importance to the international relations (IR) literature. The chapter will then outline how the research question is addressed theoretically, methodologically, and empirically. Finally, the plan and organization of the dissertation will be outlined.

This dissertation seeks to contribute to our understanding of the theories of military coalition formation. With the advent of recent conflicts involving the “coalition of the willing,”² the discipline of IR has recently turned its attention away from formal alliance formation to coalition formation. Such alliances as the North Atlantic Treaty

¹ The First Gulf War is also known by other monikers as the “Second Gulf War,” “Gulf War,” “Iraq War,” “Gulf Conflict,” “Persian Gulf War,” and “Iraq-Kuwait Crisis.” Some scholarship refers to the “First Gulf War” as the 1980’s Iran-Iraq War. However, this dissertation will always refer to the United States-led coalition against Iraq in 1990/1991 as the First Gulf War and the 2003 to present conflict as the Second Gulf War.

² The origin of the term “coalition of the willing” is ambiguous but was often used in the 1990s. President Bill Clinton used the term in a 1994 interview with ABC anchor Sam Donaldson. See the ibiblio website titled, Interview of the President by Sam Donaldson, ABC, June 5, 1994, <http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/archives/whitehouse-papers/1994/Jun/1994-06-05-Presidents-ABC-Interview-on-USS-George-Washington>, accessed March 11, 2010.

Organization (NATO) have been studied extensively by IR scholars; however the same cannot be said for coalitions. Recent IR literature on coalition formation (the First Gulf War, Second Gulf War, and Afghanistan) is very U.S.-centric. This trend mirrors the U.S. emphasis in IR literature in general. Hence, this dissertation poses a U.S. foreign policy question, how did U.S. military coalition strategies in the post-Cold War era change from the First to Second Gulf War? Its application to an international context (how other states form coalitions) is limited since the majority of states in the international system cannot match U.S. resources. This is not to preclude the possibility of future military coalitions being formed by organizations such as the European Union (EU). In fact, the EU has produced a number of such coalitions, albeit on a much smaller scale.³ These coalitions are usually led by France, Germany, or both.

The focus of IR coalition literature has centered on the motivations and reliability of “coalition of the willing” partners and has paid little attention to U.S. strategies in coalition formation in the post-Cold War era. This U.S. foreign policy study will examine, compare, and contrast the First Gulf War (1991) and Second Gulf War (2003) coalitions to understand U.S. strategies in coalition building in the post-Cold War era. This study will explain how U.S.-led coalition formation for the First Gulf War is different from the Second Gulf War. By examining traditional military partnerships and alliances, economic incentives, and rhetoric by senior U.S. leaders (i.e., the president and secretaries of state and defense), it will be shown how the strategy with which the U.S. forms coalitions changed. This change is evident in the U.S. approach to its traditional

³ According to the Council of the European Union website titled, Overview of the missions and operations of the European Union, January 2010, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=268&lang=en>, accessed January 2010, there are 11 ongoing military operations in the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and Africa. None of these coalitions however, involve combat operations. A typical EU military coalition provides advice and assistance to enhance a state’s security reform efforts.

allies, the manner in which the U.S. executes its foreign assistance programs, and in the rhetoric of U.S. senior leadership.

The two Gulf wars presented in this dissertation are well known and have been extensively covered by the mainstream media and academia. What can this dissertation present that has not already been studied, reported, and examined many times over? There are five elements of this study which provide additional insight into the study of U.S. coalition building. First, the history of U.S. military interventions reveals a trend to work multilaterally through coalitions despite its overwhelming advantage in international affairs. The U.S. needs to learn from its previous strategies of coalition building. Some coalitions have been more successful than others; therefore, the U.S. strategy to form them is an important factor to consider. This dissertation focuses on input from the two lead organizations (departments of state and defense) in coalition building to highlight the differences in approach in the U.S. strategies for the two Gulf wars. The second element concerns the importance of working with U.S. traditional allies in both war and peacetime coalitions. Despite the U.S. dominance in various aspects of national power (diplomatic, economic, information, and military), the U.S. continually chooses to work multilaterally to solve international security issues. The inclusion of traditional allies in U.S.-led coalitions is important for long-term post-conflict solutions. The U.S. often looks to more formal entities (U.N. and NATO) to obtain political legitimacy and traditional allies can assist in this endeavor.

The third element to provide additional insight involves economic incentives. While the effect of U.S. foreign assistance has been extensively studied, this dissertation examines the coalition building phase exclusively to determine whether an

aid for troop contribution connection existed in both Gulf wars. Elite interviews with those responsible for building these two coalitions provide a supporting narrative to the departments of state and defense data on U.S. foreign assistance and troop-contributions. The unique feature of the fourth element resides in the focus of examining U.S. senior leader rhetoric for coalition building. Peacetime and wartime rhetoric has been extensively examined but often with the goal of explaining U.S. public support for an operation. Instead of focusing on U.S. public opinion, this dissertation focuses on how U.S. rhetoric is used in forming coalitions. The intended targets of this rhetoric are those possible troop-contributing states in both Gulf wars. Finally, the fifth element explores the policy implications of coalition building. Rather than muddle through forming future coalitions that emphasize quantity instead of quality, the U.S. must work collaboratively with partners on priorities and interests with constant consultation in the spirit of compromise to achieve coalition objectives. The success of future coalition building is dependent on the U.S.-traditional ally relationship and less on U.S. foreign assistance and rhetoric. How the U.S. organizes for a military operation needs to be explored.

A simplistic way to view how to organize any military operation can be broken down to four choices. First, a state could attempt to accomplish the operation alone. This option is limited to those states that have the resources and capability to deploy world-wide. Of course, the U.S. has this option and an argument can be made that other states have this capability, although with limitations. Second, the military operation can be organized as a coalition of the willing that is U.S.-led. America recruits other states along the way, but there is no particular structure. Third, an operation can

be centered on an existing alliance, such as NATO, or an international organization, such as the United Nations (U.N.), that has a permanent structure and where states have permanent commitments to each other. This structure is further formalized when military and government civilians work daily to prepare decisions for senior leaders. The advantage of this third option is that states have a stake in decisions from the very beginning and alliance-led operations provide political legitimacy. The final option is to begin with an alliance, but fall back to the coalition option when best efforts fail to operate on a more formal level. The United States chose the more formal route in the First Gulf War by going to the U.N. for political legitimacy but also assembled a coalition of allies and friends for the combat operations. The Second Gulf War was different. When the attempt to engage the U.N. failed, the U.S. chose to use a less formal option and eventually pulled together a coalition of the willing.

A strategy for coalition formation can take many forms. A state can rely on one instrument of diplomatic, informational, military, or economic power to form an international coalition of states. However, such a limited effort is unlikely since any one single instrument of foreign policy can only achieve so much. Instead, a state will likely use a combination of or all the instruments of foreign policy to achieve its end goal of a coalition of states. The U.S. strategy of coalition formation for the two Gulf wars is different in the three factors (traditional allies, foreign aid, and rhetoric) mentioned above. The First Gulf War coalition relied on traditional allies and senior leader rhetoric, but did not emphasize U.S. economic incentives. In fact, the majority of coalition members contributed economic assistance to help pay for the First Gulf War.⁴

⁴ According to the Final Report to Congress titled, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, (1992:634), <http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf>, accessed March 2009, total US incremental costs for

Demonizing Iraq and Saddam Hussein was part of the U.S. government rhetoric. In contrast, the Second Gulf War coalition was built by a U.S. strategy that de-emphasized traditional allies but relied on foreign aid and fear-mongering rhetoric. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld indicated this shift in strategy when in 2003 he referred to allies such as France and Germany as “old Europe.” While traditional allies were still important to the U.S. in the Second Gulf War coalition, the U.S. strategy emphasized adding those post-communist states that were yearning to move closer to the West. This shift in emphasis from “old Europe” to “new Europe” is illustrated in the U.S. foreign aid provided to states joining the coalition. In addition, the U.S. strategy also included “fear mongering” rhetoric toward potential coalition partners to solidify and justify their participation.

One might ask why this topic is important to study and understand? The importance of this research question to international relations is three-fold. First, the current IR literature is inadequate in addressing military coalition formation. While the more formal alliance (NATO) literature is robust, there is a gap when addressing recent military coalitions. Past examples of U.S.-led coalitions include the Korean War (1950-1953), Vietnam War (1959-1975), Grenada (1983), First Gulf War (1991), Haiti (1991-1994), Somalia (1992-1995), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001-present), and Second Gulf War (2003-present). Yet while there are many examples of these conflicts, the IR literature rarely makes a distinction between alliances and coalitions, preferring instead to use the terms interchangeably. Aron (1966) and Bennett et al. (1994) consider

Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm are estimated at \$61 billion. Without responsibility sharing, the U.S. would have had to pay these costs either through a tax increase or through deficit spending, adding to the country's fiscal difficulties. Instead, in 1990 and 1991, coalition states committed almost \$54 billion to offset these costs. Roughly two-thirds of these commitments were from the Gulf States directly confronted by Iraq, with the other one-third coming largely from Japan and Germany.

coalitions and alliances at least interrelated if not interchangeable. Assuming that coalitions and alliances are the same in the IR literature results in the nuances of a coalition being lost. Alliances are durable; coalitions are temporary. Alliances provide a set commitment from the members; coalition member contributions are flexible. Alliances focus on burden sharing; coalitions are usually led by one state, which carries the main burden. Carving out a unique role for coalitions in IR literature is crucial to keep these entities separate and unique. This dissertation addresses this shortfall in the literature. Second, this examination of coalition formation is important because international conflicts will continue into the future. While U.S. administrations change every four to eight years with each administration choosing to emphasize its own U.S. foreign policy approach, global security concerns will likely continue into the future. Recognizing the change in U.S. coalition strategies will contribute to starting the conversation in IR on coalition formation to address future conflicts.

Finally, the examination of military coalition formation is important to the U.S. government, specifically to agencies such as the departments of state and defense. Acknowledging how coalitions have been formed could affect how traditional allies are approached, how future foreign assistance is used, and how rhetorical practices affect the coalition building to be arrayed against future threats. Senior civil servants, political appointees, and military officers can and should learn from these lessons of the past and find alternative means of coalition formation that do not rely on economic incentives and fear mongering. These alternative means of coalition formation will require relying more on the Department of State as a means to win the “hearts and minds” of future allies. Emphasizing public diplomacy efforts that complement and support formal

diplomatic efforts will accomplish more than relying on traditional allies, economic incentives, and/or rhetoric.

The Theoretical Literature

Starting with the traditional IR focus on alliances, Stephen Walt (1987) in *The Origins of Alliances* posits that those able to attract allies are advantaged, while those with others allied against them are at a disadvantage. While this statement seems simplistic, it reveals the importance of understanding the forces that shape international alliances and/or coalitions. Walt initially argues that states balance rather than joining the more powerful state, termed bandwagoning, and that states balance against threats and not against power alone. The second part of Walt's (1987:5) argument "shows that ideology is less powerful than balancing as a motive for alignment." Ideological solidarity would seem like a logical factor in alliance formation, but Walt finds that many alliances are actually forms of balancing behavior. He also finds that states sharing the same ideology are often competitive, which hinders alliance formation. An example of competition that hinders alliance formation is the failure of pan-Arabism. Cooperation among Arab states is difficult to sustain despite like-minded ideology. These first two assertions of Walt's argument will not be disputed here. However, the third and final part of his argument requires further study and updating. Walt (5) "concludes that neither foreign aid nor political penetration is by itself a powerful cause of alignment." For him, states align against threats and not because of any leverage gained through aid or political penetration. Political penetration is described by Walt (1987:46) as the "manipulation of one state's domestic political system by another." This type of manipulation includes "fear mongering" rhetoric to induce a particular behavior. While other types of political penetration could include manipulation of other states' elections

and/or espionage, this dissertation will refer to political penetration as the rhetorical strategies of a state. The hypothesis behind Walt's stance is very familiar in IR literature.⁵ The general argument concludes that a state can become an alliance or coalition partner for reasons other than to obtain some type of reward such as economic or military aid or political penetration. One state's attempt to use economic incentives and political manipulation to persuade or coerce another state or states to join a coalition is not advanced as a causal factor in coalition building. This dissertation departs from this argument and hypothesizes that coalition formation in the post-Cold War era relies on economic incentives and political manipulation. This dissertation contributes to the IR literature on coalition formation and specifically addresses the third part of Walt's argument. A more expanded theoretical discussion will be presented in Chapter 2.

Methodologies

The method employed in this dissertation is straightforward. The principal historical evidence is from two cases of U.S. military coalition formation. These include the First Gulf War coalition that formed in 1990/1991 and the Second Gulf War coalition of 2003. These cases provide the opportunity to compare U.S. strategies in coalition formation during the post-Cold War era. This will allow for a comparison of cases and show how U.S.-formed coalitions are influenced by traditional allies, U.S. foreign aid, and U.S. rhetorical practices. Another reason for selecting these two cases as opposed to other U.S.-led coalitions is that these cases are in the post-Cold War era. Much of the literature on alliance formation stems from either a multipolar environment (pre-

⁵ See Baldwin 1969; Bueno de Mesquita 1975; Lebovic 1988; Poe and Meernik 1995; Palmer, Wohlander, and Morgan 2002.

World War II) or a bipolar environment (Cold War era). The post-Cold War era provides a unique opportunity to analyze coalition formation in a virtually unipolar environment. While there is much debate within the IR community on whether we live in a unipolar world, it cannot be argued that the U.S. is a dominant IR player. As Robert Jervis (2006:8) notes “measured in any conceivable way, the United States has a greater share of world power than any other country in history.” Would either of these Gulf wars have occurred if the United States did not decide to act? Would any other state or organization have had the ability, even if they had the will, to accomplish what the U.S. did in both conflicts? Charles Krauthammer (1991:25), in describing the First Gulf War, argues that “without the United States leading and prodding, bribing and blackmailing, no one would have stirred.” The most likely scenario in the First Gulf War is that Kuwait would have been left to fend for itself and Iraq would at most have faced mild protests from around the world. The same can be said for the Second Gulf War; without U.S. prompting, Iraq would not have been invaded. Of course, whether the U.S. is in a unipolar moment is subject to scholarly debate. William Pfaff (1992) states, rightly or wrongly, that a single superpower does not exist. Maybe this debate is just mired in a definitional argument where words like unipolar and superpower take on different shades of meanings to bolster one’s argument. The distinction is being discussed here because the two examined cases (First and Second Gulf Wars) take place in the post-Cold War environment of unipolarity. This dissertation makes the assumption that U.S. preeminence is a product of its diplomatic, informational, military, and economic dominance. This does not mean the U.S. always gets its way or is invincible, but that U.S. preeminence is based on the ability to be a decisive factor in any situation it finds

itself facing. The post-Cold War era can be considered a type of unipolarity since the U.S. has the ability to coerce and influence other states while also projecting its power over great distances and sustaining that effort over a long period of time. Arguments to the contrary might highlight the 2008 economic downturn and the two conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. These events sap United States economic and military might, which jeopardizes any discussion of unipolarity. However, one must consider the current economic downturn as a world-wide phenomenon that affects all U.S. near competitors. Walt (2009:92) argues that “despite its current difficulties in Iraq and the recent downturn in the U.S. economy, the United States retains a comfortable margin of superiority over the other major powers.” While challenges from other states and regional organizations abound, these challenges have a limited effect on U.S. strategies. Therefore, this dissertation will consider the post-Cold War era as a type of unipolarity that is distinct from the multipolar world before World War II and the bipolar world of the Cold War.

Holding the post-Cold War era constant among cases allows an examination of the U.S. strategies for coalition formation in the two Gulf wars. Both scholarly literature and mainstream media provide assessments of the post-Cold War era. These include what they mean, what implications arise from both events, and prescriptions for the future. This dissertation does not provide such assessments, but it does hope to demonstrate that U.S. strategies of coalition formation were different during this period. The post-Cold War era has been described as a time when America was advantaged, but also a time when America came adrift. The Commission on America’s National Interests (2000:1) describes these extraordinary advantages and argues that “America

today is uniquely positioned to shape the international system to promote international peace and prosperity for decades or even generations to come.” The Commission however also highlights the loss of U.S. focus with the demise of the Soviet Union. Without that threat, American engagement in international relations has become adrift.

Another reason for selecting these cases is the constant in the geographical location (Iraq) between the First and Second Gulf Wars. Robert Divine (2000:129) describes the First Gulf War as a “tactical victory, but a strategic failure.” United States President George H.W. Bush ended the ground war after 100 hours of fighting, leaving the Iraqi forces to retreat north. The end to the First Gulf War was less than what many expected for such a large expenditure of resources and people. Saddam Hussein was still firmly in control of Iraq and many of his elite forces (the Republican Guard) were still intact. Twelve years later, the Second Gulf War provides an opportunity to compare the U.S. efforts to form another international coalition against Iraq. This time, however, the focus of forming an international coalition rested on the premises of weapons of mass destruction and Iraq association with terrorist organizations. What were the similarities and differences in U.S. strategies employed in forming military coalitions during these two Gulf wars?

The post-Cold War era provides an opportunity to study coalitions under different external conditions during a period of U.S. dominance. Without the communist “other,” how would the U.S. form coalitions? Certainly the NATO model would be inadequate. Even in the Afghanistan coalition, the initial U.S. strategy in 2001 did not include NATO. It was not until 2003 that NATO took over the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Bennett et al. (1997:3) argue that because “alliances will be looser and

more *ad hoc* in the post-Cold War international system than they were between 1947 and 1991, findings based largely on one fixed, fairly tight alliance may not generalize to other kinds of security coalitions.” If these post-Cold War coalitions include the First Gulf War, Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Second Gulf War, why concentrate on just two U.S.-led coalitions and not all six? The coalitions for Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo each provide reasons for their exclusion. The intervention in Somalia involved actions by an international coalition to prevent in-country atrocities. The civil war among Somali warlords was devastating to the local populace and caused widespread famine. The resulting humanitarian crisis pushed the United Nations to authorize the use of force to ensure relief supplies could aid the population. However, it required the U.S. to form a military coalition and in December 1992 Operation Restore Hope began. A coalition to prevent a humanitarian disaster is quite different from a coalition to confront a state threatening others, thus Somalia would provide a poor comparison case of a U.S.-led coalition in the post-Cold War era. Haiti provides a similar problem. In response to the military coup and ouster of Haitian president Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the U.S. in September 1994 formed a U.N.-sponsored multinational force. This move was necessary because of the repressive nature of the military regime toward its own people and the worsening economic conditions in Haiti, the most impoverished state in the Western Hemisphere. These conditions resulted in a massive flood of Haitians fleeing the country and heading to U.S. shores. Hence, another humanitarian crisis prompted a response from a U.S.-led coalition. Neither Somalia nor Haiti threatened their neighbors or were deemed a regional threat. Instead, intervention in both cases was the result of

a state abusing its own population. These cases do not correspond to the external threat posed by Afghanistan and Iraq.

Kosovo is another example of a coalition intervening in the internal affairs of a state. Ethnic tensions within Yugoslavia came to a boil at the end of the Cold War. By 1990, Kosovo attempted to declare itself a state, but failed. Serbia reacted by repressing the Kosovo Albanians and a decade of conflict ensued. By 1999, the fighting escalated to the point where NATO decided to step in and restore order. The goal of the NATO forces was to get the Serb forces out of Kosovo, implement a NATO peacekeeping force, and allow refugees to return home. While the U.S. made up the bulk of these forces and it was U.S. leadership at the top military positions, it was still a sanctioned NATO mission. Various NATO member governments had veto power over target selection and U.S. autonomy was not absolute. Thus, the role of NATO in this operation excludes this coalition from consideration. It should be noted that the stated objective for NATO intervention was the threat that Serbia posed to its neighbors, which would make this case similar to Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the only NATO member even remotely threatened by the Balkan conflict was Greece; hence there was no other serious threat to the region. Much like Somalia and Haiti, this coalition was motivated by concern for the general population. Claims that Serbs were practicing genocide on Kosovar Albanians were a strong motivating factor. For these reasons, being a NATO operation (not U.S.-led) and humanitarian crisis, Kosovo is not considered a suitable case study.

The absence of Afghanistan as a case needs to be explained; however there are two reasons why the Afghanistan coalition and the associated strategy are not

considered along with the two Iraq coalitions. First, timing is an issue. Operation Enduring Freedom began on October 7, 2001, less than one month since the terrorist attacks in the United States. Such a short time period between the terrorist attacks and start of the war make it difficult for the U.S. to implement a formal strategy as well as for potential participants to recognize the implementation of a U.S. coalition strategy. Using Afghanistan as a third case might be fruitful and interesting to explore, but such a task is more time consuming and complex, so will not be attempted here. Second, the operations in Afghanistan, although U.S.-led, were soon joined in December 2001 by a U.N.-mandated organization, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), created to assist the Afghan transitional government with security in and around Kabul. Since August 2003, ISAF has been directed by NATO. The inclusion of ISAF, with NATO forces, makes using Afghanistan as a case problematic. Attempting to distinguish between U.S., U.N., and NATO strategies in coalition formation would complicate the use of Afghanistan as a case. The United States strategy for coalition formation would not be the only strategy involved in Afghanistan.

Finally, the methods of process tracing and content analysis will be employed to distinguish between U.S. strategies employed in the two Gulf wars. Process tracing will highlight the coalition formation for Operation Desert Shield in 1990 and what emerged the following year for Operation Desert Storm. The First Gulf War provides an excellent case study. The same geographical region and similar countries involved in the second coalition make comparisons straightforward. In political science, Alexander George and Timothy McKeown (1985) describe process tracing as a method that examines the decision process. According to George and McKeown (1985:35), the “process-tracing

approach attempts to uncover what stimuli the actors attend to; the decision process that makes use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions; the actual behavior that then occurs; the effect of various institutional arrangements on attention, processing, and behavior; and the effect of other variables of interest on attention, processing, and behavior.” George and Bennett (2005:6) describe process tracing as a method in which “the researcher examines histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process a theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case.” Process tracing enhances the research design by focusing on those key events in the U.S. strategy for coalition formation that are part of the historical record. Documentary research and first account interviews at the sites of those involved in the chain of events yield the necessary data.

Robert Weber (1990:9) explains that content analysis is a research tool used to identify certain words within texts and is a “research methodology that utilizes a set of procedures to make valid inferences from text.” However, the use of content analysis for social science research has often been criticized as being unscientific. Robert Mitchell (1967:231) argues that data produced by content-analysis techniques have been used in many studies primarily for descriptive rather than for hypothesis-testing purposes. The challenge of context analysis is to use a consistent coding scheme throughout the data gathering process to provide reliable and valid results. A main test of any content analysis is the large amount of data that needs to be reduced to a few content categories. The consistency or reliability of these categories is crucial. However, reliability can be compromised if ambiguity arises in either the words that are

being counted or the content categories associated with them. The validity of content analysis relies on how well what is measured is consistent with the intent of the study. In assessing the U.S. coalition formation strategy of fear-mongering, the challenge lies in coding the correct words in a text that convey such meaning. Weber (1990:41) identifies several techniques of content analysis that include: word frequency counts, key-word-in-context (KWIC) listing, concordances (a form of cross-reference between and among related words), classification of words into content categories, content category counts, and retrievals based on content categories and co-occurrences. For the purposes of this dissertation, word frequency counts will be the primary basis of the content analysis.

Empirical Evidence

The data collected for this dissertation are obtained from various sources. Documentary research provides the bulk of the evidence supplemented by elite interviews. The documentary evidence and interviews were obtained from U.S. Central Command, Office of the Secretary of Defense/Joint Staff, the Department of State, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, and the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library. The United States Central Command in Tampa, Florida, is one of six geographic combatant commands. The U.S. is the only country that divides the entire globe into military commands and assigns U.S. military forces to specific regions worldwide. This practice is outlined in the Unified Command Plan (UCP).⁶ According to General David Petraeus, Commander of Central Command, his command stretches “across more than

⁶ The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 requires the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct a biennial review of the UCP to examine the force structure, missions, and responsibilities, including geographical boundaries of each unified command. The other five geographical combatant commands are Northern, Southern, European, Pacific, and Africa Command.

4.6 million square miles and 20 countries, the area of responsibility contains vital transportation and trade routes, including the Red Sea, the Northern Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Gulf, as well as strategic maritime choke points at the Suez Canal, the Bab el Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz.”⁷ Central Command was responsible for the conduct of the First Gulf War and is currently executing the Afghanistan and Second Gulf War. Working closely with the Department of State, Central Command was instrumental in building and maintaining coalitions. The current coalition village at MacDill AFB in Tampa is made up of representatives from 50 countries supporting Afghanistan and/or Iraq operations. At its height in operations tempo in November 2003, the coalition village consisted of 72 countries supporting Afghanistan operations and 67 countries supporting Iraq operations. Data obtained from Central Command consists of coalition contributions to both Iraq wars, which include troops, equipment, over-flight permission, basing rights, and financial contributions. These data provide evidence of the military focus on traditional and non-traditional allies in the two Iraq wars.

Other sources of data are located at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and Joint Staff (JS), both of which are located in the Pentagon. These two organizations represent the civilian and military leadership and staff for the U.S. armed forces. Both the OSD and JS provide guidance to Central Command and coordinate their efforts to build and maintain international coalitions. The same types of empirical evidence (troops, equipment, over-flight permission, basing rights, and financial

⁷ From U.S. Central Command website, General Petraeus’s testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Posture Statement, April 1, 2009, <http://www.centcom.mil/en/from-the-commander/commanders-statement-to-senate-armed-services-committee-april-1-2009.html>, accessed July 2009.

contributions) reside within these two organizations. This redundancy allows verification of the data. Another government agency critical to the coalition building process is the Department of State (DOS). In both Gulf wars, the DOS was the lead agency in the initial phases of coalition building. However, as these coalitions matured and evolved, much of the day-to-day “care and feeding” of the coalitions moved to the Department of Defense, specifically Central Command. The final sources of data are from the manuscript archives at the Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton, New Jersey, and the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library in College Station, Texas, where data pertaining to the First Gulf War coalition can be found. While much of the documentation for both Bush presidencies is still classified, there are memos, directives, and other correspondence that outline the process used to build a military coalition. Obviously, more data are available and have been unclassified since the 1990/1 military coalition than for the 2003 coalition. This limitation will be mitigated by the interviews of key administration personnel involved in coalition building for the Second Gulf War.

As previously mentioned, data for this dissertation consist of documentary evidence obtained through archival research and from interviews of key players in the process of coalition building for the two Gulf wars. While this type of social science research is often used, it is not easy and not foolproof. George and Bennett (2005:94) warn that “scholars who attempt to reconstruct the policymaking process in order to explain important decisions face challenging problems.” One such problem is focusing solely on U.S. foreign policy. Problems can arise when using archival materials and interviews for sources that might not be reliable. The researcher must always be aware of “hidden agendas” in both written and spoken evidence. Another problem arises when

the researcher relies too much on a single, authoritative source of a particular event. The result of such a transgression is that the evidence might favor the stated outcome. This concern is shared by Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba (1994:228) who caution that “we must measure accurately the reasons given and select observations so that they are relevant omitted variables.” These issues are certainly a concern, but can be overcome by using archival evidence from multiple sources. Therefore, this dissertation uses sources (archives and interviews) from those currently in government and those now in the private sector. Both types of evidence are critical to ensure written accounts are verified by those intimately involved in the process. The strengths and weaknesses of process tracing have been considered. There are advantages that elite interviewing can have relative to documentary research. It gives the researcher the ability to gain information that may not be included in released documents, and the opportunity to probe individuals with further questions once they have advanced what may be the “official” version of events. With process tracing, however, the aim of conducting interviews is not to generalize to the population, but rather to uncover specific data from key individuals concerning a particular chain of events.

The three factors that will be explored in both Gulf war cases consist of traditional alliances and allies, foreign assistance, and rhetoric. The main source of empirical evidence for all factors will be drawn from the U.S. government archival documentation and interviews. A further discussion of the rhetoric variable needs to occur, specifically the method to collect this data needs to be elaborated. Weber (1990:5) identifies numerous sources for content analysis, including books, magazines, newspapers,

speech transcripts, conversations, radio and television programs, and interviews. This usually results in an overabundance of text, the analysis of which is extremely time consuming. This is a problem in this study. Attempting to examine all the sources of data available for the U.S. coalition formation strategy on two coalitions would be a major undertaking. Additionally, such a macro-level analysis would cover the U.S. rhetoric directed at possible and actual coalition partners (up to 70 countries). For this study, government sources will be selected as a representative sample of senior leader rhetoric and key words used to gather data for the two Gulf wars. The speeches and remarks by the holders of the offices of president, secretary of state, and secretary of defense found at government websites and library archives are the primary source for the content analysis. Choosing these three roles and relying on government websites and library archives over any other actor or source is a matter of expedience for its ease of use. For the purposes of this dissertation, key words will be sought in examining U.S. senior leader speeches and remarks in the years of coalition building for the two Gulf wars. Key words, such as “aggression,” “Hitler,” “dictator,” “weapon,” and “terror,” should yield appropriate data for interpretation. While such an analysis could be wide ranging, the depth of analysis for a purely statistical interpretation would be shallow.

The First Gulf War coalition is consistent with Walt’s (1987) argument that foreign assistance and political penetration have no or limited influence on whether a state does or does not join a U.S.-led coalition. However, I also find that the strategy for the Second Gulf War coalition formed emphasizes different factors. Foreign aid and the rhetorical practices of senior leaders are the primary means in the Second Gulf War strategy for coalition formation. Coalition formation in the First Gulf War was less

problematic due to Iraqi violations of international law with its invasion of Kuwait. However, the Second Gulf War presented a challenge in coalition formation. So tying Iraq to the larger global war on terror was critical to U.S. strategy on coalition formation, but failed to attract traditional allies. The United States sought other means to attract allies, hence the importance to explore foreign aid and rhetoric in coalition building. The final section describes the plan and organization of the dissertation.

Plan and Organization

This first chapter provides an introduction outlining the project and the research design. The remaining chapters proceed as follows. Chapter 2 will focus on presenting the theoretical gaps and limitations of several bodies of current IR literature on coalitions. The focus on formal alliances will be acknowledged and a summary of the literature on coalitions will be explored. The paucity of literature describing a change in U.S. strategies for coalition formation provides an opportunity to add to the already limited IR literature on coalitions. This chapter will also explore the theoretical literature of traditional alliances, foreign assistance, and rhetoric. The next three chapters will be formatted in similar manners. They each will focus on a specific factor of U.S. strategy. Each chapter will explore how that factor was or was not causal in the First Gulf War, the Second Gulf War, or both. Chapter 3 focuses on traditional allies. This factor helps explain the U.S. strategy in the First Gulf War where allies such as the U.K., Germany, and France had a major role in the conduct of the war, a trend that is reversed in the Second Gulf War. Chapter 4 will present the role of foreign assistance in U.S. strategies for both Gulf wars. Walt's hypothesis may need to be updated to reflect how the Second Gulf War was formed. In Chapter 5, the role of rhetoric is explored. Finally,

Chapter 6 will discuss what was found and the implications for future U.S. coalition formation strategies.

CHAPTER 2 COALITION THEORY

This chapter explores the international relations literature on coalitions and finds that it is embedded in the IR literature on alliances. The military coalitions of the past have been studied, analyzed, and explained as if they were actual, formal alliances such as NATO that we know today. Coalitions have a long history. As long as tribes and groups have warred there have been coalitions. In the IR literature, however, the earliest examples of military coalitions investigated by IR scholars involve the grand coalitions arrayed against France in general and, after 1799, Napoleon in particular. Starting with what historians call the First Coalition in 1793, various European states, as well as the Ottoman Empire, joined and left this coalition over a number of years. As explained by Michael Rapport (1998:13), this First Coalition finally ended in 1797, but Britain fought on and the “peace” was nothing more than a fragile truce shattered less than a year later by the advent of the War of the Second Coalition. A total of seven coalitions (1792–97, 1799–1801, 1805, 1806–07, 1809, 1812-1814, 1815) of this type (called the Coalitions against France) existed and combinations of various powers ended in failure largely due to the lack of cooperation between Vienna, Berlin, St. Petersburg, and London, resulting in no common political goals. Phillip Dwyer (2008:605) explains that these early coalitions had contradictory goals and no overall military strategy. They also were termed alliances and remained together, not for the purpose of a generic collective security guarantee, but for one specific goal – defeat Napoleon and France. The defeat of Napoleon in Russia and the formation of what is usually referred to as the “Grand Alliance of 1813” (sometimes referred to as the Quadruple Alliance) marks the first time all the great powers were finally united against

France (Dwyer:606). This definitional overlap of the terms “coalition” and “alliance” persists to this day.

In the next section, we find the IR literature dominated by theories of alliances, yet many authors erroneously use coalitions as examples. This lack of precision in the terminology diminishes the analytical validity of both terms and makes it more difficult to distinguish the unique features of each concept. The following section addresses realism and coalitions and how realism presents alliances and coalitions. In short, realists do not make a distinction between alliances and coalitions. This is followed by an examination of United States (U.S.) coalition literature and its focus on the collective action problem. The next three sections focus on traditional alliances and allies, foreign assistance, and rhetoric in the IR literature. In that literature, foreign assistance is by far the most robust topic with many explanations of the relationship between foreign assistance and coalition partners. The chapter ends with a discussion of where IR theorizing on coalitions could be headed in the future.

Alliances versus Coalitions

A great deal of scholarly attention in IR has been focused on formal alliances.¹ Most scholarship focuses on alliance formation and answering the question of why and how they form. These formal alliances involve traditional allies providing collective security for a region or area, but also include alliances of convenience among states that feel threatened. Liska (1962:7) identifies more “permanent” peacetime alliances as being reserved for special cases; they help implement either joint political control with friendly postcolonial elites or joint postwar accommodation of wartime allies and

¹ See Sabrosky, 1988; Siverson and King, 1980; Morrow, 1991, 1994, 2000; Smith, 1995; Lai and Reiter, 2000; Leeds et al., 2000; Leeds, 2003.

enemies. At the end of the Cold War, formal alliances, such as NATO, questioned their *raison d'être* because their existence was based on opposing the Warsaw Pact. The IR literature and mainstream media in the 1990s were filled with predictions of NATO's future. Many scholars and foreign policy reporters reasoned that NATO cohesion would be difficult to maintain without a focus. Much of the scholarship focused on the fact that, after the end of the Cold War, the United States faced a different challenge in NATO. United States allies' were insisting on setting their own defense priorities instead of following Washington's. Clarke and Cornish (2002:779) contend the EU's common European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is a dual-edged sword for NATO. On the one hand, ESDP could weaken European ties to NATO and the U.S., while on the other hand, ESDP could be the spark Europeans' need to close the capability gap with the U.S. and hence strengthen NATO. Another major theme in the literature concentrates on NATO expansion and questions who should be admitted and why. For example, Joyce Kaufman (1997:25) examines what NATO might be in the twenty-first century and the growing rift within the alliance, and questions what role NATO should play in the post-Cold War world in light of changing political realities.

In game theory analysis of alliance formation, Alastair Smith (1995:419) argues that scholars should be examining the effects of alliances on the behavior of states rather than looking at incidences of war. This is so because a defensive (formal) alliance could be the reason a state does not wage war and hence it is the alliance itself that is changing the behavior. This type of negative outcome is the most difficult problem to explain. Why did the United States and the Soviet Union never directly confront each other during the Cold War? Was it the presence of the NATO and

Warsaw Pact alliances? Or was it the existence of nuclear weapons? While most would agree that formal alliances play a major role in preventing conflict there are other factors (economic, political, military, informational) that also act as deterrents. One such factor is the use of coalitions to address international relations issues. But formal alliance scholarship does not explain military coalitions. This focus on formal alliances in the IR literature helps to explain the limited scholarship on military coalitions.

In fact, Smith (1995:406) contends the “study of alliances has been broken up into three lines of research: the relationship between alliance formation and the occurrence of war, the motivations for the formation of alliances, and the reliability of alliances.” A small segment of the more recent IR literature, when addressing military coalition formation in the post-Cold War era, uses the terms alliance and coalition interchangeably. For example, when exploring the First Gulf War, Kendall Stiles (2002) alternates between discussing an “anti-Iraq coalition” and an “alliance.” To confuse the issue even further, much of the IR and more general political science literature on coalitions concentrate on the influence of domestic politics.²

A more useful distinction can be found in the U.S. military’s definition of a coalition: an *ad hoc* arrangement between two or more nations [states] for common action.³ A

² The term “coalition” in this context does not apply to military coalitions, but to electoral politics. As Indridason (2008:244) states “theories of coalition formation can be divided into two categories: those that emphasize politicians’ office motivations and those that focus on their policy motivations.” This is similar to a much older definition provided by Kelley (1968:63) in which a coalition situation is described as “one individual or group in competition with others can increase its payoff (i.e., gain power over others, advance certain policies in a legislature, etc) by combining with other individuals or groups to form a coalition.” Another use of the term coalition in the literature concentrates on coalition bargaining. The costs of these domestic coalitions are a popular subject in game theory models, as Mershon (1996:538) explains: “coalition theories in the domestic context assumes that expected costs push politicians away from some behaviors, and expected benefits pull them toward others.” These domestic examples of coalition scholarship are not helpful when attempting to distinguish a coalition from an alliance.

³ See Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, April 12, 2001 (amended May 30, 2008), <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict>, accessed June 2009.

coalition action is defined as a “multinational action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for single occasions or longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest.”⁴ The flexibility in structuring a coalition allows the central power forming the coalition an opportunity to adjust to the existing conditions and not be tied to lesser states. These military definitions are similar to and complement Walt’s definition of alliances. Recall that Walt (1987) defines an alliance as a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states. This similarity allows Walt’s argument for alliance formation to be applied to coalition formation. It was Walt (1998:29) who also argued that IR comprises - one world, but many theories.

But why focus on Walt’s argument as opposed to any other? After careful review of the IR literature on alliance and coalition formation, the following reasons explain why his argument provides the best opportunity to illustrate U.S. strategies in coalition formation. First, Walt published his theory of “balance of threat” in 1987 – just three years before the start of Operation Desert Shield, the beginning of the First Gulf War. This is important since the findings of his argument should reinforce the data from the Gulf coalition. I expect to find that Walt is correct – that traditional allies play a larger role and that both aid and rhetoric play subordinate roles in determining how states chose their allies in the First Gulf War. John Duffield (1992) agrees with Walt’s balance of threat theory to help explain why the First Gulf War coalition arrayed against Iraq. Duffield (1992:826) states that “the more hostile an adversary appears, the greater will seem the possibility of aggression and the greater allied military preparations are likely to be.” This will allow a contrast with the more reluctant coalition for the Second Gulf

⁴ Ibid.

War. Here I expect to find that traditional allies played a lesser role, but that aid and rhetoric played the dominate role in determining how the U.S. secured their allies. Duffield (1992:826) states that “if adversary intentions are viewed as relatively benign, military preparations are likely to slacken and force levels to decline, since there is no perceived immediate need to balance fully the adversary’s military power.” What Duffield and Walt argue is that threat matters. Not only is it important that a threat exists, but the type of threat also is important. The biggest threat at the beginning of the twenty-first century is terrorism. The attacks on the United States prompted America to declare a “war on terror.” The war on terror, however, is not just America’s fight. Many states, including the U.K. and Russia, have been battling terrorists for many years prior to the 2001 attacks on the United States, but it was that event that clearly demarcated a new era in the fight against terrorism. Organizations pursuing global goals and causes, networking with organized crime, drug trafficking, state sponsors, and others sympathetic to their cause threaten international peace and prosperity. Martin Shaw (2003:7) writes that the “war on terrorism signifies an attempt to divide the world between an ambitious new coalition of all major states and civil society, against the terrorists and the few rogue states and movements that defend them.” Yet, just as Alexander Wendt posits in his famous 1992 *International Organization* article, “Anarchy Is What States Make of It,” the same idea can also hold that terrorism is what states make of it. The way one reacts to anarchy and terrorism is a self-imposed behavior. Obviously, all terrorists are not the same and they do not all hold the same goals and objectives. This might explain why so many states rejected the U.S. call for a global war on terror. A terrorist to one state could be considered a freedom fighter to another.

As Shaw (2003:11) writes, the use of the “generic term terrorism to cover both al Qaida and more conventional nationalist movements particularly facilitates the broad ideological framework of the war on terrorism and its multiple adaptations to the goals of different state leaders.” Since the end of the Cold War the U.S. has sought to fight along with allies and friends in coalitions of the willing. Walt’s balancing argument and the crucial role the level of threat plays in how states align within a coalition contributed to the U.S. strategies in coalition formation for both Gulf wars. This dissertation will show that U.S. coalition building strategies changed because potential coalition partners did not share the U.S. assessment of the threat.

Another benefit to using Walt’s alliance formation argument is that his definition of an alliance is not as rigid as those often used in other scholarly literature on the same topic. Walt (1987:1) defines an alliance as “a formal or informal relationship of security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.” This definition by Walt (1) assumes some level of commitment and an “exchange of benefits for both parties; severing the relationship or failing to honor the agreement would presumably cost something, even if it were compensated in other ways.” Walt’s definition provides the flexibility to work with coalitions, such as the two Gulf War coalitions, formed within the last 20 years. Other definitions of alliances are much more restrictive. The Correlates of War (COW) Formal Alliance data set seeks to identify each formal alliance between at least two states that fall into the categories of defense pact, neutrality or non-aggression treaty, or entente agreement.⁵ Identifying alliances with formal agreements precludes the types of coalitions that have dominated recent international relations.

⁵ See the Correlates of War website titled, Datasets, <http://www.correlatesofwar.org>, accessed June 2009, for explanations of the COW dataset.

While the coalitions addressed in this proposal are usually approved by a state's legislative body, the lack of a formal signed agreement among states in a coalition would preclude it from being considered an alliance by the COW definition.

Elizabeth Sherwood-Randall (2006:55) considers alliances to be “binding, durable security commitments between two or more nations [and] are the shared recognition of common threats with a pledge to take action to counter them.” The durability portion of this definition is troublesome for such coalitions as the First and Second Gulf Wars. For example, as opposed to such durable alliances as NATO, many states have chosen to join and leave the recent Gulf War coalition over the last seven years. Just as the First Gulf War coalition disbanded once the mission was considered complete, the same will occur eventually to the coalitions for Afghanistan and Iraq. Therefore, a coalition's lack of durability could prevent it from being considered an alliance by Sherwood-Randall.

Leeds et al. (2002:237) adopt the following definition: “alliances are written agreements, signed by official representatives of at least two independent states, that include promises to aid a partner in the event of military conflict, to remain neutral in the event of conflict, to refrain from military conflict with one another, or to consult/cooperate in the event of international crises that create a potential for military conflict.” While this definition is less restrictive than the COW definition, it still is not as useful as the definition provided by Walt. Finally, the U.S. military (2008) defines alliances as “the relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members.”⁶ While this definition is generic enough to include coalitions, this

⁶ See Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, April, 12, 2001 (amended May 30, 2008), <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict>, accessed June 2009.

dissertation will use the Walt definition of an alliance, which is flexible enough to encompass the military coalitions addressed here. A more thorough examination of the theoretical literature on coalitions will be presented in the next chapter.

Much of the IR literature on military coalitions focuses on why states join coalitions. What is lacking and what this dissertation addresses is how the U.S. forms coalitions in the two Gulf wars. This dissertation will explore what strategies and what actions the U.S. employs in creating these coalitions. The existing coalition literature is seriously limited by its inattention to subsystemic causal factors. This dissertation will show that three factors, traditional allies, economic assistance, and rhetoric, provide a better explanation of U.S. strategies in coalition formation.

Realism and Coalitions

Coalitions, much like alliances, are a means to an end for those subscribing to the realist tradition. In a realist world, an international institution is formed and persists only as a tool to maximize states' relative gains. Jae-Jung Suh (2007:5) explains institutional persistence as "when an alliance is allowed to 'stick,' it is because it is seen to be contributing – or at the minimum, neutral – to power balancing and the security of states." This view of realism on alliances can also be extended to coalitions. But realism is not just a single school of thought rather it can be divided into classical realism, neorealism, and neoclassical realism, many with variations that distinguish each from the others. This dissertation and the modification of Walt's (1987) argument in *The Origins of Alliances* are situated in a neoclassical realist camp. By focusing on traditional alliances and allies, economic assistance, and rhetoric, this project moves beyond the role of power politics and embraces domestic dynamics.

States in a realist international system are self-seeking entities searching for power and security. Stability and war are the concerns of a realist approach. The primary goals of this school of thought are to discover ways of enhancing states' security and of promoting stability. The primary assumptions of realism include, but are not limited to: an anarchical international system and the importance of relative gains; the distribution of material power determining relations among states; and the notion that the primary national interest is survival. Realism's strengths can be summarized as a parsimonious theory to help explain how material power determines and achieves the national interest (survival) by accumulating, maintaining, and demonstrating power. Realism's weaknesses are found in its lack of explanatory power regarding balance of power calculations. Realism is often confounded by economic globalization, political democratization, belief systems, and the role of international law and institutions.

As a classical realist, Hans Morgenthau (1985) in *Politics Among Nations* argues that international politics is a natural struggle for power. For Morgenthau this struggle involves more than numerical military superiority, it also involves the struggle for the "minds of men." Morgenthau describes this struggle in terms of propaganda (rhetoric) and economic and technical aid.

In this context, economic and technical aid for underdeveloped areas takes on special importance. For such aid differs from mere propaganda exactly in that it is a deed rather than a promise. Rather than telling other peoples what could be done, or what is being done elsewhere, it makes the promises of propaganda good here and now.⁷

⁷ Morgenthau, Hans. (1985) *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York: Alfred Knopf. 345-346.

The politics among states described by Morgenthau also involve coalitions⁸ that try to transform common interests into common policy/action.

Structural realism is a theory that seeks to explain international outcomes, for example, the likelihood of a great power war, the durability of alliances, or the likelihood of international cooperation. Unlike classical realism, structural realism does not investigate human nature, but is concerned with the structure of the international system. However, structural realism is not a unitary theory and is divided into offensive and defensive realism. Offensive realism is outlined by John Mearsheimer in *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (2001). Mearsheimer argues that the surest way for states to secure their survival is by increasing their power and becoming as strong as possible. Defensive realism theory is exemplified by Kenneth Waltz's balance-of-power theory in *Theory of International Politics* (1979). Waltz and the defensive realists argue that states should avoid trying to maximize power for fear of provoking a balancing of powers against them. Waltz asserts that the fear that others will balance power discourages states from maximizing power. Defensive realists believe that states seek security rather than influence. Consequently, states will expand their interests abroad when they are threatened. Waltz (1979) argues that alliances are intended to balance power and that third parties will generally align with the weaker state against the stronger state. As stated earlier, Walt (1987) modifies Waltz's argument and asserts that third parties will generally align with the weaker state against the stronger state only if the stronger state is perceived by the third party as a threat. The realist literature

⁸ Morgenthau refers to "general alliances" that are temporary in duration and prevalent in wartime, much like coalitions as defined in this dissertation. Once the war objectives have been met, these general alliances (like coalitions) typically dissolve even among traditional allies and friends.

does not concern itself only with balancing power against power or threats. The issue of bandwagoning needs to be addressed.

As opposed to balancing, bandwagoning is when states join the stronger, more powerful (threatening) state. This is usually due to the benefits a state gains in joining the stronger state as opposed to trying to balance against it. Walt (1987) concludes that bandwagoning occurs only under certain conditions because bandwagoning is dangerous. It increases the resources available to a threatening power and requires placing trust in its continued forbearance. Mearsheimer (2001) argues that bandwagoning is almost always a bad idea because it is capitulation to the stronger state by the third party. Schweller (1994:72) argues against “conflating bandwagoning and against assuming that balancing and bandwagoning are designed to achieve the same goal of promoting security.” Schweller departs from the realist framework by arguing that states must balance their own security and non-security interests; when security concerns are less intense, bandwagoning for material gains is rational, and more common than realists realize.⁹ The United States encourages and benefits from bandwagoning when states attempt to meet their security interests (heightened by U.S. fear mongering) and their non-security interests (economic incentives).

Neoclassical realism, exemplified by the work of Gideon Rose (1998) and Fareed Zakaria (1998), focuses on the effect of domestic factors on the foreign policy behavior of a state. Specifically, the scope and ambition of a state’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and by its relative material power capabilities. Neoclassical realism interprets and explains the behavior of an individual

⁹ See response paper by Ben Goodrich, Alliance Formation and International Relations Theory, 2004, http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~goodrich/IRnotes/Week09/Ben_response.pdf, accessed February 2009.

state, for example, its military doctrine force posture, alliance preference, foreign economic policy, or the choice of accommodative versus aggressive diplomacy. By focusing on traditional alliances and allies, economic assistance, and rhetoric, this project moves beyond the role of power politics and embraces domestic dynamics. A realist views military alliances and especially coalitions as either temporary security arrangements or as means to ends.

U.S. Coalitions

The literature on U.S.-led coalitions is embedded in the literature on U.S.-led alliances. These coalitions with their *ad hoc* arrangements, while common in the post-Cold War era, are not restricted to that timeframe. U.S.-led coalitions formed to deal with regional conflicts, such as Korea, Vietnam, and Grenada, were all in the Cold War era. These coalitions existed during a time of bipolarity in the international system. All three coalitions were attempts to check communism abroad and challenge perceived threats to U.S. interests. While the scope of and commitment to these coalitions varied widely, there is no doubt that all three coalitions were formed to confront communism. Even the tiny island of Grenada was a victim of the Cold War struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and its staunch ally, Cuba. By overthrowing the government, holding 1,000 U.S. medical students hostage, and declaring martial law, the Marxist-Leninist faction gave the U.S. the excuse they needed for military action. However, the invasion of the island and the rescue mission by U.S. and Caribbean forces cannot compare on any scale to the large coalitions that fought in Korea and Vietnam. These three U.S.-led coalitions during the Cold War, while interesting, will not be addressed here. Instead, concentrating on U.S.-led coalitions in the post-Cold War era provides an opportunity to compare coalitions in a unipolar international environment. Post-Cold

War coalitions are all influenced by the same transformational forces. The end of the Cold War challenged U.S. foreign policy to reevaluate itself and its interaction with the international system. International relations scholars were also challenged to not only explain the end of the Cold War, but also to explain this “new world order.” The various IR theories (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) as they pertain to the end of the Cold War are important. While ontologically different, the scholars all agree that the old order of bipolarity and the security it offered had come to an end.

The two coalitions studied in this dissertation provide similar cases in this post-Cold War era of states which threatened regional neighbors and/or other states outside the region. The key difference between the two coalitions is they fall on either side of the global war on terror. By examining these coalitions, a change in U.S.-led coalition formation will be highlighted. There is a limited amount of IR literature on these U.S.-led coalitions and it is concerned mainly with burden sharing. Who contributes to coalitions? What do they contribute? Why do they contribute? Corbetta and Dixon (2004:5) explore the broader debate of why states act unilaterally or multilaterally and conclude that major powers are substantially more prone to multilateral participation than other states. Other scholars¹⁰ have focused on whether unilateralism or multilateralism is a more appropriate approach to foreign policy. Coalition studies on specific areas or regions have been published by the RAND Corporation.¹¹ For example, Nora Bensahel (2003) of RAND studies U.S. cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union. Bensahel notes the predominant tendency of the U.S. to

¹⁰ See Keohane and Nye 1985; Urquhart 1986; Gallarotti 1991; Lake 1992; Ruggie 1992; Patrick and Forman 2002.

¹¹ Others researching coalition politics in specific wars include Bennett, Levgold, and Unger 1994, 1997; Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000; Martin and Brawley 2001; Lambeth 2001; Weitsman 2003; Biddle 2005.

prefer bilateral agreements rather than using more formal alliances, such as NATO. Even with its traditional allies, she advocates for the U.S. to work bilaterally on military and intelligence matters and multilaterally (through coalitions) on financial and law enforcement matters. Thomas Marshall et al. (1997:ix) focus on the problems and solutions in future coalition operations by analyzing four aspects of coalition operations: historical and cultural influences, command, technology, and doctrine and training. Steve Yetiv (2004) utilizes an integrated approach to explore U.S. decision-making in the First Gulf War. The five perspectives outlined by Yetiv are the rational actor model, cognitive approach, domestic politics, groupthink, and government politics model. He concludes that with the exception of the government politics model, each of these perspectives holds explanatory power. The U.S. post-Cold War era coalition strategy has focused on retaining the flexibility of coalitions by dominating the decision-making process, but also by making overtures to allies and friends in order to fight with those with similar training and technology. This strategy has been implemented with traditional allies, foreign assistance, and U.S. senior leader rhetoric, all of which will be explored next.

Traditional Alliances and Allies

According to Henry Kissinger (1969:65): alliances, to be effective, must meet four conditions: (1) a common objective – usually defense against a common danger; (2) a degree of joint policy at least sufficient to define the *casus belli*; (3) some technical means of cooperation in case common action is decided upon; and (4) a penalty for noncooperation – that is, the possibility of being refused assistance must exist – otherwise protection will be taken for granted and the mutuality of obligation will break down. These conditions can also apply to how today's coalition are formed. As

previously discussed, past coalitions, such as the Korean and Vietnam wars, have been analyzed as if they were alliances, but there are real distinctions between alliances and coalitions. The level of formality and longevity for a coalition is much less and shorter, respectively. In addition, while coalitions are more voluntary in nature, these four general conditions for alliances as outlined by Kissinger, can also be applied to coalitions. The U.S. goes to great lengths to build coalitions that will support its foreign policy initiatives. Meeting all four of these conditions adds the necessary legitimacy when building a coalition. It will be shown that all these conditions were pursued, with varying success, in the two Gulf War coalitions. In the First Gulf War, the common objective was the ouster of Iraq from Kuwait's territorial boundaries. Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait and his threats to Saudi Arabian oilfields were seen as a common danger to not only the immediate countries involved, but to regional neighbors and beyond. Certainly, the U.S. was deeply concerned about the annexation of territory that could seriously affect its national interest and undermine the free flow of oil from the Middle East. The second condition was met when the U.N., soon after the Iraqi invasion, passed U.N. Resolution 660, which condemned the invasion and demanded the withdrawal of Iraqi troops. This was soon followed by U.N. Resolution 661, which placed economic sanctions on Iraq. But it was U.N. Resolution 678 that defined the *casus belli*. This resolution gave Iraq a deadline of January 15, 1991, to withdraw from Kuwait and authorized the use of force to enforce U.N. Resolution 660. A coalition was formed that started with Operation Desert Shield as the U.S. and other forces rushed to the region to defend Saudi Arabia. This met the third condition of a successful coalition, which gave it common purpose prior to conflict. Operation Desert Storm was

implemented as hostilities against Iraq commenced, first with a devastating air war followed by a ground war. The coalition for the First Gulf War was dominated by the U.S. and augmented by Arab states and more traditional U.S. allies. Other states, however, did not participate or participated only minimally. Their noncompliance and the U.S. reaction met the final condition of a coalition.

Compared to the First Gulf War, in the Second Gulf War the common objective was much less clear. The al Qaeda attacks on the U.S. in 2001 pushed the topic of terrorism as a national security concern to the fore. Certainly prior to 2001, other national security issues had a higher priority. According to the National Security Strategy (2000:8), “the elements of engagement - adapting alliances; encouraging the reorientation of other states, including former adversaries; encouraging democratization, open markets, free trade, and sustainable development; preventing conflict; countering potential regional aggressors; confronting new threats; and steering international peace and stability operations - define the Nation's blueprint for a strategy of engagement.”¹² Terrorism is mentioned when outlining a strategy for the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The common objective(s) provided for the 2003 coalition included ending the brutal reign of Saddam Hussein, the possibility that Iraq possessed WMDs, and the possibility that Iraq was supplying terrorist groups with these WMDs. Among the traditional allies, agreement on this common objective was mixed at best.

The second condition of a joint policy, to define the offensive operations, also encountered problems. Although attempts were made to follow the blueprint of the First Gulf War, those attempts fell short. Despite working toward a U.N. Security Council

¹² See Air War College website for The National Security Strategy titled, A National Security Strategy for a Global Age, December 2000, released in January 2001, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nss/nss_dec2000_contents.htm, accessed July 2009.

Resolution similar to Resolution 678, the best the U.S. could obtain was UNSC Resolution 1441 (2002). This document declared Iraq in material breach of its obligations, provided Iraq an opportunity to comply with previous U.N. demands, outlined required cooperation with U.N. weapons inspectors, and warned Iraq that “it will face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations.”¹³ The lack of further U.N. resolutions outlining the use of force against Iraq was a major stumbling block in the attempt to convince traditional U.S. allies to join the coalition. The third and fourth conditions were also pursued, but with limited success. The aspect of actually fighting the Second Gulf War was accomplished primarily by a small number of coalition states with the majority of states contributing troops for support, rather than combat duties. The lack of unified effort was due partly to a gap in warfighting capability among coalition members and partly to political restraints on coalition-deployed troops. Non-cooperation on the part of U.S. traditional and nontraditional allies was a contentious issue for the coalition. U.S. relations with those non-cooperating states were strained, and many of those repercussions are still being felt at present.

The persistence of international alliances is a topic in IR scholarship because of the many doubts that such a framework would survive the post-Cold War era. Many of today’s military alliances persist because they have remained flexible and have adapted to changing geopolitical conditions. Jae-Jung Suh (2007:1) explains that alliances persist “despite changes in the circumstances that gave rise to them...thus calling into question both the internal consistency of the alliance’s conceptual structure and the historical consistency of that structure over the alliance’s lifespan.” But what does this

¹³ See United Nations website titled, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1441, November 8, 2002, www.un.org/Docs/scres/2002/sc2002.htm, accessed August 2009.

mean for the role that alliances and traditional allies play in the formation of international coalitions? Is a coalition just alliance-lite? Comparisons of coalition formation in the two Gulf wars make a compelling case that the role of alliances and traditional allies are changing.

The U.S. has collective defense treaties that date to the Cold War era with states mostly in Europe, the Pacific, and South America.¹⁴ The most recent Gulf War, however, relied on states not considered traditional allies or on states not members of traditional alliances. Post-communist states from Eastern Europe and Central Asia provided troop contributions in Iraq, while more traditional allies, such as Germany and France, did not. Whether the U.S. continues to rely on its traditional allies or opt to form coalitions with more non-traditional allies will be a continuing U.S. foreign policy question. Richard Haass (2009:102) argues that “[I] am not attracted to calls for a caucus or coalition of democracies; in many cases, we will need to work with nondemocratic governments if we are to succeed in stemming proliferation, thwarting terrorism, promoting trade, or slowing climate change.” While the IR scholarship on the role of traditional alliances and allies in coalition building is limited, the same cannot be said for the role of foreign assistance. The next section outlines the IR scholarship on economic assistance as a foreign policy tool.

Foreign Assistance

United States foreign assistance (financial, military, technological, among others) around the world has never been more important. For example, in fiscal year (FY) 2008, the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development

¹⁴ These collective defense treaties include: NATO, ANZUS, U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, U.S.-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty, U.S.-Korea Mutual Defense Treaty, and the Rio Treaty. These treaties are discussed further in Chapter 3.

(USAID) foreign assistance request was \$20.3 billion, a \$2.2 billion, or 12 percent, increase over FY 2006 enacted levels (House Foreign Affairs Committee Testimony, March 8, 2007). Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, U.S. foreign assistance has played a role in many developing states, especially in Southeast Europe and Central Asia. While the U.S. foreign assistance budget is large, the annual amount is still less than the cost of two months in Iraq. The focus of U.S. foreign assistance is due not so much to the altruistic nature of the United States, but to the strategic location of recipient states to conflicts crucial to U.S. national interests. The current conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, both centers of gravity in the war on terror, provide the U.S. the challenge of sustaining these operations over a long distance. The obvious need for bases of operations, logistic centers, and other areas of operations in the region is not lost on the U.S. or the countries in the region. To this end, this dissertation is concerned with exploring the influence of economic factors in the creation, maintenance, and strengthening of military coalitions.

To what degree has the U.S. used foreign assistance to create military coalitions? The history of U.S. foreign assistance can be broken down into four stages. The first stage was the Marshall Plan, which operated from 1948 to 1951. During this period, Aurelis Morgner (1967:65) argues, “the United States was concerned solely with checking the spread of communism in the developed countries of Western Europe by aiding Europeans to restore their prewar levels of productivity.” The second stage of aid as defined by Morgner (66) involved shifting “from aid for reconstruction to aid for development to buttress our military support.” The third phase of aid began with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which was created by the Foreign

Assistance Act of 1961. This foreign aid was designed to address problems of the emerging African nations, the rise of Castro to power in Cuba, and the demands of the other Latin American states. The fourth stage of foreign aid is related to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the newly independent states that emerged from it. Foreign aid for this region, also known as Eurasia, amounted to over \$15 billion from 1961-2001.¹⁵ A case could be made that the U.S. has entered a new era of foreign assistance in which a fifth stage of aid exists that is related to fighting terrorism.

Although few would deny the connection between aid and influence, there is very little agreement on the precise nature of this connection or on which analytical methods should be used to study the problem. This lack of agreement provides an opportunity to explore the influence of aid on foreign troop support in military coalitions. The literature on the topic of the influence of foreign assistance is divided into three conflicting views. First, there are those who believe economic influence is idealistic rhetoric. As noted by a USAID administrator, it is “absolutely false that the foreign aid program can and should win friends for the United States and increase our bargaining power in the United Nations and other international forums” (Huntington 1970:169). The politics of foreign aid is part of the body of literature that focuses on how Congress and the American people view such aid. The lack of the usual interest group constituency, as other federal budget items have, makes foreign aid an easy target. William Morrow (1968:986) contends that “when events in areas which have received assistance are

¹⁵ See Defense Department website titled, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) FY2008 Global War On Terror Request, 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/fy2007_supplemental/FY2008_Global_War_On_Terror_Request/pdfs/operation/12_%20DSCA_Supp_OP-5.pdf, accessed September 2009.

judged unfavorable, the theory underlying the entire program is often questioned – opponents in Congress reiterate again and again that you cannot buy friends.”

Samuel Huntington (1970:170) states that other scholars are more pragmatic and believe assistance, in fact, provides influence and involves “granting of economic assistance to a government which may or may not be very friendly to the U.S. in return for that government giving us something which we want, e.g., base rights, a U.N. vote, troops in Vietnam, the rejection of aid from another country.” Some, like Morgner (1967), believe influence can be considered a given consequence of foreign assistance. Morgner (65) notes that an aid program “is not something that the United States stumbled into on a purely altruistic basis. The aid program has always been related to the objectives of American foreign policy.” David Baldwin (1969:425) demonstrates that the focus of much of the literature concerns links between particular types of aid and what is often called intervention and the possibility of functional equivalents for aid that do not involve intervention. This line of argument is touched on by Harry Shaw (1983:123) who concludes that U.S. security assistance perpetuates “a costly dependency and jeopardizes U.S. support for countries with more urgent security needs.”

Historically, the size and shape of the U.S. foreign aid program has come under administrative and congressional scrutiny. One example includes the 1963 Clay Committee in which President Kennedy asked retired General Lucius D. Clay to head up a ten man committee to re-examine foreign aid policies. The Committee published a 22-page report to the president and a more detailed report to Congress. Clay's committee offered no bold new approaches to foreign aid, but they recognized that

foreign aid emphasis has shifted over the years. Jacob Viner et al. (1963:342) offer a pragmatic notion of aid that is espoused by the lone dissenting opinion from the Clay Committee Report: The foreign aid and military assistance programs constitute “insurance against possible vast military expenditures and sacrifices of American lives.” The extensive financial support by the American people of foreign aid activities conducted by private voluntary agencies is proof of their willingness to pay the “cost of this insurance.” Along this same line is Baldwin’s (1969:427) argument, “Given the importance of wealth as a power base, it would be difficult to imagine a foreign aid transaction that did not change the distribution of influence both within and among nations.”

The third view claims that, while foreign aid is the “right thing to do,” it also is in the U.S. national interest. In his 1963 message to Congress on foreign aid funding, President Kennedy concluded, “The richest nation in the world would surely be justified in spending less than one percent of its national income on assistance to its less fortunate sister nations solely as a matter of international responsibility; but inasmuch as these programs are not merely the right thing to do, but clearly in our national self-interest, all criticisms should be placed in that perspective” (Viner et al., 1963:321). A study by Apodaca and Stohl (1999:193) finds that, in determining whether or not a state receives aid, the following factors are all statistically significant: aid received in the past, the economic need of the recipient state, and the political stability of the recipient state. However, in determining the amount of aid distributed to a recipient state, past aid received and military importance of the state to the U.S. are the only significant influences, while recipient state respect for human rights, need, and economic

importance to the U.S. are all deemed insignificant. The literature on foreign assistance does not address the connection to troop or basing support for a military coalition. For example, does the amount of foreign assistance provided by the U.S. to a coalition member depend on the troops or basing provided by a state in a military coalition or does a state's contribution of troops or basing to a U.S.-led military coalition depend on the amount of U.S. foreign assistance received?

The lag time between states receiving U.S. foreign assistance and when states provide troops or basing support is key to the causal arrow. An example of this lag time between a country's contribution of troops for a military alliance and receiving aid is illustrated by Ukraine. The first troops provided by Ukraine for the Operation Iraqi Freedom coalition arrived in Iraq in August 2003. This was at the very end of FY 2003 and any additional boost to the Ukrainian foreign assistance budget would not take effect until the next fiscal year. This is exactly what happened. In FY 2004, Ukraine's total foreign assistance budget rose from \$86.1 million to \$159.3 million.¹⁶ While economics play a role in forming military coalitions, there are other factors that motivate states to join a coalition. Some join from a real or perceived belief that a threat is imminent. Some join even though they do not perceive any threat – these states have other political motives for joining, which might include winning support for their own enemies (foreign and domestic) or simply to pay back another state for past support. These are other factors to keep in mind when studying military coalitions and the changing nature of aid.

¹⁶ See Defense Department website titled, Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) FY2008 Global War On Terror Request, 2008, http://www.defenselink.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2008/fy2007_supplemental/FY2008_Global_War_On_Terror_Request/pdfs/operation/12_%20DSCA_Supp_OP-5.pdf, accessed September 2009.

Foreign assistance has traditionally been justified as the “right thing to do.” For the U.S., this idea is based on the foundations of its Judeo-Christian background where a moral responsibility exists for those better off to help those worse off. Taffett (2007:3) argues that “aid is a way to demonstrate that the country is not simply a powerful nation, but a powerful nation committed to a higher purpose.” The U.S. developed a massive European aid program following World War II, and a similar one for Japan. Soon after these aid programs were put in place, both region’s economic, social, and political conditions improved. This simple cause and effect, while not scientifically verified, is the image of the value of foreign assistance that still persists today. Roger Riddell (1987:3) notes that, since its inception, official development assistance (ODA) has been continuously provided on the grounds of morality, with governments asserting that they have a moral obligation to grant aid and the general public in donor states support official programs on that basis.

After September 11, 2001, however, the view of foreign assistance changed as evidenced by a USAID report (2003:1) that states, “When development and governance fail in a country, the consequences engulf entire regions and leap around the world...they endanger the security and well-being of all Americans.”¹⁷ This view implies that foreign aid is vital to secure domestic peace and reduce the chances of terrorist attacks. The argument to reduce or eliminate global poverty is no longer based on altruistic motives; instead, it is a worthwhile endeavor for national preservation. Jeffrey Taffett (2007:3) suggests that “Americans believe that financially secure people are unlikely to become revolutionaries and that economic stability in the U.S. strengthens

¹⁷ See USAID website titled, *Foreign Assistance in the National Interest: Promoting Freedom, Security, and Opportunity*, 2003, <http://www.usaid.gov/fani>, accessed July 2009.

political stability.” Poverty and ineffective government are precursors of instability and indicators that conflict might emerge that could threaten the United States. By promoting democracy and effective government, economic development would be more likely to occur. Prosperity would then strengthen democracy. The elimination of poverty would mean the elimination of instability that can lead to terrorism.

Robert Zimmerman (1993:13) argues that U.S. foreign policy objectives and interests include the physical security of the U.S., the political security and cooperation with strategically important states, and the promotion of economic security and growth. U.S. foreign economic aid can advance at least two of these foreign policy objectives: promotion of political security and economic growth. Zimmerman (37) concludes that while U.S. foreign assistance may help modernize infrastructure or transfer some technology, its primary purpose is to demonstrate a quick “payoff” for cooperation with the United States toward a given security objective, “in the cause of peace” or any such related political objective.” Table A-9 in Appendix A lists the largest recipients of U.S. military and economic aid since World War II and provides strong evidence of U.S. motives regarding aid. Major recipients include Israel and other Middle Eastern states, such as Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Turkey, along with the Philippines (former U.S. possession), and the Asian states of Vietnam, South Korea, and Taiwan among others. Missing from this list are sub-Saharan African states that could benefit from robust U.S. aid. What this table confirms is that U.S. aid is not provided for the development of a society or state since most of the neediest states are not included. Instead, U.S. aid is provided as a diplomatic tool to persuade a state to behave in favor of U.S. national interests.

This view of foreign aid as a vital link to secure domestic peace and reduce the chances of a terrorist attack is similar to the ideas of Walt Rostow's (1959) five stages of economic growth which were the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass-consumption. This modernization theory emphasized the instrument of foreign aid and helped to focus U.S. foreign assistance programs, especially during Kennedy's term. Kimber Pearce (2001:26) argues the Kennedy administration was confronted with the task of selling the foreign aid package as an anti-Castro, anticommunist initiative at home, while at the same time working to excite Latin Americans with images of economic progress and "peaceful revolution" abroad. Roger Riddell (1987:87) also contends that Rostow can be seen as the bridge between the politics and economics of aid, for his economic reasoning was clearly placed within a specific political ideology. It is not just U.S. aid that bridges with politics, the nature of U.S. rhetoric also bridges with politics.

Rhetoric

Evan Cornog (2004:5) reminds us that the essence of presidential power is the power to persuade and that "rhetoric is the art of persuasion, and stories are the vessels to persuade." This dissertation not only utilizes presidential speeches and remarks but also those of secretaries of State and Defense, as rhetorical devices. All three office's have a level of legitimacy and authority that allows the office-holder's words to carry weight with foreign leaders. It will be argued in Chapter 5 that U.S. strategies in coalition building employ U.S. senior leader negative rhetoric as one factor of persuasion. This theme of using rhetoric to foster and further foreign policy goals is touched upon in IR literature. Hans Morgenthau (1985:154) argues that a state "must gain the support of the public opinion of other states for its foreign and domestic

policies.” This is accomplished not only with diplomatic and military instruments of power, but also with the use of rhetoric to dominate what Morgenthau claims is the struggle for the minds of men. The key to winning this struggle lies in Morgenthau’s (346) caution that “political warfare is but the reflection, in the realm of ideas, of the political and military policies it seeks to support.” In other words, to be successful, the political and military policies and strategies have to lead to victory.

Other scholars, such as Martin Medhurst et al. (1990:169) view rhetoric as part of U.S. foreign policy in terms of “treating the other side as the enemy, the conflict as irreconcilable, and the struggle as a Holy War.” This was the rhetoric during the Cold War of U.S.-led coalitions in Korea and Vietnam. However, such IR scholars as Reinhold Niebuhr (1967) argue that Vietnam should be understood as a matter of imperial politics (U.S. imperialism) and not a holy war between two powerful ideologies (democracy and communism). Niebuhr (55) explained why the Vietnam rhetoric was problematic as follows:

The average voter knows little and cares less about these imperial responsibilities, such as assuring the safety of the non-Communist nations on the fringes of Asia, but is moved only by appeals to our democratic idealism, which usually is formed by static anti-Communism. Our engagement in Vietnam has consequently forced the administration to create a series of obvious fictions or myths calculated to obscure the hiatus between our idealism and our hegemonic responsibilities.

However, it was the success of anticommunism rhetoric that Justin Lewis (2001:142) describes as the “selling of the Cold War [that] rested upon decades of ideological work that portrayed communism of any kind as a creed so repressive and so threatening that almost every act of U.S. aggression was justified in its name.” This same use of rhetoric in U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War era is applicable to the two Gulf wars and the global war on terror.

The terrorist attack on the United States in 2001 was a critical juncture in how the U.S. forms military coalitions for a war on terror. Much like the fear-mongering rhetoric during the Cold War, the U.S. used fear of an “other” to justify its foreign policy. The war on terror also allows the U.S. to globalize that fear. Prior to the war on terror, demonizing a particular state or set of states, national leader or leaders, and ideologies allowed the U.S. to rally its populace and allies toward a particular goal. Examples from the past 100 years abound. The U.S. government coerced the U.S. populace into a war with Spain after the sinking of the USS Maine in the Havana Harbor. Calls of “Remember the Maine” fueled the U.S. public demand for war. The defeat of Spain in 1898, which led to the acquisition of Cuba, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and Guam, was the first step in the process that allowed the U.S. to think of itself as an international power. The entry of the U.S. into World War I brought the U.S. more prestige. Much like the Spanish-American War, the U.S. entry into World War I was prompted by the sinking of a ship. Germany’s decision to wage unrestricted submarine warfare led to the sinking of the RMS Lusitania, which was carrying U.S. citizens. The outrage in the U.S. pushed the U.S. to join the war. While the 1920s and 1930s were years when the U.S. pulled back from playing on the international stage, that all ended with the entry of the U.S. into World War II. Ironically, the ship pattern continues as the U.S. enters World War II because of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which resulted in the sinking of numerous warships and the death of thousands of U.S. personnel. The defeat of Germany and Japan and possession of nuclear weapons moved the U.S. into the forefront of international relations. The rise of the Soviet Union and the ensuing Cold War challenged U.S. hegemony, however, during this time, the U.S. continued to

oppose communism worldwide with conflicts in Korea and Vietnam. The fear of worldwide communist expansion and especially the fear of a communist takeover of the U.S. led to the “red scare” also known as McCarthyism. These fears, both domestically and internationally, prompted the initial U.S. forays into two wars in Asia.

The end of the Cold War was a time for reevaluation of U.S. foreign policy. Without the Soviet Union to play the role of adversary, a new “enemy” emerged to claim that title. In the First Gulf War, this role was assumed by Saddam Hussein, who was demonized by President George H.W. Bush and others as a “Hitler” and “dictator” whose use of chemical “weapons” against his neighbors and his own people to instill “terror” proved his “aggression.” This ongoing search for a new focus for such alliances as NATO was found in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. In the days following the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon in Washington, and the purpose-driven plane crash in rural Pennsylvania, a military coalition began to form with one common goal – to eradicate terrorism and those who perpetuate it on a global scale. The war on terror began. So what is different about the way threats are used to induce fear in others, especially in U.S.-led coalitions? The notion of security before the end of the Cold War was based on a classical realist approach. Michael Sheehan (2005) describes this type of security as being fixed, or as military versus the military power of other states. New concepts of security have been introduced that explain the focus on unorthodox approaches to security. Helle Palu (2007:3) argues that the global war on terror adds a new urgency to the “rethinking security” debate for it is even more difficult than searching for security by orthodox military means, to think or define security in terms of power and violence. Communism was portrayed as a global threat

and the new threats of the global war on terror that emerged allowed the Bush administration to be unorthodox in its thinking about security. Instead of framing the threat as one state or one particular leader, as was done for the First Gulf War, the U.S. framed the threat for the Afghanistan and Second Gulf War coalitions as a global entity that could strike anyone, anywhere. This new threat was “Islamic terrorism” and included a web of organizations, including al Qaeda. Frank Gadinger (2006:1-2) argues this point and shows how the U.S. struggled with a lost identity after the Cold War, but reframed the threat after the 9/11 attacks using a new security rhetoric of fear mongering. Gadinger believes this now stabilized U.S. identity has become “so powerful and uncontrollable that a foreign policy change in the light of the Iraq disaster might only be possible at the price of a new U.S. identity crisis.” Whether the current Iraq coalition has soured possible future coalitions is a topic for IR scholarship to embrace and explore. One thing is certain, relations of states within unipolarity are unique and need to be understood. Walt (2009:119) argues that “instead of relying on fixed, multilateral, and highly institutionalized structures that depend on permanent overseas deployments, the United States, as the unipolar power, is likely to rely more heavily on *ad hoc* coalitions, flexible deployments, and bilateral arrangements that maximize its own leverage and freedom of action.” With this in mind, IR scholars need to focus more attention on theories of military coalition separate and apart from alliance literature. The next chapter focuses on traditional allies in the formation of military coalitions.

CHAPTER 3 TRADITIONAL ALLIANCES AND ALLIES

Dealing with the enemy is a simple and straight-forward matter when contrasted with securing close cooperation with an ally

- Major General Fox Connor on World War I¹

I was about ready to agree with Napoleon's conclusion that it is better to fight allies than to be one of them

- Lieutenant General Mark Clark, 1944²

The post-Cold War era places the United States (U.S.) in a unique position in international relations. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the U.S. is left with no immediate peer competitor. Despite this, in the post-Cold War era, the U.S. continues to work with coalition partners as exemplified by the First Gulf War onward. The lack of U.S. unilateral military action does not seem logical based on the two quotes above that reflect the historical U.S. experience with coalition partners from the First and Second World Wars. Why continue to work with allies even though the benefits are sometimes overshadowed by the liabilities? The preponderance of U.S. military power should be a convincing reason to act unilaterally and yet the evidence shows it prefers to work with allies.

This chapter will demonstrate that U.S. traditional allies are crucial to coalition building strategies. Traditional allies are those allies that have historically participated with the U.S. in collective defense alliances. This long-term relationship has engendered trust and common practices that make for willing and capable coalition partners. These coalition partners are familiar with U.S. procedures from participation

¹ Freeman, Waldo, Randall Hess, and Manuel Faria. (1992) The Challenges of Combined Operations. *Military Review* 62(11): 4.

² Silkett, Wayne. (1993) Alliance and Coalition Warfare. *Parameters* Summer. 74.

with the U.S. in other coalition operations. This familiarity allows the coalition partner to operate with the U.S. in most, if not all, environments and situations. Besides the capability these coalition partners bring to the operation, traditional allies are usually loyal states that have previously answered the call to join a U.S.-led coalition. Finally, traditional allies are crucial to U.S. coalitions because they provide legitimacy to the operation. This chapter will distinguish between traditional and non-traditional allies and examine whether these traditional allies are part of U.S. strategies for the two Gulf wars. Which states does the U.S. pursue in forming the Gulf War coalitions? Who pursues them and how are they pursued? This chapter also takes into account the strategic environment, specifically the U.S. experience in coalition building in the 1990s. What did the U.S. learn about coalition building in the breakup of Yugoslavia? This chapter supports the thesis that the U.S. coalition building strategy in the First Gulf War emphasized traditional allies and was deemphasized in the Second Gulf War. But why should the U.S. even pursue coalition partners?

The U.S. faces a dilemma because it is a dominant military power. As John Becker (1993:25) notes, “the U.S. is the only international power currently capable of projecting, and sustaining, large-scale military forces in any theater of the world.” While this is true, being dominant does not make the U.S. omnipresent. The U.S. military cannot be and do everything everywhere around the globe. Becker (1993) summarizes this dilemma and finds the U.S. incapable of unilaterally using its dominant military force and acknowledges there are strong political and economic reasons why the U.S. can no longer act alone as the “world’s policeman.” But there are other reasons why working with allies in coalition operations is a smart choice. One reason is trust, another is

loyalty, while still another involves allies sharing common interests. These and other attributes of a traditional ally will be explored.

The U.S. tactic relies upon traditional allies to build a military coalition to take advantage of existing institutional commitments; existing institutional procedures, relationships, and joint training experience; common interests, worldviews, and norms; trust and loyalty; and “special” historic connections. In general, focusing on traditional allies, a state hopes to avoid or at least minimize those points of friction that historically affect coalitions. States with institutional commitments (political, economic, or military) to each other have common operating principles already established that make coalition building easier. Marshall et al. (1997:18) identify “organizations which have the ability to develop and coordinate such agreements on common principles include NATO [and] the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).” Institutional procedures, relationships, and training are what hold a military force together. When combining different militaries within a coalition, having equivalent capabilities within these areas limits points of friction. Traditional allies, especially NATO allies, possess the advantage of common goals, logistics, and capabilities.

Cultural differences (religion, class, tolerance, work ethic, and national traditions) could hamper an international coalition. These differences can be minimized within a coalition by focusing on traditional allies. A level of understanding and cultural tolerance exists among these states that enhance cooperative efforts. Marshall et al. (1997:11) argue that “the more personnel available who are experienced in the cultures of various coalition partners, the smoother the operations of the coalition are likely to be.” This same argument applies to the trust and loyalty among traditional allies. Trust and

loyalty are precious commodities in international relations with every state concerned about its national interests. Yet, traditional allies provide each other with trust and loyalty through their “special” historical connections. Some Western European states, especially the United Kingdom, and the U.S. have such a connection. This connection has been strained, however, by the post-Cold War era wars and conflicts. The years since the 9/11 terrorist attacks have strained this European-U.S. connection, which will become evident later in this chapter as the role of traditional allies is analyzed in both Gulf wars.

Much like the democratic peace theory, traditional allies are assumed to be immune to conflict with one another, while at the same time being ideal partners for coalitions. There are two main parts to the democratic peace theory. First, democracies do not fight other democracies (or only do so rarely, according to some authors³), and second, democracies have the least foreign and domestic violence. Russett and O’Neal (2001:10) expand on this theory by building on “Immanuel Kant’s three-cornered intellectual construct of the structure of a peaceful world, which he believed was dependent on democracy, economic interdependence, and international law and institutions.” Michael Mandelbaum (2005:294) argues this point in which the broad allegiance to peace, democracy, and free markets affects the international community so that disputes within the community do not lead to armed conflict. The role of traditional alliances and allies in coalition operations is analyzed in much the same way. Any state, especially the U.S., would prefer to fight alongside those states it

³ See Siverson and Emmons (1991), Barnett and Levy (1991), Siverson and Starr (1991), Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman (1992), and Maoz and Siverson (2008) as examples of those who test the impact of democracy on alliance choices.

can trust the most. The case is often made that the U.S. and U.K. have an alliance because they are both liberal democracies (Simon and Gartzke 1996). The validity of the democratic peace theory will not be debated here, but the premise of trust applies to traditional allies and must be acknowledged if we are to look at how U.S. strategies in coalition building utilize traditional allies in the post-Cold War era. Walt (2009:117) argues that “in assembling these coalitions – which are needed less for the capabilities they produce than for the appearance of legitimacy they convey – the unipole will naturally prefer to include states it believes will be especially loyal or compliant.” But what makes one state an ally, while another state not identified as an ally is also not considered an enemy? What makes the United Kingdom a stalwart ally to the U.S., while a state like Norway is not? The answer resides in the definition of what makes an ally an ally. Russett and ONeal (2001:103) note that allies do not usually fight or threaten one another with military action and, because they are allies, they share common strategic and security interests. Dan Reiter (1994:490) acknowledges that “alliances are central to international relations: they are the primary foreign policy means by which states increase their security, and they are crucial determinants of the outbreak, spread, and outcome of wars.” These security interests are what make any state an ally and these arrangements are documented in treaties that formalize the alliance among allies.

The U.S. Department of State 2009 Treaties in Force⁴ (TIF) is a list of treaties and other international agreements of the United States in force. This particular listing

⁴ United States Department of State, *Treaties in Force* (TIF) as of January 1, 2009 (Washington, DC: Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Dept. of State, 1950). This annual publication lists and very briefly summarizes all US treaties and agreements still in force, arranged by country and subject. Includes both bilateral and multilateral treaties. The primary use of TIF is verification of the existence of a treaty.

contains thousands of bilateral and multilateral treaties signed by the United States. The TIF (2009:i) uses the term “treaty” in the generic sense as defined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, that is, an international agreement “governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.” Using this broad definition of a treaty to explore coalition formation will not be very useful since the U.S. has some type of treaty with almost every state in the world. Just because the U.S. has a treaty with another state does not mean that state is an ally of the United States. Rather, it just means the U.S. has a common interest on a particular item with that state. Therefore, some other criteria will be needed to help determine who is an ally. Since this paper is concerned with military coalitions, the logical solution is to look at collective defense treaties because it is with these states the U.S. either will work together to avoid conflict or, if necessary, fight alongside on the battlefield. While other treaties are concerned with diplomatic and/or economic issues, collective defense treaties involve committing a state’s “blood and treasure.” Coalition partners are then determined by the willingness of a state to commit troops for collective security. Table A-1 in Appendix A summarizes the historical U.S. collective defense treaties with other states. In whole or in part, some of these treaties are no longer in force. For example, the Rio Treaty, originally signed in 1947, includes Cuba. Obviously, the U.S. currently does not have a defense obligation with Cuba, although many of the other states from Central and South America listed in the treaty remain tied to the United States. As an example of these coalition defense treaties in action, “on September the 14th (2001), just three days after the terrorist attacks, Australia invoked the ANZUS treaty’s mutual defense provisions.”⁵

⁵ See The Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents website titled, The President’s New Conference

States enter into these formal alliances for collective security, as a way to balance the power within the international relations of states, and to further their own self-interests. Alan Sabrosky (1988:2) contends that alliances are an instrument used by states to advance their interests or goals, usually in the area of security or defense. When it comes to gathering allies together to form a coalition, it is important to gather states that have a common goal and purpose. Otherwise the coalition could fracture due to diversified interests and agreement could be difficult to reach. This chapter will assess traditional allies in U.S. coalition building strategies for the two case studies of the First and Second Gulf Wars. It will be shown that, for the First Gulf War, such traditional allies as the U.K., France, Turkey, Germany, and Japan played major roles in the U.S. strategy for building an international coalition. This will then be contrasted with the U.S. coalition strategy (traditional allies) for the Second Gulf War. For this second coalition, the U.S. will rely on “new friends” from Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Kissinger (1969:11) argues that an intense and direct threat is normally required to produce a timely, united response, while lack of agreement on the threat weakens a coalition. This is evident in the wide support for U.S. efforts against Iraq after the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the world-wide support for U.S. efforts to overthrow the Taliban government in Afghanistan in 2001. Yet that same level of agreement was absent from U.S. efforts against Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003, because there was a definite lack of agreement on the threat and coalition goals for the Second Gulf War.

with Prime Minister John Howard of Australia in Crawford, Texas, May 3, 2003, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2003-book1/pdf/PPP-2003-book1-doc-pg421.pdf>, accessed September 2009.

The next section will explore U.S. employment of strategies of traditional allies to build coalitions.

First Gulf War

The events that unfolded in 1990 that led to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait are well known and documented by many scholars (Summers 1995, Gay 1996, Head and Tilford 1996, Bennett et al. 1997, Mohamedou 1998). A full accounting of those events, their implications, and various permutations will not be elaborated here. It is important, however, to note that Iraq's aggression toward its Gulf neighbors has a long history and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was not the random act of a madman. Jasem Karam (2005:1) explains that Iraq's "first real claim (on Kuwait) was made by King Ghazi in 1937, the next was by President Abdul Kareem Qasim in 1961, and the final claim was made by Saddam Hussein, when he invaded Kuwait in 1990." These border disputes initially involved claims of access to the Persian Gulf and later claims on oil fields. The August 2, 1990, invasion of Kuwait was preceded by a period of hostile Iraqi rhetoric. Iraq's threats in the Persian Gulf prompted a U.S. Department of State (DOS) cable dated July 24, 1990, to recommend U.S. embassies in the Persian Gulf region to brief host-country governments on the regional threat.⁶ The concern revolved around threats made toward both Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. The DOS cable emphasized that "while we [the U.S.] take no position on the border delineation issue raised by Iraq with respect to Kuwait, or on other bilateral disputes, Iraqi statements suggest an intention to resolve outstanding disagreements by the use of force, an approach which

⁶ Department of State cable titled, U.S. Reaction to Iraqi threats in Gulf, July 24, 1990, ID # CF01937-003, WHORM: Subject File, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

is contrary to U.N. charter principles.”⁷ This U.S. concern about threats of violence in the Persian Gulf has a long history. United States policy toward the Persian Gulf has traditionally focused on regional stability and emphasized the free flow of oil. The concern by the U.S. for regional stability increased with the British withdrawal from the region forty years ago. J.C. Hurewitz (1972:106) notes that “when the British government in January 1968 announced that it would withdraw from the Persian Gulf before the end of 1971, American security planners on the Middle East became uneasy.” This uneasiness manifested itself into numerous requests by the president of the United States to direct national security studies in 1969, 1973, 1976, and 1982.⁸ The common element among all these National Security Council memoranda is the examination of U.S. political and strategic goals in the Persian Gulf. The purpose of these national security studies was to develop policy alternatives with particular emphasis on Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. United States involvement in the Persian Gulf increased in the 1980s in response to increased Iranian attacks on neutral shipping and threats to the Gulf states. In 1984 President Ronald Reagan approved political and military consultations with U.S. allies and the Gulf states on security cooperation to respond to these threats. In April 1987, President Reagan authorized U.S. naval protection for Kuwaiti tankers under the U.S. flag, which required a major augmentation of U.S. naval forces in the Gulf and North Arabian Sea. Finally, with the August 1988 Iran/Iraq ceasefire in effect, the U.S. government began a gradual

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ National Security Memorandums 66 (July 12, 1969), 181 (May 10, 1973), 238 (February 13, 1976), and National Security Study Directive 4-82 (March 19, 1982). ID numbers CF01937-006 and CF01937-003. WHORM: Subject File, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

reduction of U.S. forces in the Gulf, in consultation with European allies and the Gulf states.

Based on this historical concern for the region, the United States assessment of the Persian Gulf in the July 24, 1990, DOS cable is certainly justified. Whether the U.S. should have taken a more proactive stance concerning the border disputes is certainly debatable, but this stance is consistent with the role the U.S. historically has taken in the Persian Gulf. U.S. security relations with states in the region range from strong (Saudi Arabia) to non-existent (Iran). In fact, the United States has no legally binding commitment to provide U.S. forces to defend any state in the Gulf region, although a previously classified Department of Defense (DOD) paper, titled “U.S. Security Relations, Commitments, and Interests in the Persian Gulf” dated July 24, 1990, claims that “repeated public and private statements by a succession of Presidents, are viewed by the states in the region as de facto commitments of U.S. support.”⁹ For example, in 1957, Congress passed a joint resolution, known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, declaring a vital U.S. national interest in the independence and integrity of the states of the Middle East.¹⁰ This doctrine was reiterated by presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. In January 1980, the Persian Gulf region was placed under a more specific U.S. security umbrella by the Carter Doctrine, which stated that “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any

⁹ Department of Defense paper titled, “US Security Relations, Commitments, and Interests in the Persian Gulf” July 24, 1990. ID #CF01937-004. WHORM: Subject File, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

¹⁰ Fordham University website titled, The Eisenhower Doctrine on the Middle East, A Message to Congress, <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1957eisenhowerdoctrine.html>, accessed June 2009.

means necessary, including military force.”¹¹ In this instance, the outside force referred to the Soviet Union. Similarly, President Reagan in 1984 and 1985 stated that the U.S. would take whatever measures were necessary to prevent interference with freedom of navigation in the Gulf (Richman 1987). In addition, a number of presidential letters have been sent to Gulf rulers over the years expressing a U.S. interest in the security of the Gulf states generally.¹²

For all of these reasons, it would be contrary to U.S. interests to permit any power, including Iraq, to gain dominance over Gulf oil supplies. Dominance by a single state would enable it to dictate oil prices and production, placing the economies of the U.S. and its allies in an extremely vulnerable position that would become more precarious as Western dependence on Gulf oil continued to grow. Therefore, the United States monitored the Iraq-Kuwait dispute closely. As an example, Figure A-1 in Appendix A depicts a National Security Council-produced timeline of the Iraq-Kuwait events leading up to the August 2, 1990, invasion. However, to monitor a situation and to take steps to prevent it from occurring are not the same. While the U.S. was aware of Iraq’s belligerent rhetoric and movement of forces toward the Kuwaiti border, nothing of consequence was implemented to prevent the eventual invasion. Many within the foreign policy community believed that Iraq was simply using coercive tactics to get Kuwait to the bargaining table. However, as Kendall Stiles (2002:124) describes it, “on August 2, 1990, the Iraqi army, fourth largest in the world, led by more than 4,000 tanks,

¹¹ President Carter Library website titled, President Carter’s State of the Union Address on January 23, 1980, <http://www.jimmycarterlibrary.gov/documents/speeches/su80jec.phtml>, accessed June 2009.

¹² Department of Defense paper titled, “U.S. Security Relations, Commitments, and Interests in the Persian Gulf” July 24, 1990. ID #CF01937-004. WHORM: Subject File, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

poured across the Kuwait border to overrun a nation roughly the size of Connecticut.” Even though pre-invasion Iraqi military movements were being monitored, the scale and swiftness of the invasion took many by surprise.

Marshall et al. (1997:1) argue the “main reason coalitions have formed has been to overcome a common threat or situation that an individual nation could not face alone...fear often has been the driving force holding a coalition together.” Jeffrey Yaeger (1992:60) contends that the two most critical factors in keeping the First Gulf War coalition and any other coalition together were present: a pronounced threat and a workable framework on which to build the coalition. The serious threat came from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The workable framework came in the form of diplomatic command and control. Freeman et al. (1992:4) argues that it is vital that allies choose a single leader or at least reach an agreement on how operations will be coordinated to achieve a semblance of unity. For the First Gulf War, no single supreme commander existed.¹³ This framework allowed the Arab states to condemn Iraq’s actions, join the coalition, but not be subordinate to the United States. The threat of what Saddam Hussein was doing and might do in the future was powerful glue in building a coalition of states to stand against him.

By the third of August, the seeds of an opposing coalition of states were being planted. The United States led this effort and immediately made contact with Arab and European leaders. A review of President George H.W. Bush’s telephone conversations provides a glimpse into the role that traditional allies had in forming the First Gulf War

¹³ There was a tandem operational command with General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of all U.S. forces, and Saudi Lieutenant General Khalid bin Sultan, commander of all Saudi and Arab forces. All allied forces in the Gulf War were under one or the other headquarters. See Chapter 14 from COL (ret.) Harry Summers’ 1992 book, *On Strategy II: A critical analysis of the Gulf War*. New York: Dell Publishing.

coalition. Carlisle (2003:56) notes that President Bush “went on an August ‘vacation’ to Kennebunkport, Maine, and while there placed more than 60 phone calls to world leaders.” Bush chose his telephone calls very carefully, “talking with Abdul Fahd (Saudi Arabia), Talal Hussein (Jordan), Hosni Mubarak (Egypt), and Ali Saleh (Yemen) in the Arab world” and also speaking to such traditional allies as Margaret Thatcher (U.K.), Francois Mitterand (France), Helmut Kohl (Germany), Turgut Ozal (Turkey), and Toshiki Kaifu (Japan).¹⁴ Also revealing is the order of these telephone calls. Among the Western traditional allies and Middle East friends, Prime Minister Thatcher is the first international leader consulted by President Bush. President Turgut Ozal of Turkey is the second, called at 1:58 pm; Prime Minister Thatcher of the U.K. received a second call at 3:03 pm, then President Mitterand of France at 4:32 pm, Chancellor Kohl of Germany at 6:01 pm, and, finally, Prime Minister Kaifu of Japan at 8 pm.¹⁵ The call to President Ozal is essential, since Turkey is at the crossroads of Europe and the Middle East and an important NATO partner. President Ozal committed to calling King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, President Rafsanjani of Iran, and President Assad of Syria. This interaction by Turkey with Iran and Syria on behalf of the United States proved helpful to the eventual coalition, as Iran remained (relatively) neutral during the crisis, while Syria eventually contributed troops to the coalition. The following day, President Bush phoned President Ozal and confirmed that he had “talked to Margaret Thatcher, Francois Mitterand, and Helmut Kohl [and] all agree with us that Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait and that the [Kuwaiti] Amir should go back...[E]very Western country, and

¹⁴ Memorandum of Conversations dated August 3, 1990 (various times), ID numbers CF01478-027 and CF01478-028. WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

¹⁵ Ibid.

Japan too,...agrees with us.”¹⁶ President Ozal then provided a summary of his conversations with the leaders of Iran, Syria, Egypt, Kuwait, and Jordan. He relayed that “all were in agreement except Jordan [that] Saddam made a mistake...[T]o pay, he should withdraw...[T]here is no compromise solution.”¹⁷ While Jordan’s reluctance to join the U.S.-led coalition stemmed from the belief of Jordan’s King Hussein in an Arab solution to the Gulf crisis and Jordan’s population was bolstered by pro-Iraqi Palestinian refugees who influenced King Hussein’s pro-Iraqi behavior, in fact Jordan’s behavior was more about economics than about being loyal to the Palestinian or Iraqi causes.¹⁸ Bush and Scowcroft (1998:347) argue that Jordan “imported 95 percent of its oil [from Iraq and] was an important channel for Iraq’s imports, about 45 percent of which went through Aqaba,” a Jordanian coastal city. Despite friendly U.S.-Jordan relations and U.S. attempts to accommodate Jordan’s concerns, it refused to join the U.S.-led coalition.

The initial strategy to form an international coalition was discussed at a National Security Council meeting held on August 4. At this meeting, intelligence updates and military options were discussed that outlined an initial two-part plan of deterrence and war fighting. This plan eventually evolved into Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm. The idea for a coalition of the willing was formed in this meeting, as the

¹⁶ Telephone call to President Turgut Ozal of Turkey, August 4, 1990, 4:39 – 5:05 pm, ID# CF01478-026, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ POTUS to King Hussein letter, September, 1990, ID# CF01478-019, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

following conversation between General Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, President Bush, and Richard Haass, Special Assistant to the President, illustrates:¹⁹

General Powell: If we get [a] request from [the] Saudis, it would be wise that there not just be a U.S. flag.

President Bush: It is too much to expect NATO to extend itself.

Richard Haass: But we may be able to do something along the lines of the Korea war model of a U.S.-led multi-national force.

This idea of not fighting alone is a critical part of the U.S. strategy. The U.S. did not wish to be seen as the aggressor or as the hegemon fighting for oil. The inclusion of both traditional (Western) allies and non-traditional (Arab) allies in a coalition was the preferred solution. Freeman et al. (1992:3) notes that from the “[American] Revolution to Operation Desert Storm, the American Army, with few exceptions, has fought its wars with allies, and our track record, though uneven, includes a number of highly successful combined efforts – the Gulf coalition being only the most recent example.”

Table 3-1 lists the 28 troop-contributing members of the First Gulf War coalition separated into traditional allies and non-traditional allies. These states contributed to the First Gulf War coalition in many ways. All 28 states contributed troops, but also contributed diplomatic and economic support. Other allies that did not contribute troops were also part of the coalition, lending their diplomatic and economic support. For example, Turkey provided political support and a strategic operating location for U.S. forces, while Germany provided financial support.

¹⁹ National Security Council meeting, August 4, 1990, 8:00-10:00 am, ID# CF01478-030, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

Table 3-1. Troop-contributing members

Traditional Allies	Non-Traditional Allies
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, United Kingdom	Bahrain, Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Kuwait, Morocco, Niger, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Syria, United Arab Emirates

Discussions among the leaders of the U.S., U.K., France, Turkey, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait centered on what initial steps to take in response to Iraq's invasion. A consensus was reached on three steps as a suitable initial reaction. First, economic sanctions on Iraq would be imposed, but only if they were collective and effective. As Prime Minister Thatcher told to President Bush on August 3, "Tomorrow we will try to persuade our European partners to adopt collective and comprehensive sanctions."²⁰ Second, Iraqi assets would be frozen, and third, military forces (naval) would be moved to the area as a show of force. From the outset, France stood with the U.S. in opposing Iraq's action. President Mitterand argued that "To see Saddam Hussein continue his offensive would be to secure his hegemony over the Arab world."²¹ He went on to assure President Bush that "Our representatives are working together at the Security Council...[and] our representatives will speak in the same manner at the meeting of the twelve members of the European Community."²²

The time between August 2, 1990, and January 16, 1991, is commonly referred to as the diplomatic phase of the First Gulf War. While it is also the time period in which Operation Desert Shield took place, more importantly for the purposes of this paper it is

²⁰ Telephone call to PM Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom, August 3, 1990, 3:03 – 3:10 pm, ID# CF01478-027, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

²¹ Telephone call to President Mitterand of France, August 3, 1990, 4:32-4:57 pm, ID # CF01478-027, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

²² Ibid.

the time in which the U.S. strategy for forming an international coalition was formulated and put into practice. The initial steps taken by the Bush administration to garner support from traditional allies, such as the U.K., France, Germany, Turkey, and Japan, involved continuous communications among these state leaders during the month of August. While Turkey did not contribute troops to the coalition efforts, as noted above the importance of Turkey to the coalition cannot be ignored. At a September 24, 1990, White House background briefing to the press, it was acknowledged that President Ozal of Turkey “Was one of the first international leaders President Bush contacted, and they have been in regular contact ever since...[N]o leader has [had] more frequent contact with President Bush over the last five or six weeks.”²³ These consultations were also important for those non-traditional allies, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, who were the leaders of states with the most to lose if the Iraqi invasion was not reversed. Western support arrayed against Iraq was highlighted by Presidential Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater on August 11, 1990, when he declared, “The United States welcomes the participation of forces from so many countries in our joint efforts to fight the aggression of Saddam Hussein...[M]ilitary participation by Canada, Australia, West Germany, France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom signals a high degree of unity.”²⁴ The initial outlines of this strategy were documented in National Security Directive (NSD) 45, titled “U.S. Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait” and dated

²³ Background briefing by Senior Administration Official, September 24, 1990, ID# CF01478-019, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

²⁴ Weekly compilation of Presidential Documents, Excerpts of a statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the Persian Gulf Crisis, August 11, 1990, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

August 20, 1990. This directive outlined the following four principles that guided U.S. strategy throughout the crisis:

1. The immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait;
2. The restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government to replace the puppet regime installed by Iraq;
3. A commitment to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf; and,
4. The protection of the lives of American citizens abroad.²⁵

Diplomatic, economic, energy, and military measures were outlined in NSD 45. It directs "The Secretary of State to work bilaterally with our allies and friends, and in concert with the international community through the United Nations and other fora, to find a peaceful solution to end the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and to restore Kuwait's legitimate government."²⁶ The directive also directs the appropriate U.S. agencies to work with allies and friends on such issues as economic sanctions, the coordinated drawdown of the strategic petroleum reserve, and the establishment of multinational forces for the defense of Saudi Arabia and enforcing U.N.-mandated sanctions. This effort by the U.S. for burden-sharing among allies and friends of the U.S. was outlined by President Bush in an August 30, 1990, news conference. "We will be asking for other governments, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Federal Republic of Germany, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), free Kuwait, and others, to

²⁵ National Security Directive 45, U.S. Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, August 20, 1990, ID# CF01478-030, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

²⁶ Ibid.

join us in making available financial and, where appropriate, energy resources to countries that have been most affected by the current situation.”²⁷

By December 1990, the U.S. strategy for the coalition had matured, as outlined by the diplomatic and military steps shown in Figures A-2 and A-3 in Appendix A. A main component of the diplomatic efforts focused on maintaining the current coalition and strengthening this body of states. Four months of economic sanctions aimed at isolating Iraq, the military buildup in the region, and diplomatic efforts to convince Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait placed a strain on the coalition. In addition, the U.S. diplomatic strategy focused on increasing the Chinese and Russian support of coalition goals. For example, in November 1990, President Bush sent a letter to Chinese leaders (President Yang Shangkun, General Secretary Jiang Zemin, and Premier Li Peng) seeking Chinese support on U.N. resolutions related to Iraq. President Bush wrote, “It is my firm belief that any break in Perm Five [the U.N. security council] solidarity would only lead Saddam Hussein to conclude that the coalition is beginning to crumble.”²⁸ Overtures to the Soviets continued and at this point in the coalition formation, the possibility of Soviet troop participation was still an available option. In addition, U.S.-Soviet cooperation was highlighted in a December 2, 1990, letter from President Bush to President Gorbachev. President Bush expresses his view that “U.S.-Soviet cooperation on this [Iraq] issue since early August has been a crucial factor in cementing the multinational coalition and

²⁷ Weekly compilation of Presidential Documents, The President’s News Conference on the Persian Gulf Crisis, August 30, 1990, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

²⁸ Cable from Secretary of State to American Embassy Beijing, Presidential letter to Chinese Leaders, November 27, 1990, ID# CF01584-028, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

discharging the peacekeeping responsibilities of the United Nations.”²⁹ The other permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China) were the focus of U.S. diplomatic efforts. The goal was to work as one to show unity within the United Nations. This was accomplished by passing a dozen U.N. resolutions condemning the actions of Iraq. A summary of those U.N. resolutions can be found in Table A-2 of Appendix A. The vote count reveals the U.S. was successful in holding the coalition together and preventing potentially adversarial China and the Soviet Union from vetoing passage of any U.N. resolution concerning Iraq. The final U.N. Resolution, 678, concerning the setting of a January 15, 1991, deadline for Iraq to comply with the previous eleven U.N. resolutions and authorizing the use of force prompted the Chinese to abstain. Otherwise, Table A-2 shows a consistent record of either unanimous votes for the resolutions or majority votes with only Cuba and Yemen abstaining.

Additional U.S. diplomatic strategies included coordinating with all of the coalition members the timing of breaking off diplomatic relations with Iraq. This show of solidarity was a necessary step as the U.N. deadline of January 15 approached. This coordination was crucial to withdraw embassy personnel within Iraq and Kuwait to avoid endangering coalition-member personnel once force was implemented. Mitigating fractures in the coalition was a U.S. priority. Another diplomatic strategy was to renew efforts to increase burden-sharing among coalition members. As Bennett et al. (1997:4) note, even with “unilateral U.S. force commitments ultimately totaling over 500,000

²⁹ Cable from Secretary of State to American Embassy Moscow, Presidential letter to President Gorbachev, December 2, 1990, ID# CF01584-026, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

troops, there was still almost no free-riding; more than forty countries collectively contributed \$70 billion and 245,000 troops.” The focus of this effort was on Germany, Japan, and the Gulf states. Neither Germany nor Japan contributed troops to the coalition effort. For both, constitutional restraints resulting from their defeat in the World War II limited their direct military participation. However, to avoid the perception that both states were free-riding on Persian Gulf security provided by the United States and its coalition members, the U.S. sought further financial contributions. In total, Germany provided DM 17.2 billion (\$11.5 billion) to the coalition, of which 60 percent went to the United States. Table A-3 in Appendix A provides a breakdown of these contributions. Even with this robust contribution, the perception of a reluctant and distracted ally remained. Bennett et al. (170) argue that “Throughout this period the German foreign policy establishment was preoccupied with wrapping up the external aspects of unification which eventually took place on October 3, 1990.”

A similar accusation of free-riding was faced by Japan. Stiles (2002, 128) notes that “Tokyo’s initial offer of \$1 billion was judged inadequate by Washington, but the next offer of \$4 billion for the U.S. and regional allies was barely accepted in Japan’s parliament.” U.S. diplomatic efforts pushed Japan to provide even more financial contributions. On January 24, 1991, the Japanese government announced an additional \$9 billion contribution. All told, Japan provided a total of \$10 billion to the coalition. This total was only exceeded by the two Gulf states of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, each of which contributed more than \$16 billion to the First Gulf War. Clearly, these two states were contributing to the effort since their territories were threatened by Iraq. Kuwait was currently occupied and Saudi Arabia had Iraqi troops amassed on its

border. The complete breakdown of foreign contributions to the First Gulf War is provided in Table A-4 in Appendix A. The contributions used in Table A-4 are approximations since they were collated for a report published in April 1992 and final figures for coalition contributions had yet to be finalized. However, these figures do show the burden on the traditional allies (Germany, Japan, and Korea) who did not contribute troops to the First Gulf War. The burden on those non-traditional allies (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE) who were being defended by the coalition forces was much greater, but not surprising. Even the Soviets, while not contributing funds or troops, provided diplomatic support by acting as an intermediary between the U.S. and Iraq; in addition, Soviet support in the U.N. Security Council was very helpful.

As the U.N. deadline of January 15, 1991, approached, the coalition was still being maintained by the United States. One sign that some coalition members were more important to the effort than others can be found in a December 28, 1990, memo from Admiral David Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This memorandum recommends a particular order for pre-hostility consultations with coalition members. Admiral Jeremiah “recommends consultations be conducted in the following order: the United Kingdom, France, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Bahrain, Oman, Canada, Australia, Italy, Syria, Israel, and all others...Any country with forces on the ground should be in the first group to be consulted.”³⁰ The actual listing of which countries were contacted, mode of communication, by/to whom, and when can be found in Table A-5 in Appendix A. This listing highlights that the first five traditional allies

³⁰ Admiral Jeremiah letter to Richard Haass, Comments on “pre-January 15/use of force checklist,” December 28, 1990, ID# CF01584-022, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Library.

being notified include the U.K., France, Turkey, Israel, and Australia. However, it should be noted that Germany and Japan also received private channel notification one hour prior to hostilities starting. The first five non-traditional allies notified include Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, and Qatar. The Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev received notification in a phone call from President Bush one hour prior to the war commencing, while the Chinese received a cable when the war started.

While this study focuses on the initial strategies necessary to create a coalition, the importance of maintaining coalition unity through the uncertain conditions of combat was acknowledged by the Bush administration. A State Department cable dated December 30, 1990, argued for the “explicit agreement within the coalition about what military action after January 15 would be intended to accomplish and what terms Iraq must meet for a ceasefire to go into effect.”³¹ These consultations on war aims were critical as Iraq’s forces withdrew from Kuwait and coalition goals were being met.

The United States strategy for military coalition formation in the First Gulf War is clear. The focus combined traditional allies (U.K., France, Germany, Turkey, and Japan) with friends in the Persian Gulf region (Saudi Arabia and Kuwait). The solidarity among traditional allies, however, was the key element in the coalition. Without U.K. and French support in the U.N., agreeing to sanctions on Iraq, and providing troops, the coalition would not have formed. Without Turkish support, acting as a liaison to states such as Syria, Iran, and others in the region, the coalition would not have been as strong. In addition, Turkey’s geopolitical location and agreement to allow U.S. forces to

³¹ Cable from “AmEmbassy Riyadh to SECSTATE, U.S. and coalition war aims: sacked out on the same sand dunes, dreaming different dreams?” December 30, 1990, ID# CF01584-025, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

operate from its territory only strengthened its part in the coalition. Finally, Germany and Japan blunted criticism of their nonmilitary role in the coalition by supporting the coalition financially. The next section on the Second Gulf War provides an opportunity to explore whether this same reliance on traditional allies can be obtained.

Second Gulf War

The Second Gulf War, also known as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), poses a unique challenge for historians, political scientists, and other social scientists. The war began in 2003 and, while Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist Party was overthrown and democratic elections have been implemented, the U.S.-led coalition remained together for a few years before slowly coming apart. Analyzing the U.S. strategies for coalition formation in the Second Gulf War does not provide the same opportunities in access to evidence and passage of time as in the First Gulf War. Has enough time elapsed to make credible hypotheses and does sufficient evidence exist to reconstruct strategies decision-makers employ? The answer to those questions is a qualified yes. The evidence of these strategies is formulated from a combination of elite interviews³² and archived coalition documentation. Of course, highlighting and acknowledging the challenges for such an endeavor are important. George and Bennett (2005:98) argue that "research on recent and contemporary U.S. foreign policy must be sensitive to the likelihood that important data may not be available and cannot be easily retrieved for research purposes." This is true in most cases. Classification of official government documentation, especially for an on-going operation, makes collection of data very difficult, if not impossible. This problem has been somewhat addressed by seeking

³² A total of eleven interviews were conducted. A complete listing of these interviews can be found in Figure B-1, Appendix B.

other means to illustrate the U.S. strategies employed. While some archival research at the United States Central Command headquarters in Tampa, Florida, was accomplished; this has been supplemented by access to former and current U.S. government personnel involved in forming the Iraq coalition in 2003. The limitations and credibility of such access will be discussed as evidence is presented. This section on the Second Gulf War will provide the historical background on the inter-Gulf War period that helps to explain U.S. coalition strategies, what strategies were considered and employed in 2003.

When compared to the First Gulf War, the Second Gulf War presents a compelling case study. In both conflicts, the United States formed an international coalition that eventually invaded Iraq. While the goals of the two wars were different, in both cases the U.S. still found itself having to convince states to join an international coalition and accept U.S. leadership. The strategies employed by the U.S. in both cases consisted of three elements: traditional allies, foreign assistance, and negative rhetoric/persuasion. For each of the Gulf wars, how these elements were emphasized by the U.S. differed. Also, just as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was more than just the actions of a madman (Saddam Hussein), the invasions of Iraq in 1991 and 2003 were more than just the wishes of one person. To understand the U.S. strategies employed to form a military coalition in 2003, one must understand the post-Gulf War environment in the 1990s.

The success of the coalition formed in 1990 was evidenced by a swift victory in the air and on the ground in Kuwait and Iraq. The coalition had held together through a dozen U.N. resolutions, months of economic sanctions, tactical ballistic missile (SCUD)

attacks on Israel, and Iraqi claims of coalition attacks on civilians. The success of the First Gulf War coalition can be attributed to two main factors; first, although the U.S. still provided the majority of troops to the effort, coalition troop contributions were fairly robust.³³ Second, those states not providing troops found other ways to contribute, including diplomatic and economic means. This provided the U.S. with the legitimacy it sought to focus the coalition efforts on removing Iraq from Kuwait. The U.S. government went to great lengths to ensure the First Gulf War coalition was not perceived as a West versus Arab encounter or as a U.S. grab for oil.

Even so, the success and cooperation of the First Gulf War coalition did not last for long. Even before the land offensive was launched, the first cracks in solidarity were beginning to form. Two weeks prior to the beginning of the ground war, the American embassy in Paris sent a DOS cable back to Washington citing the French concern that the U.S. would seek to shut France (and the rest of the international community) out of a post-war settlement. Specifically, the cable outlined France's claim to a post-war role and was based on "[France's] status as a permanent member of the UNSC and its self-perceived role as having a special relationship with key regional players."³⁴ The French concern about any post-war settlement was motivated by economic, cultural, and political interests it held in the region. This concern, therefore, was about preserving France's "special relationship" with the Arab world, which persisted during in the

³³ Non-U.S. coalition ground troops consisted of 160,000 personnel and increased to approximately 240,000 when maritime and air force personnel are included. This data can be found in Appendix I of the *Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War* (April 1992).

³⁴ Cable from AmEmbassy Paris to SECSTATE, Trouble Brewing With France Over Post-War Settlement, February 15, 1991, ID# CF01584-003, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

interwar period between the two Gulf wars. Once the First Gulf War goals were obtained and Iraq was out of Kuwait, the coalition weakened and eventually disbanded.

International relations scholars have studied the 1990s, most characterizing it as an era of change in the international environment. Palmer and Morgan (2006:63) propose that, since 1990, two significant events are seen as defining the American role in the world – the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. The end of the Cold War brought a “new world order”³⁵ in which rival superpowers no longer competed for regional influence around the world. Instead, a sense of international cooperation was fostered, although not always realized. And yet, this new world order also presents other threats, such as ethnic tensions, nationalism, and terrorism. Immediately after terminating hostilities in the First Gulf War, the U.S. faced all these threats, many of these emanated from Iraq itself. In a background note, the U.S. DOS stated, “The U.N. Security Council required the Iraqi regime to surrender its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and submit to U.N. inspections but when the Ba’ath regime refused to fully cooperate with the U.N. inspections, the Security Council employed sanctions to prevent further WMD development and compel Iraqi adherence to international obligations.”³⁶ Although regime change in Iraq was not an official objective of the First Gulf War, but an anticipated consequence, the Shiite population in the south and Kurdish population in the north rose up to trigger a *coup d’état* that ultimately failed.

³⁵ The origins of this term are not clear, however, it is generally attributed to the numerous times it has been evoked by President George W. Bush in speeches and press conferences leading up to, during, and after the First Gulf War. The general meaning of the term refers to a future where international cooperation (led by the U.N.) would peacefully resolve disputes.

³⁶ Department of State website titled, Background note: Iraq, February 2008, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6804.htm>, accessed June 2009.

This forced the U.S. to organize no-fly zones in the south and north of Iraq to protect those ethnic groups from annihilation by Iraqi forces. The U.S.-led coalition in the First Gulf War did not push onto Baghdad to remove Saddam Hussein from power because of U.S. concerns about a negative reaction by other members of the coalition. Steve Yetiv (2004:220) argues that after the U.S. achieved its critical objectives, it did not want to lose Arab support and find itself in the same type of trouble that U.S. forces faced in the terror bombings in Saudi Arabia in 1996. In the 1990s, Yetiv (220) concludes that “Saddam Hussein survived onerous economic sanctions, the most intrusive postwar U.N. inspection regime in history, unwavering U.S. military containment, and virtually unending global scrutiny.” But the challenges of this new world order extended beyond the Gulf region, compounded mainly by post-communist states in transition.

The breakup of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia is considered a momentous occasion in international relations, not because Soviet communism failed, but for the first, second, and third order effects on the international system. The end results were the large number of independent states that formed, the rise of nationalism, and the seeming triumph of liberal principles. As such, the dominance of the U.S. was evident because no peer competitor existed. The threat of global war was significantly diminished and America’s “unipolar” moment had come. Huntington (1989) and others highlighted the unique nature of America’s position in the world, calling for continued leadership and international engagement. Yet, despite a growing U.S. economy, Stiles (2002:116) argues America “cut back on foreign aid, negotiated the North American Free Trade Agreement which took advantage of its strong position relative to Canada and Mexico, and repeatedly pressured Japan to allow increased amounts of U.S.

imports with specific targets for market shares in semiconductors, autos, and automobile parts.” Another trend in U.S. behavior as the world hegemon in the 1990s is the promotion of liberal ideals, which include the promotion and sustainment of democracy and human rights. Some of these include “sanctions against China for its repression of students in 1989; support for Somalis, Kurds, and Bosnians fighting against authoritarian enemies; and admission of Haitian refugees into the United States on humanitarian grounds” (Stiles 2002:116). Multilateral approaches to security concerns were a staple of U.S. foreign policy at this time.

The breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991 unleashed nationalist demands by ethnic groups in the Balkans and tested the validity of multilateral approaches. The U.S. and international community of security organizations were unable to effectively address Balkan unrest. Stiles (230) argues that “The international community was ill prepared to intervene in this situation, coming as it did during the collapse of the Soviet Union and the general restructuring of international institutions and practices.” The European Community (EC) was unable to resolve the situation and “the EC lost several diplomats in the skies of Croatia in their efforts to mediate a peaceful settlement” (Stiles:230). NATO was not able to assist since “out of area” operations were prohibited at that time and the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was also ineffective as a security organization due to its requirement for unanimous decisions. Finally, the U.N. did not initially seek to resolve the conflict. Stiles (230) notes that “It was not until September [1991] that the Security Council began to issue a series of resolutions condemning Serbian and Yugoslav army support of Serbian militiamen in Croatia.” Efforts by the United Nations and the NATO alliance to promote a settlement of these

disputes proved ineffective until the summer of 1995 (Sodaro 2008:165). The U.S. and NATO allies launched air attacks that finally forced a settlement known as the Dayton Peace Accords. Multilateralism was also attempted to resolve security issues in Somalia and Haiti in the 1990s, both of which also resulted in less than optimal solutions. The new world order after the First Gulf War was not living up to its promise of international cooperation to peacefully resolve disputes. The success of the First Gulf War coalition could not be extrapolated to other international security concerns. The lack of multilateral success in the 1990s had the effect of diminishing U.S. trust in institutions of collective security. Hence, U.S. strategies for forming a Second Gulf War coalition were influenced by the U.S. experience in the inter-Gulf War period.

There were two distinct strategies employed for the Second Gulf War. The first strategy attempted to use the First Gulf War coalition as a model. However, following this strategy was problematic since the threat assessment and political conditions were not the same. The First Gulf War strategy consisted of a two-part plan of deterrence and war fighting. This was executed in two operations, Desert Shield and Desert Storm. For the Second Gulf War, Iraq was not occupying a country. Instead, it was being accused by the U.S. of threatening its neighbors and the world with WMDs. In theory, WMD possession should be more dangerous than the occupation of one state by another. However, for some of the traditional allies (France, Germany), the same sense of urgency that existed in the First Gulf War did not exist for the Second Gulf War and this complicated the U.S. coalition building strategy. Additionally, the First Gulf War strategy called for a U.S.-led multinational force that included both Western and non-traditional (Arab) allies. Emulating this strategy a second time proved difficult since the

U.S. relationship with both traditional and non-traditional allies had changed in the intervening dozen years. This change in relationships with traditional allies can be attributed to their experiences in other coalition operations, such as Operation Allied Force (OAF) in the Balkans. That 1999 NATO air campaign was initiated to compel Serbian compliance with NATO demands to cease the conflict in Kosovo. While OAF was a successful air campaign and highlighted a transformed NATO, the results of the coalition interoperability were damaging to future coalitions. John Peters et al. (2001:68) conclude that “Fewer countries will want to join a U.S.-dominated coalition if they see few direct threats to their interests, as was the case in Kosovo, and if they fear being dragged along with the rest of the coalition to unacceptable levels of force.” As a result, traditional Western allies (France, Germany) required more information on and justification for any U.S.-led operation to counter domestic opposition to military intervention.

The relationship of non-traditional allies and the U.S. in the First Gulf War is also difficult to duplicate. In 1990, the Arab response and involvement in the coalition provided the U.S. with the international legitimacy it needed for the coalition to succeed. However, the U.S. relationship with these coalition Arab states deteriorated over time. This was due to a variety of factors, including Arab-Israeli relations and terrorism. While U.S. support for Israel certainly harmed Arab-U.S. relations, this one factor alone does not explain the decline in the relationship. Rather, the continued U.S. presence in the Middle East after the First Gulf War and the subsequent terrorist attacks against the U.S. were the chief cause of the decline. Robert Pape’s (2005:40) study on explaining suicide terrorism found that between 1996 and 2003, al Qaeda conducted 21 terrorist

attacks against the U.S. and allies, killing 3,661 people. Pape argues that these attacks are not driven by religion, but by nationalism, and the goal of this terrorism is to drive U.S. forces out of the Middle East. Pape (46) concludes that the purpose of suicide terrorism is “to compel modern democracies to withdraw troops from territories that terrorists consider to be their homeland.” This might help explain the U.S. military move out of Saudi Arabia (once home to Osama bin Laden), but the move of U.S. Central Command operations to Qatar and the keeping of forces in Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, and UAE, calls into question the lessons of Pape’s study. Saudi Arabia is of more religious significance than other Gulf states as the keeper of various holy sites in Mecca and Medina. Therefore the U.S. military move out of Saudi Arabia can be attributed to acknowledging this connection to religion.

The second U.S. strategy for the Second Gulf War is a much more limited version of the first strategy. Ambassador Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from 2001 to 2005, describes the strategy for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) as “pieces of strategy” that originated from the departments of State and Defense that competed for prominence. There was a State Department desire to try to recreate the coalition that had been formed for the First Gulf War that State Secretary Powell felt was a model for accomplishing this type of warfare. The pattern of this strategy involved the U.S. going to the U.N. to seek a resolution condemning the Iraqi violation, followed by U.S. attempts to obtain a second resolution authorizing force. For the Second Gulf War, the first U.N. Resolution 1441 obtained in November 2002 stated “Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq’s failure to

cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], and to complete the actions required under paragraphs 8 to 13 of resolution 687 (1991).”³⁷ To this end, the State Department sought to assemble the broadest and most effective coalition possible to deal with Saddam Hussein. That strategy ended on January 20, 2003, when the French declared there would never be a second resolution. Just like the First Gulf War, the U.S. sought a second resolution that would authorize the use of force. Ambassador Grossman describes a simultaneous DOD effort to limit the number of coalition members as much as possible because the Defense Department had taken the lesson from Bosnia that coalitions were constraining, rather than enhancing, reinforcing, force-multiplying, events. The DOD objective was to have as few coalition members as possible, especially limiting “important ones.”³⁸ This reference to “important ones” refers to the key NATO allies (France, Germany) that the DOD identified as being obstructive during the Bosnia campaign. The DOD did wish to have the British involved due to their obvious advantages in capability, interoperability, and political support. Additionally, the DOD sought Turkish support to allow the U.S. to move the Fourth Infantry Division into Iraq from Turkey to create a northern front.

Once conflict began in 2003, there was an attempt by the U.S. to create a coalition, first, to improve public relations, i.e., “lots of people are fighting with us,” and second, to call on certain niche capabilities to help the U.S. in Iraq. For example, the Czech Republic deployed a Consequence Management team that would be vital in case chemical weapons were employed. The problem was the U.S. put together a coalition

³⁷ United Nations Security Council website titled, U.N. Security Council Resolutions for 2002, <http://www.un.org/docs/scres/2002/sc2002.htm>, accessed August 2009:

³⁸ Author interview with Ambassador Marc Grossman, April 30, 2009.

that involved contributions that varied in size and capability. This strategy soon became a transparent attempt to build a public relations coalition, rather than a warfighting coalition. This type of approach stems from the lack of national command authority direction concerning OIF coalition building. As Ambassador Grossman notes, “Did I ever hear the President of the United States say, write, or send out: here is my plan for creating a coalition to fight Saddam in OIF – I would say the answer to that question is no...One of the big differences between the first Gulf War and the second was that the first President Bush sought, as his major national objective, to fight with the largest coalition that he could get and to do so with U.N. Security Council resolutions...The wrong lesson drawn by very senior people (chiefs of military services and Joint Staff) at the Pentagon was that Kosovo/Bosnia showed that coalitions were a bad thing and not a good thing.”³⁹ The different strategies employed by the departments of state and defense in the initial stages of coalition building led to an initial constraint on the number of coalition members, which was then followed by the pursuit of any state (however small or incapable) willing to contribute troops to the effort.

The difference in philosophy of the two administrations in each Gulf war was an important factor in the U.S. strategies for coalition building. In the First Gulf War, President H.W. Bush set the tone with his desire to have a large and effective coalition. The main effort to create a coalition was led by the White House and National Security Council (NSC). In the Second Gulf War, the lack of direction from the White House and NSC staff on building a coalition led to the departments of state and defense at odds with each other. Ambassador Lincoln Bloomfield, the DOS lead, and Ms. Debra Cagan,

³⁹ Author interview with Ambassador Marc Grossman, April 30, 2009.

who held senior positions in both the DOS and DOD, pursued a robust coalition despite reluctance on the part of the White House and Pentagon. Ms. Cagan argues that the flaw in the Second Gulf War strategy lay in a simple rule of thumb: “If you do not respect, train, and equip coalition partners as if they were your own, the coalition will not be successful.”⁴⁰ This dysfunctional staff work did not go unnoticed by states being pursued as coalition members. For example, France provided troops in the First Gulf War, but not the second. Fundamentally, it had to do with objectives and U.S. administration commitment. The U.S. objective and commitment in the First Gulf War, remove Saddam from Kuwait, was clear and unwavering. The same cannot be said, however, for removing Saddam from power in 2003. French opposition to the war centered on the belief that any Saddam replacement could be worse and the French were unconvinced by the U.S. justifications for war. France preferred maintaining the status quo since it was better (economically, politically) for France in the long term. Stability of the region was of paramount consideration. The commitment of Bush 41 to international support for U.S. operations was not a priority for his son, Bush 43.

Since it was a diplomatic effort, the process of recruiting allies for the coalition usually began with a State Department cable but this was followed by U.S. Central, European, and Pacific Command military officers meeting with their military counterparts to work out the details of how states would flow into the coalition. Negotiations usually followed one of two tracks, although a combination of the two was also possible. The first track involved recruiting those states that would provide troops for either combat or support operations. British and Australian troops were the first to

⁴⁰ Author interview with Ms. Debra Cagan, May 7, 2009.

be pursued, while reluctant traditional allies (France, Germany) remained unconvinced by U.S. arguments on Iraq. The other initial troop-contributing states included Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine. The second track involved other support that a state might provide, such as access to basing, overflight, and/or resupply. These states provided important support to the war effort, but this often was perceived by the U.S. as not enough since troop contributions were valued more than other support. For example, France provided overflight rights so U.S. Air Force B-52s could fly from Royal Air Force Base Fairford in the U.K. over France on their way to Iraq. The coalition integration process, difficult and time-consuming, is illustrated in Figure B-1 in Appendix B. A complete listing of troop-contributing coalition partners (37) from 2003 to 2006 and the number of troops provided to the coalitions in Iraq and Afghanistan can be found in Table B-2 in Appendix B. A chart depicting the total number of non-U.S. multinational forces in Iraq that summarizes the information in Table B-2 is presented in Figure B-2 in Appendix B.

Not surprisingly, the focus on which states to recruit centered on those that possessed chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) capabilities. This meant the U.S. focused on Central and Eastern European states from the former Warsaw Pact. Those states still practiced and trained for these contingencies. Recruiting efforts also focused on states with a willingness to work with the United States. Ms. Cagan identifies three reasons why Eastern and Central European states were initially pursued as part of the U.S. strategy in coalition formation. First, it allowed the U.S. to have capable partners and avoid accusations of unilateralism; second, many of these states believed they owed their freedom to U.S. support during their difficult

transition from communism; and finally, those states believed the Iraqi people deserved a chance to pursue democracy just as they had.⁴¹

Coalition formation, deployment, and execution ran into difficulties in the overall ability to move forces and equipment from Europe into the Iraqi theater of operations. Some states were so adamantly against the Iraq war that moving equipment through those states was extremely difficult. Ms. Cagan relates a particular incident in which a “Belgian Defense Minister went out to one of the Belgian rail yards and threatened to lay his body on the tracks to block the tanks we [the U.S.] were trying to move out of the Rhineland.”⁴² Instead, the U.S. moved the tanks north through Amsterdam to get the equipment to Iraq. This is a strong indication that the U.S.-led coalition of the willing did not have the full support of its traditional allies and friends.

Other related coalition information can be found in Table B-3 in Appendix B, which depicts the major states that contributed troops to the coalition effort in OIF. The states shown in Table B-3 are sequenced in descending order from the largest contingent (U.K.) to the smallest (Kazakhstan). Figure B-3 in Appendix B depicts the total coalition from Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom) and Iraq (OIF). This time frame (March 2005) was selected to illustrate the largest number of coalition partners garnered since the two wars began. Many coalition partners left the coalition as casualties and terrorist attacks increased in Iraq. Figure B-4 in Appendix B depicts this increase in terrorist attacks, which began in 2005 and peaked in the summer of 2007, as the “surge” operations began, showing the effect of terrorism on the fragile coalition.

⁴¹ Author interview with Ms. Cagan, May 7, 2009.

⁴² Ibid.

The U.S. is currently engaged in a protracted struggle against violent extremists that will continue into the foreseeable future. A chart depicting prominent terrorist incidents between 1991 and 2003 can be found in Figure B-5 in Appendix B.

Summarizing the results of this chapter on traditional allies might be useful to highlight how the U.S. coalition building strategy changed from the First to Second Gulf Wars. Any U.S. strategy to use traditional allies to build a military coalition seeks to take advantage of the institutional commitments, procedures, relationships, and connections between the U.S. and these states. Traditional allies, such as NATO allies, possess common goals, logistics, and capabilities. This commonality minimizes the friction that can occur within a military coalition. For the First Gulf War, the U.S. aggressively sought out traditional ally support to address Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. President H.W. Bush began the process of coalition building with personal phone calls to the leaders of the U.K., France, Germany, Turkey, and Japan. These calls were supplemented by phone calls to the leaders of the two states most directly affected by Iraq's invasion, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The U.K., France, and Germany support in the United Nations was evident in the numerous resolutions condemning Iraq. Other traditional allies providing military support include Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain. The U.S. coalition building strategy was led by the White House buttressed by the departments of state and defense. This robust support from traditional allies in the First Gulf War is in contrast with the tepid support received during the Second Gulf War.

In 2003, President W. Bush sought to build an international coalition of states to address Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction. The initial wartime coalition

was small and consisted of the U.K., Australia, Poland, and the United States. The post-conflict coalition was larger but consisted mostly of non-traditional states. The traditional allies in Europe were taken for granted and instead post-communist and Central Asian states were the states that mattered. As will be shown in the next chapter, U.S. foreign assistance was one aspect to build the military coalition. The lack of a unified U.S. strategy helps explain the difficulty of building the Second Gulf War coalition. The departments of state and defense initially worked at cross-purposes in building the coalition with DOS working to be inclusive and DOD trying to limit the coalition partners. Additionally, like the First Gulf War, the U.S. initially sought U.N. support to contain Iraq. However, once it was apparent that traditional allies, Germany and France, would not support a U.N. resolution endorsing force, the U.S. proceeded ahead without a second resolution and instead went to war based on the legitimacy of an earlier resolution. Even those traditional allies that eventually sent troops (Italy and Spain) did not stay long in Iraq. Unlike the First Gulf War, traditional allies were unconvinced of the need to strike at Iraq because the sense of urgency was not there. As shown in Chapter 5, the U.S. senior leader rhetoric is another factor to help explain the U.S. strategy for coalition building in both Gulf wars.

The challenge for the United States is to shape the strategic environment by deterring major conflict, precluding the rise of major instability, enhancing the governance or military capacity of partner countries, and preparing for catastrophic events. These critical events cannot be accomplished alone. They require the assistance of allies and friends. In some cases, a coalition of states will be required to deal with these issues. The ultimate aim, however, is to defuse these strategic

problems before they become crises and resolve crises before they reach the stage that requires large-scale military operations. Post 9/11, the United States has to form strategies to build coalitions that address this reality. The U.S. coalition building strategy for the Second Gulf War eschewed traditional allies. Initially, the U.S. administration attempted to “sell” traditional allies a connection between Iraq and terrorism. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, there was never a direct connection between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda, so this was not a sound selling point for states to join the coalition. Over time the argument evolved to include: Saddam has weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Saddam is flouting the U.N., and Iraq is a threat to regional stability. The war on terror did play a role as the argument was presented to potential coalition partners that Saddam’s possession of WMD was a problem, especially if he supplied those weapons to terrorist groups like al Qaeda. Besides trying to enlist traditional allies, the U.S. coalition-building strategy also included economic incentives and rhetoric that will be addressed in the next two chapters respectively.

CHAPTER 4 FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Of the seeming and real innovations which the modern age has introduced into the practice of foreign policy, none has proven more baffling to both understanding and action than foreign aid.

- Hans Morgenthau, 1962¹

Foreign direct assistance (“aid”) is an economic tool of United States foreign policy. The foreign assistance provided to Germany and Japan after World War II and the success of that aid has left an indelible mark that persists today. This link between economic and military assistance and the eventual recovery of the recipient state has been advocated and challenged by governments, academics, and the media. For example, Kendall Stiles (2002:115) argues that foreign aid, military deployments, and other initiatives are increasingly designed to strengthen liberal regimes and punish autocrats. Less altruistically, Francis Adams (2000:117) describes U.S. foreign assistance goals as being linked (in no particular order) to “either the developmental needs of recipient nations, the political objectives of donor countries, or the economic interests of transnational corporations.” Despite this debate, most scholars (Wilhelm and Feinstein 1984, Adams 2000, Browne 2006, Brainard 2007, Taffet 2007) agree that reform of U.S. foreign assistance programs would make those programs more effective and help achieve U.S. foreign policy goals. A final report to Congress in 1992 stated, “Since the 1950s, U.S. foreign policy has included a long-term commitment to security assistance, which helped develop strong relationships with NATO and coalition partners;...[S]ecurity assistance and defense sales provide compatibility of equipment; the

¹ Morgenthau, Hans. (1962) A Political Theory of Foreign Aid. *The American Political Science Review* 56(2): 301.

training that comes with U.S. hardware often leads recipients to adopt U.S. doctrine and tactics, resulting in operational compatibility as well.”²

This chapter will demonstrate the role that U.S. foreign assistance had in coalition building strategies for the two Gulf wars. The practice of providing economic and military assistance to other states is not a recent phenomenon. The reason for providing assistance however is a point of contention among scholars. Brainard (2007:ix) notes, “the urgent demands of post-conflict reconstruction and humanitarian disasters have led to a faster rate of expansion of foreign assistance dollars in the last six years than at any point since the onset of the Cold War.” This increase in resources improves the effectiveness of foreign assistance as a foreign policy tool. This chapter will compare and contrast U.S. foreign assistance data provided to coalition partners with troop contributions to U.S.-led coalitions in the First and Second Gulf Wars. Was U.S. foreign assistance used as a coercive tool to gain troop-contributing coalition partners? The data and analysis that follow support the thesis that the U.S. coalition building strategy did not emphasize foreign assistance in the First Gulf War but was emphasized in the Second Gulf War.

The purpose of this chapter is to compare and contrast use of U.S. foreign assistance as a strategy for coalition building in the First and Second Gulf Wars. First, the data employed in this chapter will be presented to distinguish the types of foreign assistance that are in use. Second, this chapter analyzes the use of U.S. foreign assistance in the First Gulf War. As Bennett et al. (1997:61) concluded in their study of burden sharing in the First Gulf War, it was not foreign assistance that brought states to

² National Defense University website titled, Final Report to Congress. (1992) Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, I-2, <http://www.ndu.edu/library/epubs/cpgw.pdf>, accessed July 2009.

the coalition, but U.S. leaders using other states' security interests and obligations to great effect. This was certainly true in the First Gulf War, as will be shown later in this chapter. However, it will be shown that U.S. leaders in the Second Gulf War were unsuccessful making the case that other states' security interests coincided with the United States. Instead, the U.S. relied on foreign assistance as a coercive tool. This type of assistance comes at a price, as noted by Lael Brainard (2007:326), who argues that "aid to advance...coalition building often evidences a tension between supporting repressive governments in order to achieve short-term vital interests and promoting open, democratic societies that will better serve U.S. interests over the long term." Before analyzing whether assistance is a coercive tool, the type of U.S. foreign assistance needs to be elaborated.

The data used in this chapter, total U.S. overseas loans and grants³ (economic and military assistance) on the troop-contributing states in both Gulf wars, could be legitimately criticized as being too broad a measure. As James Lebovic (1988:117) notes, "foreign assistance is a crude aggregate and studies err when they indiscriminately treat it as a single entity and fail to consider the differences in the purposes and impact of the aid programs involved." Nonetheless, the purpose of using the total amount of foreign aid is to take into account the wide variations found among the states involved. A solid U.S. friend like Poland has needs different from a country like Armenia. For example, the economic portion of Poland's annual U.S. aid package is only \$2 million of the total. In fiscal year (FY) 2005, that would have equaled only 2.5

³ The *Greenbook* produced by the U.S. Agency for International Development provides summary data of U.S. foreign assistance since 1945. In this instance, foreign assistance, is categorized as either economic or military assistance. Because, due to inflation, the value of the U.S. dollar changes over time, and makes it difficult to compare levels of assistance at different time periods. Therefore, the *Greenbook* provides constant-dollar data (i.e., inflation-adjusted values) to make comparisons accurate.

percent of the total aid received from the United States. The rest (97.5 percent) was military aid. The situation is reversed, however, in Armenia. In FY05, the total amount given to Armenia was \$91.9 million. Of that amount, 90.6 percent was economic aid, and the remaining 9.4 percent was military aid. For the purposes of this dissertation, both economic and military aid will be regarded as providing incentives for a recipient country to become a coalition participant.

James Lebovic (1988:118) concludes that “foreign assistance can be multidimensional, a whole that encompasses distinct forms of assistance that can be directed at distinct objectives.” Yet there are advantages to using foreign aid in its totality. For example, Morgenthau (cited in Richardson and Kegley 1980:198) argues “that all aid may be used to bribe or as a device for enhancing the prestige of the donor, when assistance assumes the form of a transaction in which economic rewards are exchanged for political concessions.” Another argument for using the figure of the total amount of U.S. foreign assistance concerns the benefits of disparate types of aid. Different types of aid may be exchanged for one another. For example, “different kinds of aid can...increase a recipient’s discretionary resources; economic assistance can promote infrastructural development for security ends or military assistance can have economic benefits; and either economic assistance or military assistance can be used to create exploitable dependencies on a donor” (McKinley and Mughan 1984:4).

The data for this chapter is extracted from the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) database, called the *Greenbook* (see footnote 3), but there are problems with that data, including missing data and summing errors. To minimize these inadequacies, a crosscheck of data was made between the *Greenbook* and the

Department of State Account Tables. The most common missing data in the *Greenbook* involved supplemental funding for some, but not all, troop-contributing states. The most egregious omission was the 2003 missing supplemental for Turkey that amounted to one billion dollars.⁴ Other errors were found for some but not all states. The 2002 total for Georgia is one example, and it was off by \$23 million.⁵ All data for troop-contributing coalition members that received U.S. foreign assistance were crosschecked and updated. The figures and charts referenced in this chapter reflect that updated data.

The data on international coalition forces assisting the U.S. in both Gulf wars have discrepancies originating from various agencies and governmental organizations. These variations include how a country was identified as a willing member of the coalition and if that country was only committing to the combat operations, post-war reconstruction, or both. In the data, the war-time participation of a state can range from boots-on-the-ground military reinforcements, diplomatic letters of support, providing personnel in nearby countries, to monetary support. The data used in this chapter contain the most consistent level of troop contributions supporting U.S. operations in both Gulf wars. This includes troops a state provided or provides to either operation. But this restriction has its drawbacks. For example, a country is credited for supporting the U.S. even if troop-level support is rather minimal. Kazakhstan's 29 troops are given

⁴ When asked about this discrepancy, Jennifer Torres, a senior economist with USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services, replied that the 2003 ESF supplemental to Turkey was eventually rescinded in 2005 due to the terms of the agreement not being followed by Turkey. Hence, the *Greenbook* and DOS Account Tables were in conflict.

⁵ When asked about this discrepancy, Jennifer Torres, a senior economist with USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services replied that it was a problem with the programming generating the selection list of programs/accounts. Ms. Torres thanked the author for pointing the discrepancy out and replied that it only affected a limited number of accounts and might have gone unnoticed for years. This programming problem in the *Greenbook* has since been corrected.

the same weight as Georgia's 898 troops. The quality of those troops is also an issue. A transportation support company is also given the same weight as an infantry or mine-clearing company. While all troops contribute in their own way to an overall mission, the U.S. would rather have combat troops to contribute to the force-protection mission. For this dissertation, the size and composition of the coalition troops are not the major issues. Instead, the focus is on U.S. strategies in coalition building: comparing U.S. use of aid to build coalitions in the First and Second Gulf War.

Foreign assistance was and is one tool in the U.S. foreign policy toolbox to assist friends and allies, but also used to influence and sometimes coerce those states. Brainard (2007:ix) notes that "in a world transformed by globalization and challenged by terrorism, foreign aid has assumed importance as a foreign policy tool." But it is not just since September 11, 2001, that foreign assistance has become important. Jeffrey Taffet (2007:2) writes that "foreign aid is a tool that policymakers use, and have used, to achieve their larger aims of dominating, pacifying, protecting, strengthening, or changing certain countries." Palmer and Morgan (2006:122) agree and assert that "foreign aid is an efficient tool for bringing about desired changes in the international status quo." During the post-Cold War period, the U.S. has fought two very different Gulf wars. Consequently, the role of foreign assistance in building U.S.-led coalitions needs to be explored. How did the U.S. strategy for the First Gulf War coalition use foreign assistance as a coercive tool? The next section will focus on troop-contributing coalition states and the U.S. foreign assistance received before, during, and after the conflict.

First Gulf War

In relation to other international events, the timing of the First Gulf War is an important factor in explaining the U.S. strategy for building the Gulf coalition. The end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s encompass the termination of communist rule in many states in Central and Eastern Europe as well as Central Asia. The fall of the Berlin Wall, Solidarity's electoral victory in Poland, and the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia mark the beginning of fledgling liberal democracies in former communist states. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 occurred during the time of German reunification in which East and West Germany fused together their economic, political, and social fabrics. During this time, the Soviet Union was in the midst of a democratic and economic reform movement led by President Mikhail Gorbachev. The beginning of the 1990s mark an era when Soviet control of its satellite states was all but lost. By the time the U.S.-led coalition expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the end of the Soviet Union was nearing. By August 1991, communist hard-liners attempted a coup against Gorbachev and by the end of the year Gorbachev had resigned, marking the end of the Soviet Union. Those new states emerging from communism were seeking closer ties to the West and specifically with the United States. While a few (including Poland and Czechoslovakia) participated in the First Gulf War, the majority were too preoccupied with transition issues. A conscious refocusing of U.S. assistance dollars in the early 1990s was directed to helping these new democracies.

The list of coalition troop-contributing states in the First Gulf War and the associated U.S. foreign assistance received can be found in Table A-6 in Appendix A. The three charts in Figure A-4 reflect the U.S. assistance data from Table A-6. The first chart depicts the five states receiving the most U.S. foreign assistance (Egypt, Pakistan,

Greece, Morocco, and Bangladesh). The states in the second chart received the next highest totals and include Argentina, Niger, Oman, Poland, and Senegal. The third chart shows the coalition partners (Bahrain, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Kuwait, Spain) who receive a small amount of U.S. foreign assistance. The remaining First Gulf War coalition members receive no U.S. foreign assistance and are not graphed. These states include Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and the United Kingdom. The total amount of economic and military assistance for the troop-contributing states increases slightly from 1988 to 1990, which can be explained by Egypt's total foreign assistance increasing by almost ten percent (\$214 million) over that time. This increase could be explained by Egypt's coalition participation but also by the maintenance of the Israeli–Egyptian peace treaty and Camp David Accords. Additionally, there is a drop in total U.S. assistance to these states in 1991 that continued through 1993. The decrease of almost 25 percent in foreign aid spans the high in 1990 of \$3.71 billion to the low in 1993 of \$2.79 billion. These totals alone provide clues that rewards for coalition participation were not realized by most partners and were not part of a U.S. strategy for coalition building. Analyzing individual states is also instructive. Egypt was a critical coalition partner in the First Gulf War. Brumberg (in Bennett et al. 1997:91) notes that Egypt “provided the coalition with political and symbolic support that was critical to wider Arab participation...[having] sent 35,000 troops into action, many of which played an important – if circumscribed – role in the ground war itself.” Despite this critical role, U.S. foreign assistance numbers tell a different tale. Egypt received fewer U.S. dollars each year from a high in 1990 (\$2.39

billion) to a low in 1993 (\$2.06 billion). This drop in U.S. foreign assistance also affected other coalition members. Greece, Morocco, Niger, Oman, and Pakistan (all troop-contributing states) also experienced a similar drop in assistance. For its coalition participation, Egypt, however, did receive a “reward” from the U.S. in the form of debt relief. In a September 1, 1990, telephone communication between President George H.W. Bush and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Bush declared that “I am recommending that the entire debt be written off, unconditionally, \$6.7 billion.”⁶ After the Gulf War, in an interview with the Cairo newspaper Al Ahram, President Mubarak explained that “he calculated his country’s overall losses from the Gulf War at \$20 billion...700,000 Egyptians who worked in Iraq and Kuwait returned jobless...Egypt lost billions in tourism, and revenues from oil exports fell because of increases in consumption by the growing population” (Farnsworth 1991). Others states, including Canada, several European Economic Community member states, Persian Gulf states, and Saudi Arabia also forgave Egypt’s debt obligations and by early November 1990, the total debt cancellation stood at about \$14 million (U.S. Federal Research Division 1991:xxvii). So, while Egypt’s coalition participation was not compensated by U.S. foreign assistance, it was rewarded by debt forgiveness.

On the other hand, Pakistan did not fare as well. Its share of U.S. foreign aid dropped significantly from 1988 to 1993. The initial largess was mainly due to Pakistan’s emergence as a U.S. ally in the 1980s during the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan. Following the withdrawal of Soviet troops in the late 1980s, assistance to

⁶ Telephone call to President Mubarak from President Bush, September 1, 1990, ID# CF01478-020, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

Pakistan dropped precipitously.⁷ The data in Table A-6 shows Pakistan receiving over \$726 million in 1988, but only \$52 million by 1993. Although, in the First Gulf War, Pakistan supplied 15,000 troops as part of an armored brigade, U.S. foreign assistance dropped 81 percent from 1990 to 1991. Besides Egypt, the only other state to receive a spike in U.S. foreign assistance in 1990 was Poland. In 1989, Poland received just over three million dollars, but this jumped to \$86 million in 1990, then plunged back to three million dollars in 1991. It is doubtful this spike in U.S. foreign assistance was due to Poland's contribution to the First Gulf War. The country dispatched two ships to the Gulf: the Piast-class salvage ship *Piast* and the Wodnik-class training ship *Wodnik*, which had been retrofitted as a hospital ship.⁸ Rather, this single year increase in U.S. foreign assistance was more likely a show of support for Lech Walesa, the first popularly-elected president of Poland.

In 1991, Bangladesh, too, saw an increase in U.S. foreign assistance when it received a 22 percent increase in aid over the previous year, but was returned to previous funding levels the following year. Bangladesh contributed 2,000 troops to the First Gulf War coalition as part of a mechanized infantry battalion. While these troops were no doubt appreciated, a better explanation for increased U.S. aid can be traced to the Bangladesh elections about which Craig Baxter (1992:164) notes, "many groups of foreign observers [stated] that the elections were free and fair." In addition, a major cyclone had hit the coast of Bangladesh that year, prompting an additional \$24 million in

⁷ Center for American Progress website titled, U.S. Aid to Pakistan by the Numbers, August 21, 2008, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/08/pakistan_aid_numbers.html, accessed September 2009.

⁸ Grossman, Mark. (1995) *Encyclopedia of The Persian Gulf War*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO. 75.

food aid. Clearly, the increase in U.S. foreign assistance to coalition troop-contributing states was not always connected to a U.S. strategy in coalition formation.

Traditional alliances and other states' perceptions of their security interests were adequate to bring them into the First Gulf War coalition without the U.S. providing economic incentives. Seeking U.N. approval for diplomatic, economic, and military actions against Iraq was also part of U.S. coalition-building strategy. As Table A-6 shows, U.S. foreign assistance totals remained consistent before, during, and after the First Gulf War for the remaining troop-contributing states.

If a few states were rewarded, what were the consequences for those states that did not join the coalition? Did America "punish" those states by reducing their foreign assistance? Jordan is a good example, because President Bush made a concerted effort to bring Jordan's King Hussein onboard the U.S.-led coalition. Early on in the crisis, however, it became clear that Jordan would not cooperate. Only two days after the invasion of Kuwait and after the initial U.S. efforts to build international opposition to Iraq's action, President Bush in a National Security Council (NSC) meeting said he had "lost confidence in King Hussein."⁹ This sentiment was repeated two days later in another NSC meeting as economic sanctions on Iraq were being discussed. Secretary of State James Baker noted the Central Bank of Jordan was allowing Iraq to use Jordanian accounts, hence skirting the freeze on Iraqi assets. Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady concluded that "Jordan is our biggest problem."¹⁰ While President Bush considered King Hussein a "long time friend," Bush's frustration was

⁹ National Security Council meeting minutes, August 4, 1990, ID# CF01478-030, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

¹⁰ National Security Council meeting minutes, August 6, 1990, ID# CF01478-030, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

compounded by Jordan's insistence on seeking a diplomatic solution that did not conform to either U.S. or U.N. objectives for withdrawal¹¹ coupled by Jordan hosting a conference in Amman attended by what the U.S. believed to be known terrorists. Martin Indyk (1990) states that "King Hussein gave tacit endorsement to [the suspected terrorists] denunciations of U.S. policy and threats of stepped up terrorism by receiving them at the palace and with some 6,000 local Palestinians rallying in Amman in support of Saddam Hussein."¹² U.S. foreign assistance to Jordan, reflecting both the hope, then disappointment of the U.S. in its attempts to court Jordan to join the coalition manifested itself as follows. In 1990, U.S. foreign assistance to Jordan jumped from \$14.05 million to \$51.84 million, but that amount declined over the next two years to \$35.82M then \$17.87M. In the latter half of 1990, the U.S. hopes of bringing Jordan into the coalition diminished, yet the U.S. continued its efforts to help Jordan cope economically from the effects of the Gulf crisis. Figure A-5 in Appendix A shows the commitment to Jordan by the European Community, Japan, and Korea (at the request of the U.S.) of \$397 million. Jordan did not suffer from its refusal to join the coalition.

All three charts in Figure A-4 show a downward trend in U.S. assistance to 1993 for those troop-contributing coalition partners. This trend is attributed more to the international environment during the First Gulf War than any link to coalition performance. A better explanation is the so-called "peace dividend" researched and written about by academics and media during this time. The peace dividend refers to the belief that, post-Cold War, redistributing resources that normally would be used for

¹¹ The four objectives include the immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf; and the protection of American citizens abroad.

¹² Indyk, Martin. (1990) Who Lost Jordan? *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy* (September 25, 1990), <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2750>, accessed August 2009.

military purposes could now be shifted to social programs. The collapse of the Soviet Union, America's only peer competitor during the Cold War, offered the opportunity for a "new world order." This involved reducing or dismantling parts of the large military force structure that had existed for forty years. However, the prospect for a lasting peace did not materialize because the superpower rivalry was replaced by international conflicts driven by nationalism and ideologically focused non-state actors. The charts in Figure A-4 show the beginnings of a reduction in U.S. foreign assistance worldwide. This trend, as we will see in the section on the Second Gulf War, did not hold because U.S. foreign assistance increased after 2001.

Table A-6 and the charts in Figure A-4 show that the U.S. strategy for coalition-building in the First Gulf War did not involve using foreign assistance as a coercive or influential tool. Rather, U.S. strategy focused on America's traditional allies and friends. This is not to discount the large sums of aid that were raised by coalition partners during the First Gulf War. As Figure A-5 shows, the U.S. encouraged its friends and allies to contribute monetarily to Gulf War financial assistance. The primary beneficiaries of this effort were Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan, and out of these states only Egypt provided troops to the coalition. Unallocated funds were collected that were intended for general humanitarian assistance. Other states that received funding were Syria, Morocco, Lebanon, Somalia, and Djibouti. Out of these states, only Syria and Morocco contributed troops to the coalition. In short, these funds were not exclusively used to reward coalition members nor were they part of any U.S. strategy to build the coalition. The U.S. strategy did include working with coalition partners and other states to impose

economic sanctions against the Iraqi regime,¹³ but these measures were enacted separately from the effort to build the coalition. Any public discussion of assisting such states as Egypt, Turkey, and Jordan did not occur until August 30, 1990, at President Bush's news conference on the Persian Gulf Crisis, then privately during presidential phone calls with other state leaders. In both the news conference and the phone calls, President Bush emphasized that the initiative sought to "help those adversely affected economically by this endeavor...by providing substantial economic assistance."¹⁴ This effort was a coalition-maintenance issue, not a coalition-building issue; Secretary of State James Baker (1995:279) argued that "maintaining the coalition's solidarity was even more difficult than assembling it in the first place."

This assistance was intended to come from sources other than the United States. President Bush sent Baker to Europe and Secretary of the Treasury Nicholas Brady to Europe and Japan to solicit funds. Specifically, the U.S. asked "Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Federal Republic of Germany, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, free Kuwait, and others, to join in making available financial, and, where appropriate, energy resources to countries that have been most affected"¹⁵ by the Gulf crisis. The major contributor to this effort was Saudi Arabia, whose financial support to the coalition involved host-country support that included out-of-country transport costs reaching \$2.5 billion in calendar year 1990. Secretary of State Baker raised the issue of economic assistance

¹³ See National Security Directive 45 which outlines the U.S. policy response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Economic actions include "freezing Kuwaiti and Iraqi assets" as well as "imposing mandatory economic sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait" in concert with coalition partners. National Security Directive 45, August 20, 1990, ID# CF01478-030, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

¹⁴ Presidential News Conference on the Persian Gulf Crisis, August 30, 1990, ID# CF01478-028, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

¹⁵ Ibid.

to Eastern Europe with the Saudis, but the majority of funds provided by the Saudis (\$1.6 billion) went to Egypt. Although not considered part of the official Gulf War contributions outlined in Figure A-5, the Saudis provided \$4 billion in financial assistance to the Soviet Union. Baker (1995:295) noted that “the U.S. role in arranging the line of credit was instrumental in solidifying Soviet support for the use-of-force resolution and keeping [the Soviets] in the coalition throughout the crisis.” Saudi Arabia also assisted the U.S. by correcting glaring logistical deficiencies in the coalition Arab forces, such as the Egyptians, Syrians, and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) ground forces. As the Joint Forces Commander General Khaled bin Sultan (1995:196) described it, the Saudis provided logistical support to the Arab coalition and, in some cases, had to provide complete support to smaller national contingents who arrived with only the clothes on their backs. Sharing the burden of the First Gulf War took many forms and was outlined by President Bush as follows:

The response of most of our friends and allies has been good. To help defray costs, the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE, the United Arab Emirates, have pledged to provide our deployed troops with all the food and fuel they need. Generous assistance will also be provided to stalwart front-line nations, such as Turkey and Egypt...[the U.S. has] contributed \$28 million for relief efforts. There is [also] an energy-related cost to be borne as well. Oil producing nations are already replacing lost Iraqi and Kuwaiti output.¹⁶

It is clear the U.S. strategy for building an international coalition in the First Gulf War did not involve using U.S. foreign assistance as an incentive to commit troops to the effort. However, reward in the form of debt relief was offered to the troop-contributing states of Egypt and Jordan. The focus on burden sharing and on traditional

¹⁶ President Bush September 11, 1990 address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit, ID# CF01478-020, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

allies and friends produced a commitment by those benefitting the most from the security provided by the coalition to provide the resources for those states most at risk politically, economically, and militarily. Freeman et al. (1992:3) argue that “coalitions/alliances have existed for a range of reasons, not the least of which is that they create economies of scale that make defense more affordable.” In this respect, the First Gulf War coalition could be counted a qualified success, but this same strategy was not employed in the Second Gulf War for reasons that will be explained in the next section.

Second Gulf War

In relation to other international events, the timing of the Second Gulf War was an important factor in explaining the U.S. strategy in building a Gulf coalition. Just two years prior, nineteen al Qaeda operatives high-jacked four American-owned commercial jets and flew two of them into New York’s World Trade Center, one into the Pentagon, and the fourth, by the efforts of the passengers, into a rural field in Pennsylvania. This terrorist act was one of a series of terrorist attacks aimed at the U.S. in the post-Cold War era. Figure B-5 in Appendix B depicts these major events. In reaction to these events, the U.S. went to war twice. First, it drove the Taliban government from Afghanistan, then defeated Saddam Hussein’s forces in Iraq. The U.S., however, did not fight these wars alone, but with allies and coalition partners. Since the war on terror began, U.S. foreign assistance has centered on the idea that foreign aid is vital to secure U.S. domestic peace and reduce the chances of a terrorist attack. This has been accomplished in three ways. First, by providing economic and military assistance to allies and friends who are assisting in the war on terror and share U.S. cultural

values. Second, foreign assistance is provided to those poorly performing states that are seen as possible “breeding grounds” of terrorism. This type of assistance is difficult to deploy with confidence as conflict within a state often prevents the aid from reaching the intended recipients. In addition, foreign assistance to these states is especially prone to failure. As Goran Hyden (1986:246) noted, “for every official success, there are at least ten failures...billions of dollars have been spent on projects and programs that never achieved their intended objectives.” Third, foreign aid is granted to foreign partners who are capable states, but do not necessarily share U.S. values concerning human rights and the rule of law. The challenge here is to ensure aid is not misdirected by the recipient regime. The universe of states that contributed troops to the Second Gulf War can be assigned to the first and third categories. Those are states that have capable militaries and functioning governments that are either allies of or partners with the U.S. in the war on terror. The second category, unstable states receiving U.S. foreign assistance, will not be addressed.

The U.S. strategy for building a Second Gulf War coalition and the role of foreign assistance in that strategy is the topic of this section. As depicted in Table B-2 in Appendix B, since 2003, 37 coalition partners have provided troops for operations in Iraq. This table shows the wide diversity of troop contributions among coalition partners. Some allies, including Great Britain and Australia, have provided large quantities of troops and have remained in Iraq for several years, while other states, including Italy, have provided a substantial number of troops for a short period. Smaller states, such as New Zealand and Tonga, understandably have provided a few troops and stayed a relatively short time. Other small states, such as Albania and Estonia,

have made available a small number of troops, but have remained in Iraq a long time. This diversity of assistance helps make the case for the influence of U.S. foreign assistance in coalition building because it shows how the U.S. uses foreign assistance as a reward for joining the coalition and also as an enticement to remain in the coalition as will be discussed below. Identifying qualitative relationships between foreign assistance provided to troop-contributing allies and friends and coalition troop contributions as well as the longevity of those troop deployments provide the essential evidence of a U.S. strategy for coalition building.

The listing of troop-contributing states and U.S. foreign assistance to each state between 2001 and 2007 are listed in Table B-4, Appendix B. The year 2001 is used to establish a baseline of foreign assistance two years prior to the Second Gulf War. Also, 2001 is the year of the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks in the U.S., as well as the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. The Afghanistan coalition was formed in that year and some states have contributed troops to both coalitions (see Table B-2 for a listing of those states and Figure B-3 for a breakout of total support). For example, South Korea provided troops to both coalitions; Ukraine provided troops only to the Iraq coalition; and such European powers as France and Germany provided troops only to Afghanistan. Sixteen of the 37 troop-contributing states in the Second Gulf War also contributed troops to Afghanistan. These states are Australia, Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Italy, Lithuania, Mongolia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. While this dissertation is not analyzing the Afghanistan coalition, the baseline of U.S. foreign assistance for these states must be considered carefully insofar as their support of the Afghanistan coalition

in 2001 might be the result of foreign assistance, but also might be the result of the dramatic events of September 11, 2001.

Before examining how the U.S. attempts to use foreign aid as a strategy for coalition building, we first must understand who receives foreign assistance and why. Foreign assistance has two primary goals, first, to advance the strategic objectives of the donor and, second, to assist in the economic, military, and social development of the recipient state. From the perspective of coalition-building, the U.S. provides foreign assistance primarily for strategic reasons. Donor states around the world are those developed, industrialized states that have sufficient available resources, plus the will necessary to carry out a successful assistance program. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is made up of states that meet that requirement. The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) consists of 23 modern, industrialized states/organizations and is comprised of Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, U.S., and the European Commission (OECD 2007-2008). This list of donors helps explain why ten troop-contributing states in Table B-4 do not receive U.S. foreign assistance or at least very little. Australia, Denmark, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Spain, and the United Kingdom make up those states that do not receive U.S. assistance, while Portugal does receive some International Military Education and Training funding (less than \$1 million per year). Rather than giving foreign assistance, the U.S. relies on emphasizing traditional alliances and rhetoric to influence these states.

Other states have received U.S. foreign assistance. The majority of these states broke away from the Soviet Union in the early 1990s and they continue to move economically and politically toward the West. Eighteen of the 37 troop-contributing states are post-communist states and include Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and the Ukraine. The other states are from either Latin America or the Asia-Pacific region. The four Latin American states are the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, while the Asia-Pacific states are Mongolia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Tonga. The post-communist states have been receiving U.S. foreign assistance since the late 1980s and this continues in the present. According to USAID's FY2010 International Affairs budget request, the actual amount spent in 2008 in assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States amounted to more than \$293 million, plus more than \$396 million in assistance for the independent states of the former Soviet Union.¹⁷ Despite the high cost to the U.S. for the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns, America continues to provide economic and military assistance to its less prosperous allies and friends.

But has U.S. foreign assistance been a part of the U.S. strategy for coalition building? A comparison of the total amount of U.S. foreign assistance with the total troop contributions between 2003 and 2006 reveals a mixed result. Table B-4 shows that aid fluctuated from \$1.56 billion in 2003, the first year of the Iraq war, to a high of \$2.12 billion in 2006, a year when many coalition partners were leaving Iraq. According to Table B-5, in one year, total coalition troops declined from 26,022 in 2005 to 13,951

¹⁷ Department of State website titled, U.S. Department of State International Affairs Account Tables, <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/iab/index.htm>, accessed August 2009.

in 2006. This fluctuation in results is illustrated in the first chart of Figure B-8 in which the amount of U.S. aid decreased in 2004, yet the total number of troops increased that same year. The opposite took place in 2005 in which total U.S. aid increases, while the number of troops decreases. This discrepancy and others will be discussed next.

As previously mentioned, U.S. foreign assistance in a strategy for coalition building for the Second Gulf War is not applied uniformly to every state. This instrument of foreign policy must be focused on those states in which it might have an effect.

Traditional European and Asian-Pacific allies, such as Australia, Denmark, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Spain, and the United Kingdom do not qualify and will not be discussed here. Rather, the focus will be those states receiving U.S. foreign assistance. Putting the spotlight on the post-communist states makes sense since they make up the majority of coalition partners. The first state to consider is Poland, which, along with the U.S., Australia, and the United Kingdom, in 2003 provided substantial troops. Poland began with a small contingent of troops that participated in the invasion of Iraq, the only other European state to do so besides the United Kingdom. Poland's support of the Iraq campaign continued and increased during the reconstruction phase. But why show so much support to America while the rest of Europe resisted providing troops? The answer might be found in the fact that the United States provided substantial financial support to Poland in the post-Cold War era. Between 1990 and 2000, USAID delivered more than \$1 billion to support Poland in its transformation from communism to a market-oriented democracy.¹⁸ The chart on Poland in Figure B-8 of Appendix B shows increasing aid provided to Poland for its

¹⁸ USAID website titled, Europe and Eurasia, http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/countries/pl, accessed August 2009.

robust coalition support up until 2005. It also shows the decline in U.S. aid in 2006 after Poland reduced its troops. The spike in U.S. assistance in 2005 coincides with the Polish government's plans to reduce Polish troops in the coalition. By February 2005, with Iraqi parliamentary elections held, many countries, including Poland, contemplated withdrawing their troops. The high cost in lives and money along with the low public opinion polls at home were powerful incentives to rethink coalition participation. Poland had already announced plans to withdraw troops and a 2005 spike in U.S. assistance was intended to slow down or stop those plans. Poland, however, did reduce its troop contribution in 2006 and eventually pulled all of its troops from Iraq in October 2008. As a result, U.S. foreign assistance to Poland was reduced. According to USAID's FY2009 International Affairs Budget, the actual amount sent to Poland in 2007 was \$30.53 million; a slight reduction from 2006. In 2008, U.S. assistance to Poland again was reduced to \$28.98 million and the FY2009 request was the same. The initial drop in U.S. assistance occurred in 2006 and aid was reduced by 59 percent as Polish reduced its troops in Iraq by 30 percent. These percentages are just one example of the connection between U.S. foreign assistance and coalition partner troop contribution and are not meant to hold constant across all cases. Rather, the amounts of U.S. foreign assistance given to state X and state X's troop contribution in Iraq can vary. There are three reasons for this. First, the U.S. goal to obtain cooperation from key allies and friends involves payment, even when troops are not involved. Second, the fiscal realities of two wartime campaigns affect the amount of resources the U.S. can apply to foreign assistance as a coalition-building tool. Third, as noted earlier, not all coalition troop contributions are equal.

As the U.S. initiated the process of forming a “coalition of the willing” prior to the invasion of Iraq, the unpopularity of a second Iraq war reduced the number of potential coalition members. Inducements to join the coalition before, during, and after the invasion of Iraq were often referred to as the “coalition of the wanting” or the “coalition of the billing” (Richard 2003). One such example was the U.S. effort in late 2002 into early 2003 to persuade Turkey to allow the U.S. entry into northern Iraq from Turkish territory. This would require substantial Turkish support. In addition to the use of Turkish bases from which the U.S. would operate, convoys of U.S. equipment and troops would have to pass through Turkey. Discussions within the U.S. administration included providing Turkey with \$6 billion of incentives in exchange for Turkey’s permission and support. While the Turkish parliament eventually rejected the U.S. request, the U.S. did provide \$1 billion in economic support funds in 2003.¹⁹ Other allies that received additional incentives to be supportive of the Iraq War and yet not provide troops included Israel, Egypt, and Jordan. Comparing the amounts of U.S. aid given to Israel, Egypt, and Jordan for both Gulf wars is instructive. In fiscal year 1990, Israel received over \$4.5 billion, Egypt received over \$3.5 billion, and Jordan received over \$169 million. In fiscal year 2003, Israel received over \$4.1 billion, Egypt received over \$1.9 billion, and Jordan received over \$1.9 billion from the U.S. for their cooperation in the Gulf region. Israel and Jordan did not provide troops to either conflict, while Egypt provided troops for the First Gulf War, but not the Second Gulf War. For the Second Gulf War, while Israeli troops were not even a consideration, the U.S. would have welcomed Egyptian and

¹⁹ As noted earlier, the 2003 ESF supplemental of \$1 billion to Turkey was eventually rescinded in 2005 due to the terms of the agreement not being followed by Turkey. The original data can be found in the U.S. Department of State website titled, International Affairs Account Tables, <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/iab/index.htm>, accessed August 2009.

Jordanian troops. Compared to the First Gulf War coalition, the limited number of Muslim troops in the Second Gulf War coalition is a glaring deficiency. The only coalition members with sizable Muslim populations were Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Taken together, these two countries have provided a total of 180 troops – or about 0.1 percent of the coalition total. As discussed earlier, part of the legitimacy of the First Gulf War coalition came from the variety of states providing troops to the effort. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members that participated in the First Gulf War prevented Saddam Hussein from claiming a “West versus East” conflict. Muslim participation in the Second Gulf War coalition was much more limited and hence cast a shadow of doubt on the legitimacy of the coalition.

By the time the invasion of Iraq occurred, the U.S. had already been in Afghanistan 18 months. The cost of providing support to U.S. troops in Afghanistan, as well as the cost of the ensuing Iraq invasion, occupation, and reconstruction posed real fiscal challenges. These economic challenges grew as the conflicts in both theaters continued. For example, in FY2003, the U.S. allocated over \$507 million in foreign assistance to Afghanistan and that amount grew to over \$2.6 billion by 2005.²⁰ The same magnitude of increase in foreign assistance occurred in Iraq as the U.S. attempted to stabilize it. For FY2003, the U.S. provided Iraq with over \$274 million in foreign assistance and by FY2006, the amount was over \$1.5 billion.²¹ Much has been written about the cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and it should be acknowledged here that this dissertation only considers foreign assistance accounted

²⁰ Department of State website titled, U.S. Department of State International Affairs Account Tables, <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/iab/index.htm>, accessed August 2009.

²¹ Ibid.

for in the State and Defense Department budgets. This is important to note since calculating the cost for Iraq and Afghanistan by such other U.S. government agencies as the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Congressional Research Service (CRS), White House Budget Office, and Department of Defense vary considerably. For example, the CRS, when calculating the cost of the two wars, estimates the allocation of all funds appropriated to deploy troops and their equipment, conduct military operations, provide in-country support at bases, provide special pay for deployed personnel, and repair, replace, and upgrade war-torn equipment (Belasco 2009:2). The numbers presented by CRS are staggering. Belasco (2009:8) reports that, if the FY2009 supplemental request was enacted as proposed, total war funding from FY2001 to 2009 would be allocated as follows: \$684 billion for Iraq (73 percent), \$223 billion for Afghanistan (24 percent), and \$28 billion for enhanced security (3 percent) which covers force protection projects. This dissertation, however, remains true to the term “foreign assistance” and does not consider these other budget items. However you consider the costs of the present Iraq war and Afghanistan war, the remaining scarce resources for coalition partners assisting the U.S. have to be allocated with care. Hence, there are cases where states increase their troop contribution in Iraq, yet the amount of U.S. foreign assistance goes down, a decrease relative to the overall decrease of the foreign assistance budget.

Examining State Department foreign assistance budgets from 2003 to 2006 reveals two trends in the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program. These trends are the targeted states receiving funding and the use of supplemental funding. The State Department website describes FMF as a critical instrument to “further U.S. interests

around the world by ensuring [that] coalition partners and friendly foreign governments are equipped and trained to work toward common security goals and share burdens in joint missions.”²² Clearly, the FMF has been an important part of coalition building for both Iraq and Afghanistan. In FY2003, European and Eurasian states received over \$252 million in FMF. Twenty-six states received aid that year and all but one of those states were contributing troops or bases to the Iraq or Afghanistan coalition. Malta was the lone exception, it received \$5 million for its role in combating illicit trafficking (arms, drugs, and persons) in the Mediterranean. By FY2004, only those states (23 in total) assisting the Iraq and Afghanistan campaigns received funding. The majority (18) of those were part of the Iraq coalition. This trend of focusing on the Iraq coalition states continues in FY2005. Out of the nineteen European and Eurasian states receiving funding, only two, Slovenia and Turkey, are not part of the Iraq coalition. By this time, however, Slovenia was being recruited to join the NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTMI) and Turkey remained an important border state with Iraq as coalition convoys transit via the Habur Gate on the Turkish-Iraq border. The same nineteen states received FMF in FY2006 with Slovenia joining the NTMI in January of that year.

The use of supplemental funding is another way for the U.S. to reward coalition partners contributing to the Iraq coalition. In the first year of the Second Gulf War, despite the rising costs of the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns, the U.S. added supplemental funding to Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and the Ukraine. All these

²² Department of State website titled, Summary and Highlights, International Affairs Function 150, Fiscal Year 2010 Budget Request, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/122513.pdf>, accessed September 2009.

states joined the Iraq coalition either before or immediately after the invasion. This trend of supplemental funding also held true for the Philippines, which joined the coalition in 2003 and contributed troops. While overall funding decreased over the 2003 to 2006 timeframe, the supplemental funding slowed that decline for these targeted states. This trend of declining foreign assistance can be seen in the charts in Figure B-6 in Appendix B. While 2003 is the only year of supplemental FMF funding for these states, it is the most important year because the U.S. sought coalition partners for the Second Gulf War.

By midyear 2004, after the invasion of Iraq, a number of coalition partners joined the U.S.-led effort in the reconstruction efforts and others already there increased their troop contributions. Excluding the two largest contingents (U.S. and U.K.), who accounted for 90 percent of all coalition troops deployed, the next five states, Italy, Poland, the Ukraine, Spain, and the Netherlands, each had between 1,000 and 3,000 troops deployed. Only two, Poland and the Ukraine, received U.S. foreign assistance. The Ukraine joined the Iraq coalition in August 2003 with a robust 1,600-strong mechanized brigade that served with the Polish-led multinational division in south-central Iraq. The chart in Figure B-8 in Appendix B shows the consistent troop levels provided by the Ukraine over a three year period. During that time, U.S. foreign assistance declined, then increased in 2005. This increase was in response to the January 11, 2005, Ukraine parliament (Rada) resolution requesting President Leonid Kuchma (in his final days in office, pending Viktor Yushchenko's inauguration) to order the Defense Ministry to present a plan for bringing all troops home without delay (Socor 2005). By increasing the Ukraine's foreign assistance in 2005, the U.S. hoped to

persuade the incoming Ukrainian leadership to keep troops in Iraq. The U.S. ambassador to the Ukraine, John Herbst, declared that “such an important decision should not be taken by an interim government, and Washington is going to talk this issue over with the new government” (Socor 2005). This attempt failed and all Ukrainian troops left Iraq by December 2005. Subsequent to this, U.S. foreign assistance to the Ukraine dropped in 2006 by 34 percent to \$96.98 million, down from the 2005 level of \$148.09 million. This example illustrates that U.S. foreign assistance is part of a strategy to build and maintain a military coalition for selected and targeted states.

Poland is an example of a state that bucked the trend of continued declining U.S. foreign assistance dollars over the years from 2001 to 2007. This is illustrated in Figure B-6 in Appendix B as U.S. assistance rose from \$17.5 million in 2001, peaking at \$92.7 million in 2005. Along with the U.S., the U.K., and Australia, Poland joined the Second Gulf War coalition at its inception. U.S. foreign assistance to Poland in 2003 was \$32.1 million (see Table B-4) and U.S. assistance continued to climb and eventually spiked in 2005 to \$92.7 million, an increase of 35 percent. This influx of U.S. dollars can be explained by the intent on the part of the Polish government to remove their troops from Iraq by the end of 2005. Unlike the Ukraine, however, Poland decided to keep their troops in Iraq, but reduced the total number in 2006. A reduction in U.S. foreign assistance to Poland followed. Polish troops eventually left Iraq in October 2008.

Another post-communist state that was influenced by U.S. foreign assistance was Georgia. As the chart in Figure B-8 depicts, U.S. foreign aid to Georgia remained fairly constant from 2002 to 2005. In 2005, Georgia increased their troops from 200 to 850.

Consequently, U.S. aid increased from just over \$100 million in 2005 to just over \$400 million in 2006. The increase in Georgian troops was a result of a U.S.-led Georgia Train and Equip Program that began in 2002 and was completed in 2004. The formation of these troops was the culmination of U.S. Special Forces and U.S. Marines providing instruction on joint military doctrine, command and control training, and staff and organizational training for the Georgian Ministry of Defense and Land Forces Command, in addition to unit-level tactical training for the Georgian commando battalion.²³ The \$300 million increase in U.S. assistance to Georgia in 2006 was the result of a jump in economic assistance, specifically in the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) account. According to the MCC website, the U.S. signed the agreement for the increase in economic assistance in 2005, but the agreement was actually implemented in 2006. Georgia, like Poland and Ukraine, received U.S. foreign assistance as part of a U.S. strategy to remain in the coalition with different effects.

So if troop contributing states were rewarded, what happened to those states that did not join the coalition? The high profile states that did not contribute to the Second Gulf War coalition included Germany, France, Canada, Egypt, Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Out of these states, only Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey received U.S. foreign assistance. All three states were energetically pursued by the Bush administration as key components of the Second Gulf War coalition. Egypt's participation in the First Gulf War was crucial to legitimizing Arab solidarity against Iraq. Twelve years later, however, Egypt was reluctant to join another U.S.-led coalition without serious

²³ U.S. European Command website titled, Georgia Train and Equip Program Transitions to U.S. Marines, November 22, 2002, <http://www.eucom.mil/English/FullStory.asp?art=%7BE78619B9-76F4-476C-941B-5D7C108DC7C7%7D>, accessed September 2009.

consideration by the U.S. of the Israeli-Palestinian issue. In the run-up to the Second Gulf War, violence between the Israelis and Palestinians was escalating. Richard Haass (2009:206), principal advisor to Secretary of State Colin Powell from 2001 to 2003, related a comment made to him by a senior Egyptian official: “If you attack Iraq, I’ll be happy to go in on the first tank...but first you must do something to improve the situation of the Palestinians.” Egypt was not the only state who wanted to link a Middle East peace plan to the situation in Iraq. Correspondent Simon Marks, in an interview with Bassem Awadallah, Jordan’s minister of planning and a close aide to King Abdullah, discovered the Palestinian link is also strong in Jordan. Awadallah concluded that “when you speak about Iraq, immediately people mention Palestine, immediately...[T]hat is the reaction; they cannot separate the two issues.”²⁴ This link between Egypt and Jordan supporting an Iraq coalition and the U.S. support of a pro-Palestinian Middle East peace plan complicated the U.S. strategy of coalition building.

The use of U.S. foreign assistance as an incentive to join the coalition is evident in these states as outlined below. Figure B-9 in Appendix B depicts U.S. foreign assistance to Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey between 2001 and 2007. Both Egypt and Jordan realized an increase in U.S. aid in 2002 and 2003 as the U.S. was building support for a coalition to address Iraq’s non-compliance with numerous U.N. resolutions. Egypt received 22 percent more aid in 2003 than in 2001. After Egypt’s decision not to cooperate with the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq, Egypt’s overall aid from the U.S. dropped 29 percent between 2003 and 2005. The rise and fall of U.S. aid

²⁴ Public Broadcasting Service website titled, *NewsHour* with Jim Lehrer transcript, The War Next Door, March 31, 2003, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/jan-june03/jordan_03-31.html, accessed September 2009.

to Jordan is even more dramatic. In 2003, Jordan received 83 percent more U.S. aid than in 2001, but after its non-cooperation with the U.S.-led coalition, Jordan's share plummeted by 59 percent in U.S. aid. Turkey is another key regional partner that was sought as a coalition member. Turkey's location on Iraq's northern border would allow the U.S. to have a second front and split Iraq's military forces. In addition, the use of Incirlik Air Base in Turkey as a base of combat operations would reduce the logistic footprint of U.S. forces in the area. However, Turkey was reluctant to participate in a war with its neighbor. The prospect was unpopular with the Turkish people and Turkey was worried about the effect it would have on Turkey's Kurdish people. The U.S. nearly doubled its aid to Turkey in 2003 compared to 2001 levels giving Turkey a \$1 billion supplement. When the Turkish Parliament rejected a U.S. proposal to allow U.S. forces access to Turkish bases and territory, U.S. aid to Turkey dropped by 94 percent by 2005 compared to 2003 levels. While all three states experienced a temporary drop in U.S. aid, overall U.S. assistance eventually increased and by 2007 exceeded 2001 aid levels. U.S. foreign assistance was employed as a tool to encourage these states to join the Iraq coalition and was also an instrument to express U.S. displeasure when they did not comply. Despite this, the important geostrategic locations of these states to the region compelled the U.S. to continue to support Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey with U.S. foreign assistance, albeit at lower levels, despite their absence from the coalition.

To summarize the arguments of this chapter, the U.S. strategy for coalition building in the First Gulf War did not include using foreign assistance as a coercive tool. However, in the Second Gulf War, the U.S. did have some limited success by manipulating foreign assistance to targeted states. In the First Gulf War, foreign

assistance to troop-contributing states increased from 1988 to 1990 but then decreased from 1990 to 1993. Rewards for coalition participation were not realized by most troop-contributing states. Egypt provides evidence of this mixed result. Although Egypt provided political and substantial troop support to the U.S. coalition, U.S. foreign assistance to Egypt decreased by \$90M from 1990 to 1991. However, for its coalition participation, Egypt was rewarded with debt relief by the United States. U.S. foreign assistance to most coalition partners either remained steady or was reduced from 1990 to 1991. Bangladesh was the only partner to receive a significant increase (\$37M) from 1990 to 1991. This can be contrasted with the increases in U.S. foreign assistance during the Second Gulf War. During the critical period of 2003 to 2006 when the larger post-conflict coalition was being built, the U.S. foreign assistance program for most troop-contributing states also remained steady or was reduced. However, the U.S. did target certain post-communist and Central Asia states that were critical to adding flags to the coalition. Poland, Georgia, and Ukraine were each enticed with additional aid for either adding more troops or keeping troops in Iraq. The largest aid increase involved adding \$300M to Georgia in 2006 for their additional 650 troops. The U.S. coalition building strategy in the Second Gulf War included using foreign assistance as a coercive tool, however, the effect was limited.

Bridging traditional allies and U.S. foreign assistance in these U.S. strategies is very difficult because most traditional allies do not receive U.S. foreign assistance. For example, in the First Gulf War, Greece was the only traditional ally providing troops that received U.S. foreign assistance. From 1990 to 1991, U.S. foreign assistance to Greece remained unchanged. Turkey is an example of a traditional ally that did not

provide troops but did provide critical support (basing, overflight, logistics) to U.S. efforts in Iraq. U.S. foreign assistance to Turkey increased \$619M from 1990 to 1991. In the Second Gulf War, none of the traditional allies that provided troops received U.S. foreign assistance. Therefore, bridging traditional allies and foreign assistance in U.S. coalition building strategies is not fruitful.

Using foreign assistance as a tool to coerce certainly has its limits. The resources applied to the effort are limited and in most cases, inadequate. Other foreign policy tools are better suited to influence another state to join a U.S.-led coalition. Being a traditional ally of the U.S. is one part of a strategy in coalition building; using foreign assistance is another; rhetoric voiced by a senior U.S. leader is a third. The last, rhetoric, can be expressed through public or traditional diplomacy; either way, U.S. senior leaders were engaged in a practice to influence and coerce other leaders to join U.S.-led coalitions. The next chapter will explore how senior U.S. leader rhetoric was employed during the First and Second Gulf wars.

CHAPTER 5 RHETORIC

In war, the first casualty is truth

- Senator Hiram Johnson, 1917¹

The use of rhetoric in politics is not new. Presidential use of the “bully pulpit” is well documented by academics, the media, and think tanks. According to Jeffrey Tulis (1987) presidential rhetoric can be broken down into three eras. The first era began with the first United States (U.S.) President, George Washington, and lasted until the late 1800s. During this time, presidents rarely spoke in public and rarely addressed Congress directly (Kennedy-Shaffer 2006). The second era includes the late 1800s to the early part of the twentieth century. During this era, the use of rhetoric was limited and used to influence policy. Alan Kennedy-Shaffer (2006:24) uses the example of President Theodore Roosevelt who “employed rhetoric as an informational tool that could be used to accompany his major policy pronouncements.” The final era, which continues to the present, is commonly referred to as the presidential “bully pulpit.” Kennedy-Shaffer (24) explains that presidents during this era “traveled around the country, attempting to rhetorically persuade Congress and the public of the soundness of their positions.” Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations provide a good example of this use of rhetoric.

Not all scholars agree with this framework of presidential rhetoric and argue instead that U.S. Presidents have always engaged in rhetoric for political purposes. For example, Elizabeth Frost (1988:xiii) claims that “from George Washington to Ronald

¹ Conroy, Thomas and Jarice Hanson. (2008) *Constructing America's War Culture*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 112.

Reagan, America's presidents have used their office to speak out on every conceivable subject." Of course, presidential rhetoric did not stop with Ronald Reagan; it also applies to the four presidents since Frost's 1988 book, *The Bully Pulpit*. While the study of rhetoric in domestic politics is quite common, studies of its use in international contexts is less so and studies of its use in building international coalitions even less. Whereas Vejai Balasubramaniam (1999:2789) finds the use of rhetoric has an important place in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), in that case the role of rhetoric encourages non-involvement in coalitions. Martha Medhurst et al. (1990:14) examine the rhetorical histories (political, social, and economic) of the Cold War from the standpoint of maintaining a coalition or alliance, but not from a coalition formation standpoint. There are studies of the two Gulf wars that address rhetoric, but most focus on the domestic aspect of the issue. While the same rhetoric can be useful for domestic and international consumption, the topics are often analyzed separately. The focus on the domestic side asks, how did the U.S. administration convince Congress and the public to go to war? One such example is Nicholas O'Shaughnessy's *Politics and Propaganda* (2004), which studies the Bush administration's rhetorical case for invading Iraq. This study notes the meaning, content, and significance of the word "propaganda," using such concepts as symbolism, rhetoric, and myth, but does not address the use of rhetoric in forming a coalition.

This chapter will demonstrate the role that U.S. senior leader rhetoric had in coalition building strategies for the two Gulf wars. Rhetoric, as a means to persuade or coerce, can be traced back to ancient Greece and is still used today. This chapter examines the fear-mongering rhetoric of U.S. senior leaders in the lead-up to and during

the formation of military coalitions for the First and Second Gulf Wars. The target audiences of this rhetoric are those potential troop-contributing states that are allies and friends of the United States. Therefore, presidential speeches and remarks are analyzed for such rhetoric as well as speeches and remarks from the secretaries of state and defense. This rhetoric does not have to be directed or targeted at specific states to be effective. These U.S. senior leaders' remarks are widely reported in various forums and this dissertation assumes that intended targets receive the message. By analyzing public statements of U.S. senior leaders, this chapter will support the thesis that the U.S. coalition building strategy emphasized fear-mongering rhetoric in both the First and Second Gulf Wars.

But what is rhetoric and why is it important? Evan Cornog (2004:5) argues that "rhetoric is the art of persuasion, and stories are the vessels of rhetoric [while] presidential life stories are the most important tools of persuasion in American political life." Nicholas O'Shaughnessy (2004:65) states that "rhetoric is emotional persuasion and its core is therefore emotion." While Medhurst et al. (1990:8) describe rhetoric as "simply one perspective among others to take in struggling to understand the past...like any perspective it will have its frailties and advantages." For the purposes of this dissertation, the definition provided by John Nelson (1998:xv) is appropriate for its simplicity and flexibility: "rhetoric as stylized persuasion." The definition of rhetoric as "stylized persuasion" reminds us that rhetoric should be considered an art and not a science because its use and results cannot be duplicated for every situation. The examination of U.S. senior leader rhetoric in both Gulf wars should reveal the U.S. strategy of using fear-mongering rhetoric to persuade other states to join both coalitions.

The importance of rhetoric in the international context and specifically for coalition building is inseparable from the sentiment of the quote by Senator Hiram Johnson at the start of this chapter. There is no doubt that in both Gulf wars (as with all wars in the past), the first casualty is truth. As previously mentioned in Chapter 2, the U.S. and other states have used fear of an “other” to justify their foreign policy. This chapter examines the use of negative rhetoric in U.S. strategies to build international coalitions against Iraq in both Gulf wars.

Demonstrating the use of political rhetoric to persuade others to join an international coalition as part of a U.S. strategy in both Gulf wars is the purpose of this chapter. First, an examination of the U.S. history of the use of rhetoric will present how it has been studied in the past. The debate on the use of rhetoric has continued since ancient Greece. Recent studies of rhetoric have focused on the fine line between persuasion and propaganda. Nicholas Cull et al. (2003) examine persuasion and propaganda from a historical perspective and find most definitions of propaganda lacking. Instead, Cull et al. (2003:318-319) claim the “aim of propaganda is to persuade its subject that there is only one valid point of view and to eliminate all other options.” The next section will outline the data employed in this chapter to help distinguish among the types of rhetoric that are in use. The focus for both Gulf wars will be the fear-mongering rhetoric employed by both Bush administrations and hence certain key words from certain key actors in the roles of president, secretary of state, and secretary of defense, will be the focus of the analysis. Next we investigate U.S. senior leader’s use of negative rhetoric in the First Gulf War, which demonized Iraq. It will reveal the fear-mongering rhetoric of Iraq’s “aggression” towards its neighbors that contributed to

coalition building. The theme of this U.S. rhetoric emphasized the fact that Iraq's invasion of Kuwait showed its "aggression," the future possibility of Iraq invading Saudi Arabia, and the threat of Iraq controlling the Gulf oil reserves. This pattern of demonizing Iraq was repeated in the Second Gulf War, but with different themes focusing more on the U.S. insistence that Iraq was tied to "terror" and "weapons of mass destruction." The theme of U.S. rhetoric leading up to the Second Gulf War emphasized Iraq's defiance in weapons inspections but more importantly the possibility of Iraq obtaining nuclear capability that could tip the balance of power in the region as well as lead to weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terrorists. In both Gulf wars, U.S. rhetoric emphasized the potential of a future threat versus the present threat posed by Iraq as the greatest concern that allies and friends must take into account. Hence, both Gulf War coalitions were built on images of what might be and not what was.

The analysis of rhetoric continues in contemporary social science research. Kimberly Neuendorf (2002:27) notes that rhetoric has a long history of use in communications, journalism, sociology, psychology, and business. In fact, the long history of communications study can be traced back to its European roots in the 1860s and the important research conducted by scholars, including Harold Lasswell (1931), Kurt Lewin (1939), Carl Hovland (1948), and Paul Lazarsfeld (1952-1953).² These scholars did most of their writing between the 1930s and 1950s. Lasswell, for example, famous for his research into wartime propaganda, developed an important

² These and other important social scientists are outlined in works such as *Propaganda and Persuasion* (1986) by Jowett and O'Donnell, and *A History of Communication Study: A Biographical Approach* (1994) by Rogers.

communication tool: content analysis. Everett Rogers (1994:214) describes content analysis as the “investigation of communication messages by categorizing message content into classifications in order to measure certain variables.” By analyzing World War I and II propaganda messages used by Allied and Axis members, Lasswell distinguished ways in which states attempted to divide the enemy, demoralize the enemy, and accuse the enemy of barbaric atrocities. He justified this type of analysis by stating that “[S]hould the United States become more intimately involved in the war, it would be important for us to formulate war aims in terms that would strengthen rather than weaken the morale of our allies...[W]e need, therefore, to keep a watchful eye on the role of political symbols in the lives of our potential allies.”³ This focus on political symbols (fear-mongering rhetoric) and the concern for potential allies is the cornerstone of this chapter. This is not to suggest that rhetoric is always negative in context. In the First Gulf War, the U.S. and its allies employed positive rhetoric associated with promoting democracy, protecting state sovereignty and the rights of the Kuwaiti people.

The U.S. strategy for coalition building in both Gulf wars was also aided by a concerted U.S. effort to demonize the enemy using political symbols. Fear-mongering rhetoric of Iraq and its leader, Saddam Hussein, was one part of the U.S. strategy to convince states to join the international coalition. This practice of producing powerful messages to achieve policy objectives has been implemented in the past and will be in the future. As K.P. O'Reilly (2007:296) notes, “tracing the development of the rogue ‘demonology,’ points to an evolution where in the 1980s concerns over terrorism were transformed into fears of a third-world power acquiring weapons of mass destruction.”

³ Laswell's proposal (1939) is held in New York in the Rockefeller Archive Center, Record Group RF RG1.1, Series 200R, Box 239, Folder 2852.

This theme will play out again in the Second Gulf War as Iraq becomes associated with the wider war on terror amid the U.S. claim of Iraq's effort to hide its weapons of mass destruction. Michael Klare (1995:27–28) observes that “from 1990 on, the general model of a ‘rogue state’ ruled by an ‘outlaw regime’ armed with chemical and nuclear weapons became the standard currency of national security discourse.” These rogue states included the “Axis of Evil” states of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. It is clear the history of rhetoric as stylized persuasion has explored both the good and bad intent of the spoken word. The strategy of using fear-mongering rhetoric by U.S. senior leaders in both Gulf wars is an extension of this emphasis in rhetorical history. In both Gulf wars, the U.S. undeniably employed rhetoric to demonize Iraq and Saddam Hussein.

With the advent of computers, the use of content analysis to analyze texts has expanded geometrically. Various software programs are available to assist the researcher by providing sophisticated text analysis. Most content analysis studies are quantitative in nature. Many powerful computer programs allow the researcher to identify, sort, and count words and phrases in massive amounts of text. This is accomplished by using on-board dictionaries for text analysis. These dictionaries provide the researcher a means to measure different concepts. This data can then be gathered into a database that then can be statistically analyzed. As noted in Chapter 1, Weber (1990:41) identifies a number of content analysis techniques, including: word frequency counts, key-word-in-context (KWIC) listings, concordances (a form of cross-referencing between or among related words), classification of words into content categories, content category counts, and retrievals based on content categories and co-occurrences. Content analysis computer software programs make these techniques

manageable for a researcher to analyze large samples of texts. Research for this dissertation did not require very sophisticated software because this analysis centers on simple word frequency counts and can be accomplished using Microsoft Word and Excel functions. However, just because a method of data analysis is simple in comparison to statistical analysis does not mean the conclusions are any less valid. Weber (1990:12) states that “many of these simple techniques produce highly reliable and valid indicators of symbolic content.” Of course, whether using sophisticated or simple techniques, certain concerns about content analysis data collection are always an issue.

Weber (1990) identifies these concerns as measurement, indication, representation, and interpretation. In content analysis, measurement consists of counting the occurrences of meaning units, such as specific words, phrases, content categories, and themes (Weber 1990:70). One problem that can occur is when numerous words are counted within a certain category. For example, “skirmish” and “battle” could be categorized under the term “war” since both refer to military activities. However, each term (skirmish, battle) might have different values placed on them by a user and that could skew the results of the analysis. This concern is mitigated within this analysis by counting words that stand alone. A problem particular to this analysis, however, could be that all words are considered to have equal value, which might not be the intent of the user. This possibility could affect the meaning of the message being delivered. By collecting data from influential actors in the roles of president, secretary of state, and secretary of defense, within the two Bush administrations, this effect should be diminished. In addition, counting words alone is not enough. David Hays (1967:19)

argues that the “method of assigning properties to words and counting appearances of properties is insufficient; the content of a message should be analyzed in terms of what has gone before, in terms of the relationship between the message and what the sender or receiver already knows.” Therefore, the context of those words in the text is important for the analysis to come. According to Weber (1990:74), indication is the second problem in content analysis because indication “refers to inferences made by the investigator of some unmeasured or latent characteristics of text using numbers that represent some manifest aspect of the text.” The analysis of certain key words to show fear-mongering rhetoric in both Gulf wars is precisely the issue that Weber identifies. Indication is a major problem when quantification of the data is the major part of the research. To mitigate the effects of indication in this study, the context of the key words will be emphasized and a qualitative analysis of that context will highlight the fear-mongering rhetoric. Weber’s (1990:76) third concern is representation, which is a problem in content analysis when coding procedures (human or computer) do not “encode or represent the richness of language or of specific texts.” The various meanings or nuances of words need to be acknowledged and could be a problem when selecting key words to study. The example provided by Weber is the word “state” which has 41 different meanings in the Oxford English Dictionary (1989). Keeping the selection of key words simple and straightforward will reduce the effect of representation. The final problem of content analysis concerns interpretation, which Weber (77) notes “consists of translating one set of linguistic or linguistically expressed elements into another.” Part of this problem involves translating text from one language to another. Meanings of words can change based on the translator. While this is not an

issue in this study, the other part of interpretation centers on concerns that two people reading the same text will interpret that text differently. As Weber (80) concludes, “just as it is true that quantitative data do not speak for themselves...so is it true that texts do not speak for themselves either.” The function of the researcher is to heed this warning and provide an objective analysis based on theory. It is only through theory that an appropriate interpretation of the text can be outlined for the reader to accept or reject. It is hoped that concern for interpretation has been taken into account in this chapter. Overall, Siobhan McEvoy-Levy (2001:1) argues that “a rhetoric and theme-centered approach, when used in conjunction with established foreign policy process models, may be a valuable tool for explaining and understanding United States foreign policy...[C]urrently, it is undervalued as such a tool but, given the importance of public diplomacy to the survival and effectiveness of administrations, it is particularly useful in a U.S. context.”

To empirically assess the use of rhetoric for coalition building, a database was constructed compiling the public statements of selected U.S. foreign policy elites for two distinct periods. The first period, from August 2, 1990, to January 17, 1991, encompasses the time between the Iraq invasion of Kuwait and the start of the First Gulf War. This period is when the U.S. administration built a coalition of states to diplomatically, economically, and militarily answer the “aggression” of Iraq. The second period, from January 1, 2003, to June 30, 2003, encompasses the time from ten weeks prior to the start of the Second Gulf War to approximately 16 weeks after. This period is when the U.S. assembled the small coalition for the Iraq invasion and began to build a larger coalition for post-conflict stability operations. Each database totals the frequency

of the use of the fear-mongering terms “terror,” “Hitler,” “dictator,” “weapon,” and “aggression.” Choosing which words to focus on in any content analysis is a difficult, but necessary, exercise. Words need to be chosen that express the concept being measured. In this case, words need to be chosen that will reflect the fear-mongering rhetoric of senior U.S. administration officials. “Terror” certainly conveys fear and is apropos of the concern of terrorism in the post-Cold War era. Other words, such as fear, horror, fright, dread, shock, panic, or alarm, could have been used for analysis, but would not capture the connection to terrorism that both administrations voiced. The use of “Hitler” in this analysis stems from the comparisons made between Saddam Hussein and the infamous German dictator by President H.W. Bush in the First Gulf War. Bush and Scowcroft (1998:375) note that President Bush “caught hell on this comparison of Saddam to Hitler, with critics accusing me of personalizing the crisis, but I still feel it was an appropriate one.” Owing to the amount of attention the use of the name “Hitler” received in both the media and academia, analyzing its use in both Gulf wars is appropriate. “Dictator” is one of those terms that might have other appropriate synonyms, such as ruler, tyrant, despot, autocrat, totalitarian, or authoritarian, but it cannot be construed as anything but negative and hence connotes fear-mongering. The word “dictator” is one way to demonize a person, a regime, a system, or a state. In both Gulf wars, both Bush administrations were trying to paint Iraq as a dictatorship and Saddam Hussein as a dictator who repressed his own people and had evil intentions toward his neighbors and the world. Like “terror,” the use of “weapon” was specifically chosen for its relationship to terrorism in general in the post-Cold War era. In both Gulf wars, the concern over chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological weapons in the

hands of a rogue regime or state played a major role in shaping U.S. rhetoric. Those presumed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) could fall into the hands of terrorists harboring ill intent toward the United States. By focusing on “weapon,” the word frequency count can capture the use of the word, whether talking about a particular WMD or as WMDs in general. Finally, “aggression” is chosen to highlight Iraq’s characteristic nature, as promulgated by both Bush administrations. With its war with Iran and the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq had proven over time that it demonstrated “aggression” toward its neighbors. With the real possibility of Iraq possessing WMDs, the fear-mongering rhetoric using “aggression” could now paint Iraq as being an aggressor in the Middle East region. The selection of any or all of these terms could be questioned as being less than optimal to capture fear-mongering rhetoric from U.S. senior leaders but each term focuses on a specific aspect of that rhetoric and provides a piece of the assemblage of that rhetoric over time.

The policy roles chosen for the analysis are the president, secretary of state, and secretary of defense. Analysis of their selected public statements generates both quantitative and qualitative data for use in answering the research question. For each role, slightly different document search methods were used due to the various archiving practices and protocols of the respective agencies. For the secretary of defense, following the method used by O’Reilly (2007), the Department of Defense website was searched for all public statements and remarks by the secretaries of defense Richard Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld containing the term “terror,” “Hitler,” “dictator,” “weapon,” and “aggression” using the site’s built-in search engine. For the Department of State, similar searches were conducted on the archived speeches and remarks of secretaries

of state James Baker and Colin Powell. Additional resources were the Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton University, and the George Bush Presidential Library, College Station, Texas. Regarding presidential speeches, searches with the applicable terms were conducted on the online and hard copy versions of the annually reported *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* for both Bush 41 and 43. These were supplemented with documentation and searches from the George Bush Presidential Library and *The Congressional Record* (hardcopy, online, and microfiche). For example, in the First Gulf War period (August 2, 1990 to January 17, 1991), President Bush spoke 504 times and 180 of those remarks related to Iraq. Each of these 180 remarks was examined and analyzed for fear-mongering rhetoric. The same method was employed for the secretaries of state and defense as well as for the Second Gulf War senior leaders. Where the search engines produced duplicative records of the same statement, where the terms were said by a person other than one of the examined actors (a reporter, foreign official, or the like), or where the term was not applicable due to its specific usage (references not Iraq-related), the data were not included. Additionally, the speeches and remarks examined include domestic and international audiences. A speech does not have to address a particular coalition member to be effective. Since U.S. senior leaders' remarks are widely reported, potential coalition members receive U.S. rhetoric whether the remarks are spoken in front of a domestic or international audience.

Before moving to the specific instances of fear-mongering rhetoric voiced by senior leaders before and during both Gulf wars, an overview of the two time periods is instructive. Figure A-6 in Appendix A shows the quantity of U.S. foreign policy

discourse utilized by policy makers at the highest levels for both Gulf wars. During the two periods examined, both presidents dominate the total amount of fear-mongering rhetoric as the respective Gulf coalitions were being formed. More than 75 percent of the fear-mongering public statements were produced by the two presidents. This should not come as a surprise considering the vested interest that both presidents had in the success of their foreign policy objectives for Iraq and the Middle East. The marked increase in the public statements made by secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld compared to their predecessors in the First Gulf War indicates the increased effort made to convince America's allies, friends, and the U.S. public of the need for a united effort in Iraq. By demonizing Iraq and Saddam Hussein, both administrations in both Gulf wars built their coalitions based on fear-mongering rhetoric. The specifics of how this was accomplished are outlined in the next two sections.

First Gulf War

Very early in the first Gulf crisis, just days after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, U.S. Information Agency Director Bruce Gelb sent a memo to Secretary of State James Baker highlighting the need for an inter-agency effort to garner support for U.S. policy. The four major public affairs themes emphasized were: the U.S. sought a universal, multinational effort; the Gulf crisis has a global economic impact; an early and considered response to aggression is necessary; and U.S. ties to Arab states remain important.⁴ The first theme, a universal, multinational effort, formed the initial public coalition-building arguments. The focus was on highlighting to the world that condemnation of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait was universal. This was evidenced

⁴ "USIA Themes Re Escalating Tensions in Gulf Region," August 7, 1990, ID# 9006418, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

by U.N. Security Council Resolution 660 from August 2, 1990, in which the U.N. Security Council voted 14 to zero (with Yemen not participating) to condemn Iraq and demand the immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. Emphasis also was placed on demonstrating worldwide support, which included such neutral states as Switzerland. Another key part of this theme was aimed at building an international coalition to show that it is not an argument between the U.S. and Iraq or between President Bush and Saddam Hussein. By August 11, 1990, the U.S. welcomed the participation of forces from many states in a joint effort to fight the aggression of Saddam Hussein. Military participation by Australia, Belgium, France, the U.K., and West Germany signaled a high degree of unity among traditional allies of the United States. But the emphasis was not just on traditional allies, as President Bush expressed in his August 29, 1990, radio address, “together with allies, old and new, we have seen a nearly unanimous condemnation of Iraq’s injustices in the Persian Gulf region; and we have been a part of a remarkable international commitment to peace and the rule of law.”⁵

The second public affairs theme focused on the economic impact of Iraq’s actions. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait needed to be exposed as a threat to the economic viability and prospects of virtually every state in the world. This theme of “we are all in this together” emphasized that economic disruption provoked by Iraqi actions impacted not just the oil-importing states of the West and Japan, but on states in the developing world as well. To help alleviate this disruption and show unity against Iraq, on August 11, 1990, the U.S. announced that “Venezuela, Iran, and other states have indicated [the]

⁵ Radio Address to United States Armed Forces Stationed in the Persian Gulf Region, August 29, 1990, ID# 9006418, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

ability to make up for oil shortfalls.”⁶ An early and considered response to aggression was the third U.S. public affairs theme. It focused on the tenet that aggression unanswered early always leads to catastrophe. Legitimacy was emphasized by showing that the world community’s response to Iraqi aggression began, as it should have, in the United Nations. In addition, the use of force was being de-emphasized and shown as being considered only in the face of Iraqi refusals to abide by the terms of the U.N. Resolution 660 and to withdraw from its illegal occupation of Kuwait. This theme was intended to head off attempts to appease Iraq and “pay a price” for the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. The U.S. public affairs theme of U.S. senior leaders rhetoric highlighting Iraq’s “aggression” in their rhetoric is the focus of this chapter.

The final theme concerns the U.S. ties to Arab states and the importance of those ties. Despite the unlawful action of Iraq in the Gulf crisis, the U.S. needed to show it placed the highest value on its bilateral relations with Arab countries with which it enjoyed ties of mutual respect. This theme was bolstered and received legitimacy when Arab states eventually joined the U.S.-led coalition and contributed troops to the operation. On August 11, 2009, President Bush called President Mubarak of Egypt to congratulate him on the successful outcome of the Arab League meeting where passage of a resolution to send Arab troops to participate in the U.S.-led multinational force.⁷ On August 28 , 1990, President Bush noted that “U.S. military forces stand shoulder to shoulder with forces of many Arab and European states to deter, and, if

⁶ Excerpts of a Statement by Press Secretary Fitzwater on the Persian Gulf Crisis, August 11, 1990, ID# 9006418, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

⁷ Excerpts of a Statement by Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater on the Persian Gulf Crisis, August 11, 1990, ID# 9006418, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

need be, defend Saudi Arabia against attack.”⁸ The president’s remarks emphasize the theme that it is Iraq against the majority of the Arab world and Iraq against the rest of the world. The focus for the Bush administration was highlighting the “aggression” of the Iraqi regime. This focus is illustrated in Figure A-7 in Appendix A, which shows “aggression” is used almost 75 percent of the time in U.S. senior leader rhetoric compared to the other four terms (terror, Hitler, dictator, and weapon).

These five fear-mongering terms analyzed during the period of coalition building of the First Gulf War reveals the dominance of the word “aggression” by U.S. senior leaders when addressing Iraqi intentions in the region. “The Bush administration’s emphasis on a coalition approach, especially one that included Arab states such as Egypt and Syria, forced the president to play down any intention of removing Saddam from power...[H]is appeal to other nations rested on their common concern over the danger of external aggression; few were likely to agree to the idea of interfering in the internal affairs of sovereign states” (Divine 2000:131). The aggressive nature of Iraq and its leader, Saddam Hussein, was not only an issue for the other regional states, but also for those outside the region. By highlighting Iraq’s aggression toward its neighbors, the U.S. focused attention on the future possibility of further aggression that would destabilize the Middle East region. An unstable region meant higher energy prices, as the price of oil could be controlled by an aggressive Saddam Hussein. Very early on in the crisis, as the coalition was being formed, the U.S. emphasized both publicly and privately to regional and world leaders Iraq’s aggressive tendencies. President Bush

⁸ Remarks at a White House Briefing for Members of Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis, August 28, 1990, ID# 9006418, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

talked of the need to deter Iraqi aggression and to get Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait by forming a coalition of willing states from Europe and the Middle East. A coalition formed, but not immediately. General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a National Security Council meeting on August 4, 1990, commented that “Saudi Arabia is not doing much to prepare for any of this now.”⁹ President Bush, however, continued his telephone diplomacy with the leaders of the U.K., France, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey. President Turgut Ozal of Turkey was an important figure in coalition building. As Iraq’s northern neighbor, Turkey had influence in the region and, as a NATO member, Turkey was close to the Western powers. President Bush had numerous private phone calls with President Ozal in which he emphasized his concern about “a possible Iraqi attack against Saudi Arabia.”¹⁰ In another call the next day, President Ozal mentioned that he had talked to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and believed the Saudis were “in line with us.”¹¹ Early in the process of building an international coalition, the commitment of U.S. resolve was questioned by many in the Western and Arab world. The Saudis were especially doubtful of U.S. commitment to such a coalition. In a conversation with Turkish President Ozal, President Bush relayed his comments to Saudi King Fahd. “I told the King we will do what needs to be done...this is not another Lebanon.”¹² His citing of Lebanon refers to

⁹ Nation Security Council meeting, August 4, 1990, ID# CF01478-030, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

¹⁰ Telephone call to President Turgut Ozal of Turkey, August 4, 1990, ID# CF01478-026, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

¹¹ Presidential telephone call to Turgut Ozal, August 5, 1990, ID# CF01478-027, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

¹² Telephone call to President Turgut Ozal of Turkey, August 4, 1990, ID# CF01478-026, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

the 1983 posting of U.S. Marines as a peacekeeping force in Lebanon. The subsequent suicide bombing of the Marine barracks on October 23, 1983, ultimately led to a withdrawal of U.S. forces. Many states questioned U.S. resolve in a showdown with Iraq, especially if U.S. casualties were a possibility. President Bush addressed this issue in remarks at a White House briefing for members of Congress on the Gulf crisis. “Let no one at home doubt my commitment to work with the Congress, and let no one abroad doubt our national unity or our staying power.”¹³ The coalition that was built over the next few months around diplomatic, economic, and military actions was outlined in National Security Directive 45, which laid out the U.S. policy response to the Iraq invasion of Kuwait and encouraged the effective expressions of support and the participation of allies and other friendly states to promote mutual interests in the Persian Gulf region. The primary mutual interest was to stand together against aggression.

President Bush’s rhetoric and his use of “aggression” in public speeches reached an all time high in November 1990. Figure A-8 illustrates this spike, compared to the other five months, in the president’s use of the term “aggression.” November 1990 alone represents 35 percent of the times Bush used the word aggression in a six month period. In one particular speech given by Bush to a Republican campaign rally in Houston, Texas, on November 5, 1990, the president used the word “aggression” 18 times. The president’s theme is clear, “The main reason we’re there is to set back aggression, to see that aggression is unrewarded...It is the aggression against Kuwait

¹³ Remarks at a White House Briefing for Members of Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis, August 28, 1990, ID# 9006418, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

that has caused this coalition to come together as it has.”¹⁴ Much of the fear-mongering rhetoric for the secretaries of state and defense are concentrated in statements made before the U.S. Congress. On September 5, 1990, Secretary of State James Baker addressed the House Foreign Affairs Committee on America’s stake in the Persian Gulf crisis. Secretary Baker used the word “aggression” 18 times, emphasizing the role the international community needed to play in opposing ruthless, unchecked aggression. The U.S. implemented its strategy by diplomatically fostering a “coordinated international response to Iraq’s aggression.”¹⁵ Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney provided similar “aggression” rhetoric during two appearances before congressional committees. These themes of turning back aggression and recalling lessons learned on the history of aggression are reiterated by the Bush administration leading up to the First Gulf War. This will be explored next, as Bush labels Saddam Hussein a modern-day Hitler.

The use of the name “Hitler” by Bush was controversial and short-lived. Many of Bush’s advisers became alarmed when the president, horrified at stories of the atrocities Iraq was committing against the people of Kuwait (some of which turned out to be false), began demonizing Saddam Hussein, comparing his deeds to those of Hitler. This type of rhetoric was discouraged by Bush’s top aides because they knew it could backfire on building support for an international coalition. In fact, the president is the

¹⁴ George Bush Presidential Library website titled, Remarks at a Republican Campaign Rally in Houston, Texas, November 5, 1990, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2406&year=1990&month=11, accessed October 2009.

¹⁵ Statement by the Honorable James A. Baker III to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, The Congressional Record, Vol 136, Part 26, 101st Congress, 2nd Session, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 23488.

only senior leader to have evoked Hitler. Both secretaries Baker and Cheney avoided using the name. The president referred to Saddam Hussein as Hitler on only ten occasions, for a total of sixteen times, from October 15 to November 3, 1990. By doing so, the president hoped to accomplish two things. First, he hoped to paint the Iraqi leader as an evil, unreasonable, and aggressive dictator who must be opposed. Second, the president hoped to remind allies and friends that appeasing Saddam Hussein was not the best policy. There were many states hoping to avoid armed conflict with Iraq who voiced the hope that some type of accommodation could be reached with Iraq. President Bush was adamantly opposed to accommodation and hoped to draw from the lessons of history regarding the unsuccessful appeasement of Hitler prior to the outbreak of World War II. Carrie Chrisco (1995:34) notes that “the remember-the-1930s theme constantly reminded [audiences] of decisions made by world leaders to grant concessions to Hitler in the early part of his blitzkrieg leading to World War II.” The news media picked up on this theme and “while care is taken not to personally attack Saddam Hussein in the early editorials after the invasion and before the Cairo [Arab] summit, Saddam is compared to Hitler throughout the pre-war and war periods” (Chrisco 1995:35).

The military aims in the First Gulf War did not include removing Saddam Hussein from power. Negative rhetoric, such as mentioning Hitler, by the president could lead to an escalation of military aims and cause the coalition to break. As Robert Divine (2000:131) notes, America’s “stated mission...was a simple one – end the aggression, knock Iraq’s forces out of Kuwait, and restore Kuwait’s leaders [but] the president knew that an invasion of Iraq would instantly shatter the coalition, but he hoped that at least

the U.S. ground offensive would grind down [Saddam's] armor and heavy equipment, thereby severely weakening Saddam's military power."

The first recorded incident of President Bush referring to Hitler and appeasement occurred in early August. This happened in a private telephone conversation between Bush and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl a day after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in which Chancellor Kohl mentions Saddam Hussein's delusions of becoming the leader of the Arab region. "That is a situation we have had once before this century – of one man declaring himself the Fuehrer."¹⁶ In another telephone conversation, this time between Bush and French President Francois Mitterrand a day after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Bush comments that "the Saudi King is very, very concerned...he equated Saddam Hussein with Hitler and called him a liar."¹⁷ Bush uses the same rhetoric with Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu of Japan when Bush called him on the same day. "King Fahd told me he considers Saddam Hussein like a Hitler...he called him a liar."¹⁸ The issue of appeasement is first brought up by Turkish President Ozal during a telephone call on August 3, 1990 with Bush. President Ozal relates a conversation he had previously with Saudi King Fahd in which he declares that "if the solution is that Iraq pulls back and Kuwait pays, that is not a solution but would be another Munich."¹⁹ This reference is to the 1938 Munich Agreement in which the European powers acceded to Hitler's

¹⁶ Telephone call to Chancellor Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany, August 3, 1990, ID# CF01478-027, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

¹⁷ Telephone call to President Mitterrand of France, August 3, 1990, ID# CF01478-027, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

¹⁸ Telephone call with PM Kaifu of Japan, August 3, 1990, ID# CF01478-027, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

¹⁹ Telephone call to President Turgut Ozal of Turkey, August 3, 1990, ID# CF01478-028, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

demands to take over the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia. Any suggestion of appeasing Saddam Hussein by rewarding him in any way for withdrawing from Kuwait was analogous to the failed appeasement of Hitler at Munich. President Ozal insisted on not repeating the mistakes made at the beginning of World War II. This theme is repeated in a follow-up call the next day, August 4, 1990, between Bush and Ozal in which Bush declares that "Saddam made a mistake...to pay, he should withdraw...there is no compromise solution."²⁰ During this call, Bush again mentions that others have called Saddam another Hitler. Bush did not just equate Saddam Hussein to Hitler with foreign leaders; he also used this analogy in a National Security Council meeting with his top advisors. Bush commented that "he may be underestimating world opposition...lots of people are calling him Hitler."²¹ This focus on "Hitler" and the associated appeasement is argued by Andrew Bennett et al. (1997:60) in which they state:

Decisionmakers also drew analogies to World War II and the lessons of Munich when they warned that Iraq would invade Saudi Arabia to control the world oil supply and Middle East politics if it were not stopped. This was particularly true of President Bush who had served in World War II. Bush saw the concessions to Hitler at the 1938 Munich conference as a key step toward World War II, and he was determined to avoid any hint of a similar appeasement in the Gulf even if it cost him the election. Bush even publicly compared Saddam Hussein to Hitler, further emphasizing his concern over a replay of Munich, this time with Kuwait in a role like that of Czechoslovakia in 1938 and Saudi Arabia – like Poland in World War II – at risk of becoming the next target of Iraqi aggression.²²

²⁰ Telephone call to President Turgut Ozal of Turkey, August 4, 1990, ID# CF01478-026, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

²¹ National Security Council meeting, August 4, 1990, ID# CF01478-030, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

²² See also Stephen Wayne, (1993) *President Bush Goes to War: A Psychological Interpretation from a Distance in The Political Psychology of the Gulf War: Leaders, Publics, and the Process of Conflict*, by Stanley Allen Renshon, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 39; Ann Devoy, (1990) *Bush Likens*

Although Bush only publicly uttered the word “Hitler” 16 times in the course of ten speeches, the press multiplied its use and questioned the validity of making comparisons between the two. The president’s hope of making a parallel between current events in Kuwait to the ruthless rule of Nazi Germany diminished and ultimately was abandoned by early November 1990. Instead, the focus remained on the “aggression” of the Iraqi regime and, as was shown earlier, the Bush administration increased the focus on the regime’s aggressive tendencies and possibility of future aggression if not first checked. But along with the references to “Hitler,” U.S. senior leaders also painted Saddam Hussein as a brutal “dictator.”

As Figure A-7 depicts, the total number of instances of “dictator” being used by U.S. senior leaders in speeches and remarks is low compared to the use of “aggression,” but still accounts for more than 9 percent of the total fear-mongering rhetoric. Analyzing the data during this period shows a similar pattern for the use of “aggression” over time. President Bush increased his use of the word “dictator” during the month of November, as depicted in the chart titled *President Bush and “Dictator”* (Figure A-8). November 1990 is a crucial month for the U.S. coalition building efforts. Economic sanctions have been in place since August and by November the Bush administration expressed its disappointment they had not had more of an effect.²³ In addition, economic sanctions also hurt Iraq’s neighbors who were part of the U.S.-led coalition. The Bush administration had to deal with those states that were either growing impatient with the coalition or were demanding compensation to remain in the

Kuwaitis to Czechs, *The Washington Post*, November 18, A23; also see James Baker, (1995) *Politics of Diplomacy*, New York: G.P. Putnam, 303.

²³ Bilateral meeting with Emir of Kuwait, November 21, 1990, ID# CF01584-028, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

coalition, a type of compensation that was addressed in the previous chapter on foreign assistance. More importantly, during the month of November, the U.S. was working hard to pass a U.N. resolution that would authorize force to complete the coalition objectives. The increased demonization of Saddam Hussein as a brutal dictator that preys not only on his neighbors, but also on his own people was directed at coalition members who might be reluctant to move toward military force as an option to oust Iraq from Kuwait. President Bush reiterated this theme throughout the month of November, but particularly when addressing allied troops assembled in Saudi Arabia in which he declared that Saddam Hussein was a “a dictator who has gassed his own people – innocent women and children – unleashing chemical weapons of mass destruction, weapons that were considered unthinkable in the civilized world for over 70 years.”²⁴ Secretary Baker’s speeches and remarks use the word “dictator” in a similar manner as he depicted Saddam Hussein as a “very dangerous dictator – armed to the teeth – [and] is threatening a critical region at a defining moment in history.”²⁵ Interestingly, Secretary Cheney almost never publicly used the word “dictator” in reference to Saddam Hussein. The one instance, found in a public comment, was on December 3, 1990, in testimony to the Senate Committee on Armed Services. The secretary made this reference as a passing comment on how authoritarian regimes were able to withstand economic hardship more than states with democratic leaders. In the same

²⁴ George Bush Presidential Library website titled, Remarks to Allied Armed Forces near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, November 22, 1990, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2485&year=1990&month=11, accessed October 2009.

²⁵ Statement by the Honorable James A. Baker III, Secretary of State, Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington DC, December 5, 1990, ID# 03418-003, White House Public Affairs, George H.W. Bush Presidential Library.

statement, the defense secretary used the word “aggression” 15 times and “weapon” six times. Clearly, the secretary chose to emphasize both Iraq’s tendency to attack its neighbors and the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s possession of weapons of mass destruction rather than demonizing Hussein as a dictator.

The use of “weapon” by U.S. senior leaders during this six-month period is third behind “aggression” and “dictator” in frequency of use. The Bush administration goal was to depict the Iraq regime as unpredictable, irrational, brutal, and in possession of weapons of mass destruction. The chart titled *President Bush and “Weapon”* (Figure A-8) shows the continuing trend of a spike in rhetoric in November 1990. The majority of these appear in public remarks over a two-day period, November 22 and 23. In the same speech to allied troops in Saudi Arabia mentioned earlier, the President makes reference to Saddam’s possession of chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons and concludes that “[Saddam] has never possessed a weapon that he didn’t use.”²⁶ In a related speech the same day to other U.S. Army troops, Bush declared that “we can sacrifice now, or we can pay an even stiffer price later as Saddam moves to multiply his weapons of mass destruction: chemical, biological and, most ominous, nuclear.”²⁷ The U.S. strategy continued to emphasize Saddam’s future threat, not the immediate threat. This theme of a future weapons threat was tied to the U.S. claim that Iraq would use those weapons or supply those weapons to groups promoting terror in the international system. Figure A-7 shows that the word “terror” was not one given main emphasis in

²⁶ George Bush Presidential Library website titled, Remarks to Allied Armed Forces near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, November 22, 1990, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2485&year=1990&month=11, accessed October 2009.

²⁷ Ibid.

U.S. leader rhetoric, yet the connection between Iraq and terror was made. The distribution of its use over the six-month time period is depicted in Figure A-8 in the chart titled, *President Bush and "Terror."* The increasing rhetoric in November does not include "terror." Rather, the word is used early (September) and late (January). On one occasion alone, September 21, 1990, the president used the word "terror" eight times. On each occasion, he expressed concern about Iraq's possible support for or direct acts of terror against the coalition that was forming. When asked by a reporter why Bush was now emphasizing terrorism so much, the president replied that irrational people sometimes resort to terror. In addition, the president was concerned about a conference held in Jordan and attended by what the U.S. considered as known terrorists. The president responded that "terrorism concerns me, and it will continue to concern me...and I will hold [Saddam], as will our allies, directly responsible for terrorist acts."²⁸ Bush's terrorism rhetoric most likely stemmed from the U.S. government concern for state-sponsored terrorism. A department of state report, "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990," released on April 30, 1991, lists the following state supporters of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria.²⁹ This concern for Iraq's support for terrorism coupled with Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction helps explain Bush's use of the word "terror." The two secretaries also invoked "terror,"

²⁸ George Bush Presidential Library website titled, The President's News Conference, September 21, 1990, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=2244&year=1990&month=9, accessed October 2009.

²⁹ Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator of Counterterrorism website titled, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 1990, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terror_90/index.html, accessed December 2009. Currently, there are four states designated by the U.S. as state-sponsors of terrorism. The following lists those states and the date the U.S. designated them: Cuba (March 1, 1982), Iran (January 19, 1984), Sudan (August 12, 1993), and Syria (December 29, 1979). See also Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator of Counterterrorism website titled, State Sponsors of Terrorism, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c14151.htm>, accessed December 2009.

but to a much lesser extent than the president. Secretary Baker used it more than Secretary Cheney, but they both mirrored the President's usage. Secretary Baker especially highlighted Saddam's use of terror on his own people and against Western hostages, plus the threat he posed to his neighbors. In a statement on December 5, 1990, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he said, "[Saddam] threatened to rain terror and mass destruction on his Arab neighbors and on Israel."³⁰ Likewise, Secretary Cheney mentioned Saddam Hussein's "repugnant hostage policy; his threats to use terror and chemical weapons against Saudi Arabia and Israel; the brutalizing of Kuwaitis and the looting of their country; and the continued mistreatment of diplomats."³¹ This use of "terror" in U.S. senior leader rhetoric reinforces the other fear-mongering words, including "aggression," "dictator," and "weapons." All together these terms suggest the reasons why states were encouraged to join the U.S. in opposing Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The international coalition that formed consisted of traditional Western powers and Iraq's Middle East neighbors. The U.S. strategy for building a coalition for the Second Gulf War, which will be explored next, emphasized a different type of fear-mongering rhetoric.

Second Gulf War

Partly to justify U.S. intervention into two sovereign states in recent years, but also to set a course for the future, President George W. Bush, in his second inaugural address in 2005, outlined the direction of U.S. foreign policy for his second term:

³⁰ Statement by the Honorable James A. Baker III, Secretary of State, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 5, 1990, White House Public Affairs, ID# 03418-003, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

³¹ Statement by the Honorable Richard Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Concerning Operation Desert Shield, before the Committee on Armed Services, December 3, 1990, White House Public Affairs, ID# 03418-004, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world...The difficulty of the task is no excuse for avoiding it. America's influence is not unlimited, but fortunately for the oppressed, America's influence is considerable, and we will use it confidently in freedom's cause. (Palmer and Morgan 2006:xiii)

In this speech, there is no mention of Iraq, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, or other terms that were used to justify the Second Gulf War. Instead of fear-mongering rhetoric, the promotion of democratic values and international cooperation through institutions were major themes of the speech. Is this because the direction the Second Gulf War was taking was reflected in declining poll numbers? This is most likely, but another reason may be that the Second Gulf War coalition had been assembled and was fairly stable after almost two years in Iraq. Those states that were going to contribute to the second Iraq war had already made their commitment and further U.S. senior leader fear-mongering rhetoric was no longer necessary.

The importance of U.S. senior leader's using rhetoric as an instrument of foreign policy is highlighted by McEvoy-Levy (2001:3) who states that "periodically, in times of grave crisis, such as war, and in times of slow breaking crisis, such as international political transformation, the public diplomacy of a President or Secretary of State have deterrence, mediation, threat and counter-threat, alliance-building, and ally-supporting functions." This was true during the First Gulf War and is true for its successor. David Campbell (1998:31) posits a similar view in that "texts of foreign policy are replete with statements about the fulfillment of the republic, the fundamental purpose of the nation, God-given rights, moral codes, the principles of European civilization, the fear of cultural and spiritual loss, and the responsibilities and duties thrust upon the gleaming example of America." Political rhetoric (positive or negative) has a specific purpose and in both

Gulf wars that involved building an international coalition against Iraq. While justification for the two Gulf wars varies (Iraq invasion of Kuwait versus Iraq purported to possess weapons of mass destruction), the common factor is the use of administration fear-mongering rhetoric. As Stephen Walt (2009:114) notes, “the heightened fear of international terrorism in the wake of September 11 provides smaller states with yet another incentive for close collaboration with the world’s most powerful country.” The use of fear-mongering rhetoric centered on exploiting the worldwide terrorist threat as a tool to build international coalitions. Walt (114) argues that “cooperation against al Qaeda or its affiliates may fall well short of full alignment, but the shared fear of terrorism does provide another reason for states to overlook their concerns about U.S. power and their reservations about U.S. policies and instead to collaborate with Washington against the shared terrorist danger.” The analysis to follow will bolster Walt’s argument as the use of the word “terror” dominated U.S. senior leader rhetoric.

The preponderance of the word “terror” in the fear-mongering rhetoric leading up to the Second Gulf War is illustrated in the table and chart in Figure B-10 and charts in Figure B-11 of Appendix B. Totaling the number of instances of the use of “terror” and comparing that to instances of the use of the other four terms in public speeches and remarks by the president, and the secretaries of state and defense demonstrates this trend. Approximately 50 percent of the administration’s rhetoric referenced “terror.” The other terms and their percentages break out as follows: “weapon” (41 percent); “dictator” (8 percent); “aggression” (1 percent); and “Hitler” (none). This focus on terror should not be a great surprise since the events of September 11 happened slightly more than one year before. The U.S. government, media, academia, and the general

public were all focusing on the current and future terrorist threats to America. However, just looking at the aggregate total of times terms were used is not enough. A closer analysis reveals an interesting dynamic in U.S. senior leader rhetoric. The charts in Figures B-10 and B-11 depict this use of the term “terror” over time for each senior leader and as a group. What is evident and not surprising is the larger amount of fear-mongering rhetoric from the president compared to either secretary. In fact, the total amount of instances of use of the five words used by the president (1,175) is 41 percent greater than their combined use by Secretary Powell (431) and Secretary Rumsfeld (265). This is not surprising because the president should and does lead in U.S. foreign policy speeches and remarks. What is more interesting is the balance between the terms “terror” and “weapon(s)” used by the president in the first four months studied (Jan – Apr 2003). The president averaged 67.75 instances of using “terror” per month and 74.75 instances of using “weapon” per month. This parallel effort is illustrated in Figure B-11. The deviation from this trend will be discussed later.

The effort to focus on “weapon” rather than “terror” in the first three months needs to be addressed. While the president and Secretary Rumsfeld used “weapon” slightly more than “terror,” Secretary Powell emphasized “weapon” much more. The emphasis on “weapon” relates to the administration’s efforts to convince other states of the severity of the Iraqi threat in regard to weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The build-up to a showdown with Iraq on weapon inspections culminated in February 2003 with Secretary Powell’s appearance at the United Nations on February 5, 2003. In his remarks to the United Nations Security Council, Powell referred to Iraq’s previous use of WMDs, current possession of WMDs, and future potential to proliferate WMDs. Powell

stated that “the facts and Iraqis' behavior demonstrate that Saddam Hussein and his regime have made no effort to disarm as required by the international community...indeed, the facts and Iraq's behavior show that Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction.”³² Saddam's previous use of mustard and nerve gas on Iraq's Kurdish population in 1988 was also mentioned by Secretary Powell. This large spike in “weapon” rhetoric in February is due to the secretary's appearance at the United Nations. Powell used the word “weapon” 66 times during that speech and each time it related to a specific type of weapon (chemical, biological, or nuclear) or referred to a WMD in general. This fear-mongering rhetoric was designed to not only convince states of Iraq's current weapon capability, but, more importantly, to instill an image of Iraq with an abundance of sophisticated WMDs. The imagery also included an Iraq which had used such terrible weapons on his own population and had the ability to use them on Iraq's neighbors and beyond.

But just focusing on an Iraq with weapons does not cover the whole gamut of the administration's fear-mongering rhetoric. An adequate delivery system is required for these weapon types to be a real threat outside the Middle East region. Since Iraq did not possess the long-range ballistic missile technology required, an alternative delivery system would entail Iraq providing weapons to terrorist groups who were willing to use them worldwide. However, establishing the link between WMDs and terrorists was not a priority early in coalition building, as evidenced by the lag of the use of “terror” by all

³² U.S. Department of State archives website titled, Remarks to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/17300.htm>, accessed October 2009.

three office holders. Instead, all three pushed the issue of Iraq complying with U.N. Resolution 1441, which required Iraq to disarm its WMDs. In an address before a joint session of Congress for the State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003, the president declared that “we have called on the United Nations to fulfill its charter and stand by its demand that Iraq disarm...all free nations have a stake in preventing sudden and catastrophic attacks.”³³ In his February address to the U.N., Secretary Powell was more direct when he declared, “our concern is not just about these illicit weapons; it's the way that these illicit weapons can be connected to terrorists and terrorist organizations that have no compunction about using such devices against innocent people around the world.”³⁴ The alleged connections between Iraq and various terrorist organizations, including al-Qaida, Hamas, and Palestine Islamic Jihad, were also presented as evidence of this future threat of proliferation of WMDs into nefarious hands. Powell concluded using themes from the Bush administration’s argument in the following rhetoric:

We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of mass destruction, is determined to make more. Given Saddam Hussein's history of aggression, given what we know of his grandiose plans, given what we know of his terrorist associations, and given his determination to exact revenge on those who oppose him, should we take the risk that he will not someday use these weapons at a time and a place and in a manner of his choosing, at a time when the world is in a much weaker position to respond?³⁵

³³ National Archives and Records Administration website titled, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Remarks on Improving Counterterrorism Intelligence, February 14, 2003, <http://frwebgate4.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/TEXTgate.cgi?WAISdocID=109387498582+0+1+0&WALSaction=retrieve>, accessed October 2009.

³⁴ U.S. Department of State archives website titled, Remarks to the United Nations Security Council, February 5, 2003, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/17300.htm>, accessed October 2009.

³⁵ Ibid.

President Bush's rhetoric also attempted to link "weapons" of mass destruction owned by Saddam Hussein with known "terror" organizations, such as Al Qaida. The strategy of the administration was to convince U.S. friends and allies of the need to support U.S. diplomatic, economic, and military actions against Iraq and, domestically, to bolster U.S. public support. A month prior to the start of the Second Gulf War, President Bush declared:

This war requires us to understand that terror is broader than one international network, that these terrorist networks have got connections, in some cases, to countries run by outlaw dictators. And that's the issue with Iraq. When I speak about the war on terror, I not only talk about Al Qaida. I talk about Iraq, because, after all, Saddam Hussein has got weapons of mass destruction, and he's used them.³⁶

By associating "terror" with Al Qaida and Iraq and "weapons" of mass destruction, the president had completed the three points of the triangle of his argument. Since they are all linked, the logical and obvious move was to invade Iraq and neutralize Iraq's WMDs so they could not be used by terrorists, such as Al Qaida. Bush, therefore declared, "For the sake of peace and for the sake of security, the United States and our friends and allies, we will disarm Saddam Hussein if he will not disarm himself."³⁷ This rhetoric was the Bush administration's last hope of convincing more traditional allies, such as France and Germany as well as other friends to join the coalition. The defense department, represented by Paul Wolfowitz, was also using this same argument:

The threat posed by the connection between terrorist networks and states that possess these weapons of mass terror presents us with the danger of a

³⁶ National Archives and Records Administration website titled, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Remarks on Improving Counterterrorism Intelligence, February 14, 2003, <http://frwebgate4.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/TEXTgate.cgi?WAISdocID=109387498582+0+1+0&WALSaction=retrieve>, accessed October 2009.

³⁷ National Archives and Records Administration website titled, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Remarks at the Congress of Tomorrow Republican Retreat Reception in White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, February 9, 2003, <http://frwebgate6.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/TEXTgate.cgi?WAISdocID=110484272489+0+1+0&WALSaction=retrieve>, accessed October 2009.

catastrophe that could be orders of magnitude worse than September 11th.³⁸

This line of argument continued even after the invasion of Iraq on March 19, 2003. The combat operations of the Second Gulf War took about one month. Baghdad fell on April 9 and a week later the coalition declared the combat phase of the operation complete. A month later, despite the fact that no WMDs were found, President Bush continued the same three-point argument linking the terror of Al Qaida and Hussein with Iraq's WMDs.

Saddam Hussein is no more. The terrorists can no longer find a source of funding in the Saddam Hussein regime. They won't be able to find weapons of mass destruction from Saddam Hussein's regime because that regime is gone forever.³⁹

As the search for WMDs continued and the lack of success became apparent, Bush modified the argument by dropping the reference to WMDs, instead emphasizing the link between Al Qaida and Saddam Hussein. Additionally, President Bush's rhetoric turned to freedom and democracy as justification for the war, but fear-mongering rhetoric still prevails for the purpose of coalition building.

We also waged another battle in the war against terror when we liberated the people of Iraq from the brutal regime of Saddam Hussein. Thanks to our United States military and coalition forces, America is now more secure; the world will be more peaceful; and the Iraqi people are free.⁴⁰

This switch in presidential rhetoric from emphasizing both "terror" and "weapon" to just emphasizing the "terror" connections to the Iraqi regime is illustrated in the chart

³⁸ U.S. Department of Defense News website titled, Secretary Paul Wolfowitz speech, Iraq: What Does Disarmament Look Like? January 23, 2003, <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/index.aspx?mo=1&yr=2003>, accessed October 2009.

³⁹ National Archives and Records Administration website titled, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Remarks in Little Rock, Arkansas, May 5, 2003, <http://frwebgate4.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/TEXTgate.cgi?WAlSdocID=110055505033+0+1+0&WAlSaction=retrieve>, accessed October 2009.

⁴⁰ National Archives and Records Administration website titled, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Remarks in Indianapolis, Indiana, May 13, 2003, <http://frwebgate1.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/TEXTgate.cgi?WAlSdocID=110732254171+1+1+0&WAlSaction=retrieve>, accessed October 2009.

President Bush Rhetoric (Figure B-11). The number of uses of “terror” and “weapon” from January to April is almost identical, but starting in May there is a large divergence that continues in June when the president refers to “terror” four times more often than “weapon(s).” The three-point argument is no longer valid to employ in U.S. attempts to convince states to join the coalition in post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

The general pattern holds for both secretaries of state and defense, but, there are differences. From January to March, Secretary of State Powell emphasizes “weapon” three times more than “terror” but in April and May the emphasis is on “terror.” By June, his rhetorical use of both “terror” and “weapon” drops off dramatically. He explains this change as a function of accepting the reality on the ground.

We pushed the weapons argument because that was our concern. But we found no weapons so stopped talking about it. Once his statue fell, there was no dictator to talk about. No weapons, no connection of fear to terrorists. They became insurgents.⁴¹

Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld followed the general trend set by the president, but also deviated from it. In January and February, Rumsfeld utilizes both terms in his rhetoric, but emphasizes “weapon” slightly more in those two months. Interestingly, the switch to “terror” occurs a month earlier for him than the president or secretary of state. By March and through June, Rumsfeld is using “terror” more often by a two-to-one margin. The other divergence between the president and the two secretaries concerns the total amount of rhetoric produced over that six month period. While the total counts of the five terms analyzed in each month varied for the president, the two secretaries’ counts of the same terms declined over time. Not surprisingly, there was an initial buildup for

⁴¹ Telephone interview with General (ret.) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, October 30, 2009. General Powell also commented on the author’s data via email.

all U.S. senior leaders toward the start of combat operations in March, then a drop in rhetoric in the March/April timeframe. The president ramps up his rhetoric in May to rally states to the coalitions' reconstruction efforts and to bolster domestic support. During this same timeframe, the two secretaries' rhetoric drops. These trends are presented in the chart in Figure B-10, *Bush administration rhetoric*.

Compared to the First Gulf War, the other three words analyzed, "Hitler," "dictator," and "aggression," were de-emphasized during the Second Gulf War. An obvious lesson was learned by Bush 43 from his father's attempt to demonize Saddam Hussein as a modern-day Hitler. Over this six-month period, none of the three senior leaders associated Saddam Hussein with Hitler. Therefore, that word is a non-factor when considering U.S. rhetoric as a tool of fear-mongering in a coalition-building strategy. The use of "dictator," however, was evoked by all three senior leaders. Not surprisingly, Bush used it more often (120 times over six months) than either the secretary of state (23) or the secretary of defense (11). Visually, the president's usage makes a shallow bell curve (Figure B-11) with a slow build-up to the start of hostilities in March and then a slow decline as Saddam Hussein is overthrown. Just prior to the start of the war, the president attempts to address those states still reluctant to join the U.S.-led coalition by saying, "People of goodwill must also recognize that allowing a dangerous dictator to defy the world and harbor weapons of mass murder and terror is not peace at all."⁴² A month after the coalition declared an end to combat operations, the president justified the overthrow of Saddam Hussein when he declared, "part of the

⁴² National Archives and Records Administration website titled, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, The President's News Conference, March 6, 2003, <http://frwebgate1.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/TEXTgate.cgi?WAISdocID=110829263631+8+1+0&WAIAction=retrieve>, accessed October 2009.

war on terror was dealing with the dictator in Iraq...part of making this country more secure and the world more peaceful was going into Iraq and removing a dictator who had defied resolution after resolution after resolution from the international community, a dictator with known terrorist connections, a dictator who had weapons of mass destruction.”⁴³ The two secretaries sporadically employed the term “dictator” in their speeches and remarks. Secretary Powell used it almost exclusively after combat operations had concluded in April. His main usage was to justify the war without referencing the lack of “terror” connections and absence of “weapons.” For example, when discussing an upcoming U.N. resolution to lift sanctions against Iraq, Powell noted that “It is a resolution that will bring back together the international community to help the liberated people of Iraq build a better society, a better country, to repair the infrastructure in the country that was devastated, not by the war, but by thirty years of dictatorial rule.”⁴⁴ Therefore, the U.S. argument was that states should join the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq for reconstruction efforts as a result of Saddam’s brutal regime and not because of the devastation from the Second Gulf war. This type of rhetoric could explain the reluctance of states to join America’s coalition-building efforts. Rumsfeld used the word “dictator” even less, but when he did, the same type of argument was presented. Iraq was not rebuilding from the devastation of a war, but from the 24 years of Saddam Hussein’s rule. An example of this rhetoric from Rumsfeld is as follows:

“So, unlike Europe after World War II, for the most part, the people of Iraq do not have

⁴³ National Archives and Records Administration website titled, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Remarks in Omaha, Nebraska, May 12, 2003, <http://frwebgate1.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/TEXTgate.cgi?WAISdocID=110921266478+1+1+0&WALSaction=retrieve>, accessed October 2009.

⁴⁴ Department of State archival website titled, Press Conference at the French American Press Club, May 22, 2003, <http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/20909.htm>, accessed October 2009.

to rebuild from this recent war as they work to rebuild their country and society after decades of denial (economic/human rights) and brutal dictatorship.”⁴⁵

Finally, “aggression” is the final term to be discussed. While its usage in the First Gulf War was a leading element of the U.S. strategy in coalition building in 1990/1991, the same cannot be said for the Second Gulf War. This is unsurprising considering the individual circumstances prior to each conflict. The first U.S.-led coalition was formed in response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Twelve years later, the same context does not pertain. Instead, Iraq’s defiance of U.N. weapons inspectors and U.N. resolutions to disarm are the initial stated reasons for the second U.S.-led coalition to be formed. Therefore the use of “aggression” by the three senior leaders in their speeches and remarks is restricted to the nature of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The tendency for Iraq to endanger its own people and its neighbors re-enforced Iraq’s supposed connection to “terror” and “weapons.” Just two days prior the beginning of the Second Gulf War, President Bush addressed the nation and declared that Saddam Hussein’s “regime has a history of reckless aggression in the Middle East...[and that] in a free Iraq, there will be no more wars of aggression against your neighbors, no more poison factories, no more executions of dissidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms.” Hence, the few times (11 total over six months) that President Bush referred to Iraq’s “aggression” toward its neighbors, he tied that “aggression” to Iraq’s possession of “weapons” of mass destruction. This argument is rarely mentioned by either secretary as they only use the term “aggression” three times each over the same six months. The only time Secretary Powell uses the term was during his now discredited remarks to the U.N.

⁴⁵ Department of Defense website titled, Council on Foreign Relations (Transcript), May 27, 2003, <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=429>, accessed on October 2009.

Security Council in February. Near the end of his presentation, he posits a relationship between Saddam Hussein's past history of aggression, his possession of weapons of mass destruction, and his connections to terrorist organizations and asks the question, should the world wait until it is in a weaker position to respond? Hence the Bush administration continued to emphasize the future threat of Iraq, not its current capability.

This chapter has focused on the negative rhetoric of U.S. senior leaders during both Gulf wars. It has been shown that this rhetoric focused on fear-mongering terms as a strategy for coalition building. In both cases, the goal was to convince reluctant states to join the U.S. in its opposition to Iraq. U.S. leadership also employed positive rhetoric focusing on the benefits of U.S. intervention. These positive themes included the promotion of democracy, the potential for solidarity with the international community, promotion of global norms, and the economic and technical help provided to the Iraqi people. The decision to focus on the negative rhetoric of U.S. senior leaders relates to the themes discussed earlier in the chapter. These themes include emphasizing Iraq's aggression toward its neighbors and its own people and focusing on Iraq as a sponsor of terrorism and its possession of WMDs. The First Gulf War coalition was easier to build since, with the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, a clear violation of state sovereignty had occurred. The challenge for the U.S. administration in the First Gulf War was to convince Arab states to join the coalition to avoid the perception that any diplomatic, economic, or military action was based on Western designs on Middle East oil or that the coalition was based on ideology or religion. Highlighting Saddam Hussein's history of brutalizing his own people and enmity toward its Middle East neighbors, the U.S. strategy of employing fear-mongering rhetoric attempted to further solidify a U.S.-led

coalition that was broad-based and inclusive. For the most part, the U.S. strategy in the First Gulf War was successful. The main exceptions were Jordan's lack of participation and the non-cooperation by Palestinian authorities. As explained in Chapter 3, these exceptions can be attributed to King Hussein's belief in an Arab solution to the Gulf crisis. Jordan's population was bolstered by pro-Iraqi Palestinian refugees who influenced King Hussein's pro-Iraqi behavior. However, Jordan's behavior was motivated more by economics than loyalty to the Palestinian or Iraqi causes because Jordan's economy was intimately tied to Iraq.

A similar strategy was employed prior to the Second Gulf War. The focus, however, was not on Iraq's aggression, but on tying the Iraqi regime to such terrorist organizations as Al Qaida and highlighting the fear of Iraqi WMDs falling into the hands of terrorists. This second use of fear-mongering as a strategy was not as successful because it relied on questionable intelligence data to convince states to join the U.S.-led coalition. Many of America's traditional allies and friends were unconvinced of the immediate threat from Iraq and felt the economic sanctions were keeping Iraq contained. Nonetheless, the U.S. strategy for coalition building continued its fear-mongering rhetoric, which shifted over time. Early in the Second Gulf War, the U.S. focused on the "weapons" of mass destruction, but when it became obvious that those "weapons" were not to be found, the strategy shifted to "terror." Connecting Iraq and Saddam Hussein to the larger war on terror allowed the U.S. to demonize a brutal "dictator." While the Second Gulf War coalition-building strategy was not as straightforward as it was in the First Gulf War, it still was successful enough to form a small coalition for the initial invasion of Iraq and a relatively more robust coalition for the

post-conflict and reconstruction efforts. U.S. senior leader rhetoric, used strategically, was instrumental in both Gulf wars for coalition building.

Bridging the three factors in both Gulf wars provides a glimpse into how they interact and support each other. In the First Gulf War, the U.S. strategy involved focusing on traditional allies and convincing them to join a U.S.-led coalition based on fear-mongering rhetoric. President H.W. Bush used personal phone calls to great effect with the leaders of U.S. traditional allies immediately after the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. The emphasis in these phone calls was on the possibility that Saddam Hussein would not stop with Kuwait and continue his aggression to other Gulf states with the ultimate goal of controlling the Gulf oil supplies. This type of fear-mongering rhetoric also appeared in U.S. government remarks and speeches. The target of this rhetoric was U.S. traditional allies and friends willing to contribute troops to build a largest coalition of states. The U.S. strategy emphasized a broad coalition to counter perceptions of the U.S. against Iraq or the West against Islam. Bridging within the Second Gulf War coalition strategy is not as straightforward. The U.S. experience with coalition operations in the 1990s was a factor in the lack of U.S. enthusiasm for traditional ally participation in the Second Gulf War. The U.S. strategy focused instead on post-communist states willing to support the U.S. operation in Iraq. Some states gained from their coalition participation with a temporary increase in U.S. foreign assistance. Along with aid, the U.S. strategy used fear-mongering rhetoric to build the coalition. The U.S. senior leader rhetoric focused on Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction and its relationship with terrorist organizations. This argument did not convince key traditional allies (France and Germany) and other NATO allies. The interaction of these

three factors in U.S. coalition building strategies for both Gulf wars is limited with U.S. fear-mongering rhetoric being a common factor.

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS

Here we are, more than 16 years after the Berlin Wall began to crumble, and this period still lacks a name. Calling it the post-Cold War era is an admission that we know what came before but not where we are, much less where we are heading.

- Richard Haass¹

Armed with a better understanding of how states choose their friends, the goal of maximizing international support (and minimizing opposition) should be greatly simplified.

- Stephen Walt²

Richard Haass's epigraph above highlights the importance of U.S. foreign policy and a clear articulation of its goals and purposes. The same logic applies to America's reliance on coalitions in the post-Cold War era. Should execution of U.S. foreign policy rely on more permanent alliances (NATO, ANZUS, Rio Pact, ASEAN), rely on more flexible coalitions of the willing, or rely on acting unilaterally? Certainly, the specific context of a situation will help determine the answer, but, if coalitions are the result, then the U.S. needs to learn from its previous strategies of coalition building.

This concluding chapter begins by discussing the importance of the research question, which is how does the U.S. coalition building strategies change for the First and Second Gulf Wars? One only needs to review the history of America's military interventions in the post-Cold War era to reveal a trend to work multilaterally through coalitions. Some coalitions have been more successful than others, but the U.S. strategies to form them are an important factor to consider. The debate over whether

¹ Haass, Richard. (2006) "This Isn't Called the [Blank} Era for Nothing." *Washington Post*. January 8, 2006. B04.

² Walt, Stephen. (1987) *The Origins of Alliances*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 285.

the U.S. should act unilaterally or multilaterally is alive and well. Zoellick (2000:69) argues that a modern republican foreign policy emphasizes building and sustaining coalitions. This can be contrasted with Paul Dobb's (2002:134) assessment of unilateralist tendencies promulgated by such media and academic commentators as William Kristol (2002) and Robert Kagan (2006), who argue the case for U.S. hegemony, while others, such as Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage (2004), talk about U.S. preeminence as a force for good. Dobb (2002:136) also notes that some U.S. commentators argue that establishing a broad coalition is nothing less than an invitation for paralysis. In early 2000, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice (2000:62) wrote that U.S. foreign policy should be firmly grounded in national interests and not in the interests of an illusory international community. Continued examination of U.S. strategies in coalition formation could help in this debate.

This chapter continues by reiterating the theory of coalition formation that is drawn upon and explores which parts of the theory are confirmed or called into question. The research question derives from Stephen Walt's (1987) theory of alliance (coalition) formation. Walt concludes that coalitions form to balance a perceived or actual threat and that ideology is less powerful than balancing as a motive for coalitions. This present study departs from Walt's theory in that it assumes that foreign aid and rhetoric play a role in coalition formation. Next, the major findings of this dissertation are outlined. Table A-7 of Appendix A is a simplified representation of the influence of traditional allies, foreign aid, and rhetoric on the two Gulf War coalitions. While the roles of traditional allies and foreign assistance differed in both Gulf wars, the role of rhetoric was a factor in both conflicts. Following this the weaknesses of this dissertation are

outlined and help formulate the next steps on this research agenda. These are broken down into four areas that include the role of traditional allies, troop-contributing states, foreign assistance, and the focus on just two cases. These areas for improvement are important because of the role coalition building has for the U.S. in the future. Finally, the policy implications of these findings are explained. As Divine (2000:138) notes “the Persian Gulf War appears to confirm the oldest of adages about U.S. military involvement – the United States always wins the war but loses the peace.” The United States knows how to go to war and does it very well; however, the U.S. does not work well with others, especially in post-conflict situations. A renewed focus is needed on working with our traditional allies in both war and peacetime coalitions. The importance of learning from the lessons of the past is illustrated by the following quote by Secretary James Baker on September 5, 1990:

Once the present danger passes, however, we must not let its lessons go unheeded. We have responsibility to assure the American people that a decade from now, their sons and daughters will not be put in jeopardy because we failed to work toward long-run solutions to the problems of the Gulf.³

In hindsight, how prophetic Secretary Baker can be seen in that just over one decade later America's sons and daughters would be back in the Gulf again dealing with Saddam Hussein. The lack of long-term solutions in the intervening years on Middle East issues, such as weapons proliferation and the Palestinian quandary, are a result of a lack of U.S. resolve to work with its traditional allies in coalitions with shared burdens

³ *Congressional Record*, Vol 136, Part 26, 101st Congress, 2nd Session, Statement by the Honorable James A. Baker III to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 23489.

and responsibilities. The importance of the research question is addressed in the next section.

Research Question

The last eight years have seen the U.S. conduct its war on terror with mixed results. It has attempted to work with its allies and friends on an *ad hoc* basis using coalitions of the willing. However, unlike the strategy used in building the First Gulf War coalition, the legitimacy of recent coalitions has suffered from a lack of support from America's traditional allies and from the U.S. relying too much on its military dominance. The strategy used to build an international coalition for the Second Gulf War relied less on traditional allies and more on foreign assistance and fear-mongering rhetoric. The manner in which the U.S. builds coalitions now and in the future is important. This chapter began with a quote from Stephen Walt that reminds us that international support for military coalitions can be simplified if we know what works. Knowing how military coalition strategies in the post-Cold War era changed from the First to Second Gulf wars is an important research question to International Relations scholarship for several reasons. First, the current IR literature on military coalition formation is woefully inadequate. Unlike the literature on alliance formation, which is robust and argues that states form alliances to maintain a balance of power that leads to greater security and provides a collective good,⁴ coalition literature is not as mature. And while there are many examples of past U.S. involvement in coalitions of the willing, the IR literature treats these instances as forms of alliances. By treating coalitions and alliances as if they were synonymous, the IR literature glosses over the differences between the two.

⁴ See for instance Olson and Zeckhauser 1966; Murdoch and Sandler 1982; Oneal and Elrod 1989; Conybeare and Sandler 1990; Oneal 1990; Palmer 1990; Sandler 1993.

By carving out a unique role for coalitions in IR literature, this dissertation has clearly differentiated between the two. Second, examining coalition formation in the post-Cold War era, especially during a time of emphasis on global terrorism, is important because terrorism as a security issue will continue. Due to the flexible nature of coalition structures, the future security environment most likely will involve more rather than less reliance on them. Finally, an examination of military coalition formation is important to the U.S. government. The leading actors involved with formulating and implementing coalition formation strategies include the president and his national security team (secretaries of state and defense among others). Examining these strategies from the post-Cold War era provides an opportunity to test theories of coalition formation. This analysis provides senior civil servants, political appointees, military officers, and others an opportunity to learn from the past and consider alternative means of coalition formation. These alternative means are discussed later in this chapter, but first, a review of the theory drawn upon for this research will be discussed.

Theory Building

This dissertation draws on Stephen Walt's *The Origins of Alliances* (1987), which attempts to correct some common, but erroneous, notions on why states align in times of crisis. Walt argues that it is incorrect that states are attracted only to power, that ideology is a powerful source of alignment, and foreign assistance is an incentive to coalition formation. Instead, Walt concludes that states balance against threats and not just power alone, that ideology is not as powerful a motive for alignment as is postulated, and, finally, that neither foreign aid nor political penetration is by itself a powerful cause of alignment. The first two arguments of Walt's theory are backed up by confirming examples of state behavior. In both Gulf wars, the perception of the threat

posed by the Iraqi military far outweighed the reality on the ground. In the First Gulf War, much was made of Iraq's weaponry and standing army. Rodney Carlisle (2003:36-39) explains that Iraq spent more than \$80 billion on weapons during the Iran-Iraq war and its array of conventional munitions included 3,110 artillery pieces, 4,280 tanks, and 2,870 armored personnel carriers. Even after Iraq accepted a U.N. resolution in 1988 to end its long war with Iran, Iraq was still able to field an impressive army two years later. "Saddam Hussein was able to put an army of more than 500,000 troops into the field against any who would try to defend Saudi Arabia or liberate Kuwait" (Carlisle 2003:39). In addition to conventional munitions, Iraq's possession of chemical and nuclear weapons was also well publicized. The fact that Hussein had used chemical weapons against Iran and against his own people increased the perceived threat posed by Iraq. However, much of Iraq's military equipment was in disrepair and the standing army, with the exception of Republican Guard units, was ill-trained. It was not just Iraq's arsenal and troops that contributed to the perceived threat, but Iraq's intentions after invading Kuwait. Both Iraq's Middle East neighbors and the Western powers questioned whether the situation was a temporary occupation of Kuwait or a permanent Iraqi solution to its debt problems incurred by the cost of the Iran-Iraq war. Another worldwide fear was the additional influence that Iraq could now exert in terms of oil production and pricing. Western and Middle East fears about the future, not the apparent Iraqi power on the ground, is what drove coalition formation in the First Gulf War.

This perceived threat was also evident in the run up to the Second Gulf War. The threat posed by Iraq in 2002 revolved around two issues: weapons of mass destruction

(WMD) and terrorist connections. The claim by the Bush administration that Iraq possessed or might acquire WMDs was the central claim for intervention. This perception of threat was promulgated by Saddam Hussein himself who wanted to ensure that his neighbors saw Iraq as a strong state militarily with the ability to retaliate with WMDs. However, by Iraq hiding the truth about its WMD programs, the country opened the door for the U.S. to make the case that such weapons existed or were being developed. There are numerous instances of this occurring, as outlined in Chapter 5. One such occasion was President Bush's September 12, 2002, address to the United Nations where he referred to Iraq's "continued appetite" for nuclear bombs and pointed to Iraq's purchase of "high-strength aluminum tubes to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons."⁵ This same claim is also made by Secretary of State Powell in his U.N. address on February 5, 2003. Dana Milbank (2002:A01) tells of another claim by President Bush, in an October 7, 2002, speech to the nation that involved the possibility of unmanned Iraqi aircraft fitted with WMDs that could target the United States. The problem with the president's claim is that the known Iraqi aircraft did not have the range to reach the United States.

Another perceived threat concerned the attempts to connect Iraq with terrorists. Bush administration claims of such a connection include Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's press conference remark from July 2002 where he stated, "Iraq had a relationship with Al Qaeda" (Drogin and Richter 2002) and Vice President Cheney's 2002 remarks on *Meet the Press* that "there have been a number of contacts [with al

⁵ White House website titled, George W. Bush, President's Remarks at the United Nations General Assembly, September 12, 2002, <http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020912-1.html>, accessed November 2009.

Qaeda] over the years.”⁶ These examples from both Gulf wars affirm Walt’s conclusions that threats (perceived or actual) and not power alone are the cause for states balancing. In the case of the Second Gulf War, the threat perception was enhanced by senior leader rhetoric. Rampton and Stauber (2003:78) note that this is an “illustration of the principle, long understood by propagandists, that a lie which is repeated often enough becomes widely accepted as truth.”

The second argument (regarding ideology) of Walt’s theory is also confirmed in both Gulf wars. In the First Gulf War, ideology was not a powerful motive for joining a coalition. While Hussein attempted to make the Gulf crisis a West versus Islam issue, the facts did not support this premise. An array of Iraq’s Middle Eastern neighbors joined with the U.S. in opposing Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Having these states in the coalition added legitimacy to the mission and supported Walt’s contention that ideology is less powerful than balancing. While the Second Gulf War coalition contained only a few Muslim states providing troops (Azerbaijan, Albania, and Kazakhstan), again ideology was not a prime motive for joining the coalition. Many of Iraq’s Muslim neighbors supported the U.S.-led economic sanctions and the containment policy on Iraq. The lack of support for invading Iraq was similar to those European powers (U.S. traditional allies) that were also reluctant to join the coalition.

Walt’s argument in his third point, that neither foreign aid nor political penetration is by itself a powerful force for joining a coalition, is confirmed in both Gulf wars. Where this dissertation deviates from Walt and contributes to the theory on wartime coalitions is that a combination of foreign aid or political penetration with traditional allies is a force

⁶ Mount Holyoke College website titled, *Meet the Press* (transcript), September 8, 2002, <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/meet.htm>, accessed October 2009.

for joining a coalition. Walt (1987:42) notes that when evaluating the importance of economic or military assistance on coalitions, we should consider the degree to which such assistance has powerful independent effects on the recipient's conduct and the conditions that will increase the influence that aid brings. In addition, Walt (1987:48) argues that if a state, the U.S., for example, seeks to encourage alignment in a coalition by manipulating attitudes of a state's public and its elites by way of U.S. senior leader rhetoric, then the effectiveness of political penetration increases. This is because such rhetoric is low risk compared to other forms of political penetration, such as espionage, that are more direct and threatening to a state. This dissertation examined the two Gulf wars as case studies to show the degree to which traditional allies, foreign aid, and fear-mongering rhetoric explain coalition formation. Traditional allies and rhetoric were the contributing factors to successful U.S. coalition building for the First Gulf War, whereas foreign assistance and rhetoric were contributing factors to U.S. coalition building for the Second Gulf War. Walt (2009) argues that coalitions are built on those states that provide legitimacy through their loyalty and compliance. America was successful in building a coalition in 1990 in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The troop contributions of traditional allies (the U.K. and France) and the economic contributions of traditional allies (Germany and Japan) provided the core group of states in the U.S.-led coalition. This coalition was enhanced by Muslim states (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Kuwait) providing both troops and financial assistance. All of these states were encouraged to join the U.S.-led coalition by U.S. senior leader rhetoric. Emphasizing Iraq's "aggression" toward its neighbors (Iran/Kuwait) and its own people (Kurds) provided the basis for U.S. rhetoric. But emphasizing past and present actions was not

enough; the U.S. also focused attention on the future possibility of further “aggression” (against Saudi Arabia) that could de-stabilize the Middle East region. This is not to discount the states’ perceived interests when explaining their behavior in joining a U.S.-led coalition. Certainly, while Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, and Kuwait all acted in response to perceived threats, this study emphasizes the role that U.S. coalition building strategies had on decisions of potential coalition members.

Foreign aid and fear-mongering rhetoric were contributing elements in the U.S. coalition building strategy for the Second Gulf War. The evidence presented in chapters 4 and 5 illustrate how these factors were employed by the Bush 43 administration. As Palmer and Morgan (2006:122) argue, “Foreign aid, whatever its purposes and merits, is a tool of foreign policy – states give it because it encourages recipients to take desired actions...foreign aid is a reward or an inducement.” In the case of the Second Gulf War, U.S. foreign assistance had a mixed result. Foreign assistance in a U.S. strategy for coalition building was not applied uniformly across troop-contributing states. The U.S. focused their coercive effects on targeted post-communist states such as Poland, Ukraine, and Georgia instead of traditional U.S. allies. As was shown in Chapter 4, Poland received increasing U.S. foreign assistance from 2001 to 2005. While Poland contemplated removing their troops in 2005, the additional funding was a factor in their decision to keep Polish troops in Iraq but at a reduced number. During the same period, Ukraine received decreasing U.S. assistance until 2005 in which the U.S. aid increased drastically. The timing of this increase coincided with the Ukraine parliament’s decision to bring the Ukrainian troops home from Iraq. This attempt by the U.S. to coerce Ukraine to change its decision failed. United States assistance to

Georgia remained constant from 2001 to 2005. However, in 2005 Georgia increased their troop contribution and the U.S. reciprocated with a significant jump in foreign assistance. These examples illustrate that U.S. foreign assistance was supplied to targeted troop-contributing states and reduced for those states that rejected U.S. attempts to encourage them to join the coalition.

Likewise, as a function of political penetration, U.S. senior leader rhetoric was shown to be a factor in U.S. coalition-building strategy. The president and secretaries of state and defense employed fear-mongering rhetoric to convince states to join and maintain their status in the coalition. The two main foci of this rhetoric were claims that Iraq possessed WMDs and that Saddam Hussein's regime was a state sponsor of international terrorism. These two choices presented to the international community by the Bush administration involved either joining the U.S.-led coalition now and dealing with this threat from weapons and terror, or not join the coalition and deal with a much stronger and dangerous Iraqi regime in the future. Thus, Walt's contention concerning the viability of foreign aid and political penetration by themselves, as a factor to encourage states to join a coalition, is not challenged here. Instead, this dissertation builds upon Walt's argument and argues that either foreign aid or political penetration coupled with a focus on traditional allies are factors in convincing states to join a coalition. Any strategy for coalition building involves the interaction of political, economic, and military elements. The process to build a coalition cannot be based solely on the threat, ideology, foreign assistance, or political penetration. A coalition building strategy must take into account all of these factors and apply it to the context of the situation. Theory building about wartime coalitions has been advanced by

confirming Walt's original hypothesis and identifying the value of combining these factors into a coalition building strategy. The major findings are outlined next.

Major Findings

A strategy for coalition formation can take many forms. A state can rely solely on diplomatic, informational, military, or economic means to form an international coalition. Relying on any one instrument of foreign policy can only achieve limited goals. Instead, a state must use a combination of means to achieve its end goal of an effective coalition of states. The U.S. employed different strategies in the two Gulf wars for coalition formation. In the First Gulf War, it relied on its traditional allies and senior leader rhetoric, but did not emphasize U.S. foreign assistance. Walt (2009:117) argues that "in assembling these coalitions – which are needed less for capabilities they produce than for the appearance of legitimacy they convey – the unipole will naturally prefer to include states it believes will be especially loyal or compliant." The U.S. sought traditional coalition partners that could provide capabilities (U.K. and France), that were loyal (NATO partners, such as Italy, Spain, Turkey) as well as those that provided legitimacy to the operation (Middle East states, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria). By concentrating on traditional allies and friends, the U.S.-led coalition for the First Gulf War was much more effective than that of the Second Gulf War. In the First Gulf War, burden-sharing efforts were more evenly distributed, as evidenced by Germany and Japan providing substantial financial support in lieu of troop contributions. Therefore, the First Gulf War reveals little to no influence of U.S. foreign assistance in its coalition building strategy. In fact, of the coalition states that contributed troops, the five states receiving the most U.S. foreign assistance from 1988 to 1993 (Egypt, Pakistan, Greece, Morocco, and Bangladesh) did not receive an increase in U.S. assistance for their troop

contributions. The 10 percent increase (\$214 million) received by Egypt from 1988 to 1990 was a result of the Camp David accords and the maintenance of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. From 1990 to 1993, the total amount of aid for these states was reduced. Clearly, U.S. economic and military assistance to coalition partners was not a factor in the U.S. strategy for coalition formation in the First Gulf War. The U.S. did employ fear-mongering rhetoric; the focus remained on Iraq's "aggression" toward Kuwait, which was obvious to the rest of the world and could not be denied or explained away. President Bush did refer to Saddam Hussein as "Hitler" for a few weeks, but stopped making those references when it became obvious the media backlash was diverting attention away from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. As Bush 41 (1998:375) notes, "I caught hell on this comparison of Saddam to Hitler, with critics accusing me of personalizing the crisis, but I still feel it was an appropriate one."

In the Second Gulf War, the U.S. strategy for coalition building de-emphasized traditional allies in favor of gathering the largest coalition possible to display "flags in the sand." The U.S. strategy did, however, include attempts to garner U.N. Security Council resolutions similar to the ones obtained for the First Gulf War. This strategy included initial U.N. resolution(s) that would include language condemning Iraq's attempts to hinder the weapons inspectors to verify Iraq disarmament process. In November 2002, the first U.N. resolution (1441) was obtained. It stated, "Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991), in particular through Iraq's failure to cooperate with United Nations inspectors and the International Atomic Energy Agency, and to complete the actions required

under paragraphs eight to 13 of resolution 687.”⁷ However, with the exception of the U.K. and a few others, the inability of the U.S. to effectively work with its traditional allies (France and Germany) doomed any hope of a second resolution that would have authorized the use of force and provide the needed legitimacy to the Second Gulf War. Affecting U.S. strategy was the departments of state and defense working at cross-purposes on coalition building. The state department sought to get the broadest and most effective coalition possible to deal with Saddam Hussein. The defense department, however, initially sought to limit the number of coalition members as much as possible because of the belief that coalitions were constraining, rather than enhancing, reinforcing, and force-multiplying. Ignoring concerns of traditional allies and moving ahead without their support made the Second Gulf War coalition less effective. The initial coalition for combat operations in 2003 consisted of only the U.S., the U.K., Australia, and Poland. After the initial combat operations concluded, a second coalition was formed for post-conflict and stabilization operations that consisted of numerous states, but provided limited capability. Again, “flags in the sand” were more important than the capability these states provided.

The consequences of building a coalition of the willing are many and involve our traditional allies and friends. The United States must address the political and military implications of conducting operations with such coalitions in the future. Does the U.S. have the capability and political will to bear the burden of future coalitions of the willing that exclude our traditional allies? A Council of Foreign Relations task force led by Henry Kissinger and Lawrence Summers (2004:5) addressed this topic and recommend

⁷ U.N. Security Council website titled, U.N. Security Council Resolutions for 2002, <http://www.un.org/docs/scres/2002/sc2002.htm>, accessed August 2009.

that “Europeans and Americans acknowledge what unites them and reaffirm their commitment to a common purpose.” The United States needs to find other ways to build its coalitions. This can be accomplished, but not by using the Second Gulf War strategy as a model. Instead, the U.S. must look to more formal entities, whether they be the U.N., NATO, or other alliances, to obtain political legitimacy for an operation. Coercive tactics, whether real or imagined, must be carefully managed, even eschewed, to avoid the perception that the next U.S.-led operation is made up of mercenaries.

While traditional allies were de-emphasized in the Second Gulf War, foreign assistance and fear-mongering rhetoric were both factors in the coalition-building strategy. It was shown in Chapter 4 that the U.S. used foreign assistance as a reward for joining the coalition and also as an incentive to remain in the coalition. Of course, this effect was not universal and provided mixed results. Additionally, this factor only holds for those states that receive U.S. foreign assistance, such as the post-communist states (Poland, Ukraine, Georgia), that made up the majority of the Second Gulf War coalition partners. American foreign assistance was employed as a tool to encourage states to join the Iraq coalition, but was also an instrument to express U.S. displeasure when states did not comply. The U.S. was successful in some instances (Georgia) and not in others (Ukraine). Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey were all pursued as strategic partners in the coalition, yet none joined. Subsequently all three states experienced a temporary drop in U.S. aid, but the geostrategic importance of these states compelled the U.S. to continue to support Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey with foreign assistance despite their absence from the coalition.

In addition to using U.S. foreign assistance to persuade cooperation, the U.S. strategy included fear-mongering rhetoric to compel cooperation. While the rhetoric for the First Gulf War focused on Iraq's "aggression" toward its neighbor (invasion of Kuwait), the Second Gulf War rhetoric emphasized Iraq's possession of WMDs and connection to "terror" networks. More importantly, the focus of the rhetoric was on possible future scenarios in which Iraq's WMDs could fall into terrorists hands. Compared to the other four terms studied (Hitler, dictator, weapon, and aggression), the Bush administration (mainly the presidential) rhetoric used the term "terror" 50 percent of the time. Combined with the use of the word "terror," the administration focused on Iraq's weapons. This rhetoric was designed to not only convince coalition states of Iraq's current weapon capability, but more importantly to instill an image of Iraq as a state with abundant sophisticated WMDs. On Saddam's orders, Iraq had used such terrible weapons on his own people and the possibility of using these weapons on neighbors and states beyond was plausible and emphasized. This fear-mongering strategy was not as successful as it was in the First Gulf War because it relied on questionable intelligence data to convince states to join the U.S.-led coalition. These findings provide the major evidence to show the change in U.S. coalition building strategies between the two Gulf wars. While every effort was made to collect and analyze the available evidence, this research project has areas for improvement that will be discussed next.

Areas for Improvement and Next Steps

There are four areas that need to be addressed. First, traditional allies are presented as one factor in U.S. coalition building. But what is a traditional ally? This dissertation defined a traditional ally as a state that has a current collective defense

treaty with the U.S. as listed in Table A-1 in Appendix A. However, the weakness of this distinction is in the evolving nature of collective defense treaties, such as NATO. The original twelve members of NATO in 1949 were the U.S., the U.K., Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal. The current membership stands at 28 and include the newest members, Croatia and Albania, which joined in April 2009. This begs the question, does that make Croatia or Albania a traditional ally of the U.S. by virtue of its NATO membership? Obviously, it does not. A traditional ally is a state that has a historical relationship with another state that is based on common interests and trust. Examining the original twelve members of NATO reveals a list of states that fought together in World War II with Italy fighting for a time on the opposite side. These original twelve states are also democratic in governance, united in Western ideals and culture, and share a bond to resist tyranny and instability in Europe. These common traits allow coalitions to form among these traditional allies. Over time, however, others have joined NATO that did not fit these criteria, but were also considered traditional allies. Turkey and Greece joined NATO in 1952 and West Germany joined in 1955. Turkey, Greece, and Germany are considered traditional allies, yet Turkey is a Muslim country with little in common with fellow NATO members when it comes to Western culture and ideals. There are also states outside of collective defense treaties that could be considered traditional U.S. allies. Israel has been supported by the U.S. since it first declared independence in 1948. In fact, the U.S. was the first state to recognize Israel's independence. Since that time, the U.S.-Israeli relationship has grown and current U.S. foreign assistance to Israel in 2007 amounted to over \$2.5 billion (OECD 2007). Yet, the U.S. and Israel do not have a

signed collective defense treaty. Is Israel a traditional U.S. ally? That depends on the definition of a traditional ally. For this dissertation, Israel is not, but a valid case could be made that it is a traditional ally. The variable nature of what constitutes a traditional ally is evident in this research and has been somewhat mitigated by focusing on those long-term traditional allies that have collective defense treaties with the United States. Future research on this topic could start with a list of traditional allies that are determined using a different aperture. The focus could be on those European, Middle Eastern, and Asian states the U.S. has a vested interest in maintaining economic relations with, such as the G-7, G-8, or G-20. All these organizations include industrialized countries that are leading states in globalization. Or the focus could be on European Union states. The point is that how one determines who are America's traditional allies might lead to other factors to consider besides traditional allies, foreign assistance, and rhetoric.

For this dissertation, the analysis of U.S. strategy in coalition building that involves traditional allies, foreign assistance, and rhetoric has been limited to troop contributing states. A second weakness resides in the narrow focus of examining just troop-contributing states. The total number of states that joined both Gulf coalitions includes states that provided troops, as well as those that supplied economic assistance, diplomatic support, basing, and other logistical assistance. For example, Chapter 4 provides analysis of U.S. foreign assistance on coalition building by comparing that with the number of troops contributed by coalition members. The rationale for such a distinction, as explained in Chapter 4, is to capture those states "serious" enough to commit more than verbal support to the coalition. States willing to

risk their sons and daughters on foreign land are the states that would be the focus of any future U.S. coalition strategy. However, this distinction has its drawbacks. The generous financial assistance granted by Germany and Japan in the First Gulf War played a major role in building and maintaining the coalition. It showed the international and U.S. public, as well as the U.S. Congress, that burden sharing was an alternative to boots on the ground. Although the post-World War II constitutions of those two states prevented them from deploying troops in support of the U.S.-led coalition, they nonetheless were able to contribute. Turkey is another example of a state that was considered critical to both Gulf war coalitions, but did not contribute troops to either. However, by providing basing support (Incirlik Air Base) for U.S. troops to transit through and over Turkey, the U.S. was able to move troops and equipment to Iraq much easier. In addition, the use of the Habur Gate, a Turkish-Iraqi border crossing, also was instrumental, especially in the Second Gulf War, to moving supply-laden convoys into Iraq. The use of basing and border-crossing privileges was a crucial piece of keeping the coalition supplied. Including states that provided support to the coalition in other ways would widen the field of states and possibly tease out other conclusions. For example, are troops the most valuable asset to U.S. coalition building or could other types of support (economic, votes in the U.N., or basing) be equally, even more, valuable? The difficulty would be to determine if the U.S. strategy prioritizes such support and devising a method to measure it.

The third area for improvement involves the choice when examining U.S. foreign assistance to focus exclusively on economic and military support. As was explained in Chapter 4, this was employed for its ease of use and availability of data. However, the

shortcoming of this approach is that many traditional U.S. allies do not receive foreign assistance. This required the focus to shift, especially in the Second Gulf War, to the post-communist states. This limited the effect of foreign assistance as a factor in a U.S. strategy to build a coalition. Obviously, there are many reasons why a state would join a coalition. For the wealthier states (developed states that are traditional U.S. allies), some probably joined the U.S. because there was a belief that Saddam Hussein posed a threat. However, even with these wealthier states, economic rewards or potential negative consequences could still make an impact in their decision of whether or not to join a U.S.-led coalition. Future research on this topic could explore other economic levers, including trade and investment inducements, and the lure of U.S. government contracts and establishment of military bases. For example, the U.S. is the sole country that can exercise an effective veto over World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) decisions, another source of potent leverage (Prusher 2003).⁸ The difficulty of using these other economic levers is in trying to determine if the U.S. prioritizes them and which levers are more effective than others. Any future U.S. coalition strategy would have to examine the long-term benefits and drawbacks to rewarding or punishing states when building a coalition. Placing a value on military bases or a World Bank veto in comparison to awarding government contracts is difficult, but could provide a more nuanced look at the effect of economic assistance in U.S. coalition building.

The final weakness involves the focus on just two cases (First and Second Gulf wars). Limiting the analysis to just two cases limits what can be explained by U.S.

⁸ As Turkey hesitated over its decision to allow U.S. use of its territory to invade Iraq, it was offered not only a large U.S. aid package—but hints that if it failed to comply, its IMF bailout package could be cut or eliminated. See Prusher, Ilene, “Turkey, a Key Ally, on Fence over Supporting Iraq War,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, January 21, 2003.

strategies for coalition building. Chapter 1 explains the rationale for using these two cases as opposed to other coalitions in the post-Cold War era such as for Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. However, despite the reasons for excluding these other coalitions from this analysis, their inclusion would allow for a broader analysis of U.S. strategies and the applicability of these strategies for future coalitions. Other research could add one, some, or all of these four other coalitions to the two Iraq coalitions. Do traditional allies, foreign assistance, and rhetoric have the same effect on coalitions outside of Iraq? Another weakness of focusing on just two cases is the broad view across all the coalition states involved. Future research could include a focus on select U.S. strategies toward specific allies and friends. For example, two traditional allies and two non-traditional allies could be selected based on whether they participated in either Gulf War. It would be important to select states of both successes and failures in the outcome (whether they did or did not participate in a U.S.-led coalition) to identify the conditions and variables that may account for differences in outcomes. Table A-8 in Appendix A is a possible example of a paired comparison of states that could focus an analysis of U.S. coalition-building strategy. The actual selection of states would have to consider such factors as the size of a state's economy and the level of troop support available. Comparing similar economies prevents biasing state selection by including a state in desperate need of U.S. foreign assistance. The level of troop support available is important because the U.S. strategy for building a coalition involves gaining "boots on the ground." A state must have sufficient military capability to be an attractive coalition ally, so keeping that factor consistent across states prevents biasing the outcome. All of these areas that could be improved for future research are acknowledged here because

coalition building will remain important in the future. The policy implications of this type of research are addressed in the next section.

Policy Implications

Transatlantic disagreements over the war on terrorism and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have called into question the fundamental nature of the role of U.S.-led coalitions, specifically the role that U.S. traditional allies play in the post-Cold War environment. The United States and its traditional allies in Europe and Asia, each with its own strengths and weaknesses, are confronting uncertain prospects even as they remain partners in ensuring global security. There are strategic differences among them on specific issues, such as North Korea and Iran, reflecting what many observers cite as a diverging set of values and perspectives on security issues for the twenty-first century. Barring external shocks or major policy initiatives, the U.S. and its traditional allies will likely continue to muddle through these differences in a somewhat disorganized fashion. The potential cost of this for U.S. foreign policy will be a failure to reach its optimum military and political effectiveness. Rather, what the U.S. requires is a commitment to coalition formation that Zoellick (2000:69) describes as a way to “lead [a] coalition effectively, [that] requires clear-eyed judgments about priorities, an appreciation of others’ interests, constant consultations among partners, and a willingness to compromise on some points but to remain focused on core objectives.” Despite the U.S. ability to “go it alone,” or to put together an international coalition that is dominated by it, future coalition building will have to focus more on sharing the burden and responsibilities with other states. As Freeman et al. (1992:3) argue, the “question of legitimate use of force in a world conscious of the norms of international laws and [states] more interdependent and layered with overlapping international organizations,

will drive nations to seek allies to help justify their use of force.” While this conclusion, drawn so soon after the First Gulf War, makes sense, this pattern was not followed for the Second Gulf War.

The simple model proposed here is to present the key elements of a security relationship to help determine whether the U.S. and its traditional allies are more or less likely to act within coalitions. The two factors presented as key determinants of how the U.S. and its traditional allies will interact on security issues are: 1) U.S. commitment to consult with traditional allies and friends and 2) each allies’ abilities and resolve to be credible security actors through effective decision-making and military capabilities. Different combinations of the two drivers yield very different scenarios, suggesting that the U.S. and its traditional allies will need to work closely if they are to establish and develop security and defense policy in the future. The four possible scenarios are graphically depicted in Figure A-9 of Appendix A.

Scenario One is termed the Optimum Coalition because this scenario would yield a new strategic partnership between the U.S. and its traditional allies if the U.S. accepts its allies as real military and nonmilitary strategic partners with the power to deal with security challenges. This new partnership could negotiate a strategy on terrorism, WMDs, failed states, and the like. This allows a coupling of “hard” military power with “soft” diplomatic and economic tools. This type of burden-sharing would certainly benefit the U.S. and take advantage of its allies’ diplomatic and economic influence in the world.

Scenario Two involves the U.S. and traditional allies at cross-purposes. In this scenario, the U.S.-traditional ally relationships would wither if the U.S. pursues a

unilateralist foreign policy based on “coalitions of the willing” forged outside of their involvement. For example, if the EU continues their own progress toward a more robust European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), it would most likely result in increased challenges to U.S. interests and policy priorities. The EU could then increase its opposition to U.S. policies in EU interest areas, such as the Middle East.

Scenario Three outlines coalitions that are possible, but ineffective. This third scenario suggests that America’s traditional allies’ dependence on the U.S. would increase if those allies were unable to summon the political will and create the military capabilities to act as coherent security actors beyond their borders. If the U.S. chooses to act through a coalition of the willing, America’s traditional allies would look to the U.S. to take the lead on addressing security concerns without developing any meaningful capabilities on their own.

Scenario Four is the worst-case scenario in which traditional allies are marginalized. The fourth scenario is similar to the second in that America’s traditional allies perceive the U.S. as a unilateral actor, resulting in a withering of those partnerships. In this scenario, however, those U.S. allies fail to muster their political will and are ineffective in the security realm. Disengaged allies would be ineffective partners for any future coalition. These marginalized allies would also refuse to cooperate and deny U.S. interventions the legitimacy or relative legitimacy that it has enjoyed in the past.

This simple model attempts to look ahead at the future of coalition formation. It is not intended to offer definitive predictions or to assess the likelihood of alternative outcomes, but rather to provoke rethinking and re-examination of America’s

relationships with its traditional allies. An important policy implication of this research is that coalitions based solely on economic incentives and fear-mongering rhetoric are detrimental to effective coalitions. Only by working with U.S. allies and friends on their willingness to offer military assistance and being inclusive in the decision-making process will future U.S.-led coalitions be successful. Past U.S.-led coalitions have been unilateral in policy making and decision making but multilateral in execution. Future U.S.-led coalitions must be multilateral in all aspects to be successful. The consequences of building a coalition of the willing are many and involve traditional allies and friends. The U.S. must address the political and military implications of conducting operations with such a coalition in the future. The U.S. likely does not have the capabilities and political will to bear the burden of future coalitions of the willing that exclude our traditional allies. The U.S. needs to find other ways to persuade our allies and bring them along. This can be accomplished, but not by using the Second Gulf War strategy as a model. Instead, the U.S. must look to more formal entities, whether they be the U.N., NATO, or others, to obtain political legitimacy for an operation. Coercive tactics, whether real or imagined, must be carefully managed to avoid the perception that the next U.S.-led coalition is made up of mercenaries. To help alleviate this possibility, another policy implication is the need for political and public legitimacy.

Political and public legitimacy refers to the ability of the U.S. and its allies to understand and mitigate the resentment that is directed by the locals toward U.S.-led coalitions. Marshall et al. (1997:14) conclude that a “significant effort must be made to prepare the local population to understand and accept the coalition forces operating in their country.” This is often referred to as “winning the hearts and minds” of the local

population. The need for political and public legitimacy is important for the success of any coalition-building strategy. Hindsight on the Second Gulf War coalition provides an excellent example of what can happen when this legitimacy is missing. The local population, when confronted with military forces from around the world, requires sufficient assurances that their situation has not been made worse by coalition forces. Marshall et al. (1997:14) conclude that “public information programs that are culturally attuned to the local population, and high visibility improvement projects, must be implemented early.” This can be achieved through expanded diplomacy and dialogue at multiple levels. It will require an increase in the U.S. foreign assistance (economic aid) provided to focus states (at this time, Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan) to ensure employment and opportunities are available for the populace. However, it must be noted that foreign aid cannot be used effectively until certain conditions prevail. The fighting within a state must be completed or significantly reduced and a responsible government in place. Finally, an expanded public diplomacy campaign could highlight America’s financial assistance, persuade people (especially young men) that the U.S.-led coalition is there to help and provide an alternative vision of a future that includes partnering with the West. The long-term implications of ignoring political and public legitimacy is the growth of a home-grown insurgency. The U.S. strategy for coalition building matters – not only for winning a war, but also for winning the peace.

APPENDIX A FIRST GULF WAR DOCUMENTATION




Figure A-1. Warning time-line of Iraq-Kuwait Crisis¹

¹ Warning Timeline of Iraq-Kuwait Crisis, not dated. ID # CF01937-004. WHORM Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/NOFORN~~

COALITION DIPLOMATIC STEPS

- Strengthen coalition support.
 - Efforts to increase Chinese and Soviet opposition to Iraq and demands that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait.
 - Pursue Soviet military participation (even if only a token force) in light of Iraq's announcement to retain 2300 Soviet advisers.
 - Increased activity by Turkey in support of military operations.
 - Publicize US/NATO forces and capabilities in country.
 - Publicize Turkish military border maneuvers/alerts.
 - Increase coalition military forces in Turkey earmarked for Desert Shield operations.
 - Demonstration of commitment by France (such as air power to Turkey).
 - Major power/"PERM Five" announcements on Iraqi BW/CW/NW activities and the need to achieve reductions in the region.
 - Announced willingness to see it through to the end, regardless of Iraqi actions.
 - Publicize Iraqi activities in spite of Iraq's participation in international agreements to inhibit spread of BW/CW. Iraq must be punished for failing to adhere to the agreements.
 - Increase pressure on Yemen and Jordan to "get off the fence."
 - Identify UN observer group for Iraqi withdrawal.
- Break diplomatic relations with Iraq.
 - Coordinated with all other members of coalition so that all take same action at same time.
 - Prior to 15 January, drawdown missions to caretaker status.
 - Close missions, sever relations after 15 January.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/NOFORN~~

DECLASSIFIED
PER E.O. 12958,
AS AMENDED

98-0049-F/3
12 Oct 04 LT

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Figure A-2. Diplomatic strategy for the coalition.²

² Coalition Diplomatic Steps, ID# CF01584-024, WHORM: Working File, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/NOFORN~~

- Kuwaitis begin issuing directives to reestablish Kuwaiti infrastructure following removal of Iraqis.
- Renewed efforts to increase burdensharing.
 - Germany, Japan, Gulf nations increase contributions to Desert Shield in keeping with "windfall profits."
 - Helps blunt US domestic opposition.
 - Increases perception of strengthened coalition.
- Ambassador-designate Gnehm presents credentials to Government of Kuwait in Taif.

Photocopy from George Bush Presidential Library

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/NOFORN~~

Figure A-2 (continued)³

³ Coalition Diplomatic Steps, ID# CF01584-024, WHORM: Working File, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

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MILITARY STEPS

- Emphasize President's remarks that all Iraqi forces must be out of Kuwait by 15 January.
 - Announce date that we estimate he must begin in order to meet the deadline.
 - If withdrawal does not begin on time, we take it as a determination by Iraq to resist UN resolutions by force. (Put the ball in Saddam's court.)
- Steps to emphasize ability to keep the pressure on.
 - Identify UN observer group for liberated Kuwait.
 - Announce when all Egyptian and Syrian forces are in place and ready for combat operations.
 - Take increased aggressive action in enforcing sanctions.
 - Seize empty vessels inbound to Iraq/Kuwait.
 - Seize Iraqi assets on high seas worldwide.
- Military exercises to demonstrate ability and will to follow through on the 15 January deadline.
 - Series of exercises that carry through 16 January.
 - Begin exercises at component level, brigade size and below.
 - Increase to large single component joint nation exercises.
 - 13-16 January conduct a full-scale all component joint exercise that ends abruptly on 16 January by a quick return to ready positions.
 - Begin a period of non-flying on 16 January.
 - Maximum radio/communications exercises followed by period of no transmissions.
 - Large scale naval/air exercises in the eastern Mediterranean.
- NSDD to state policy objectives.
- Directive to CINC.

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AS AMENDED

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12 Oct 04 LT

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Figure A-3. Military strategy for the coalition.⁴

⁴ Military Steps, ID# CF01584-024, WHORM: Working File, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

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- Military moves short of full offensive operations.
 - Following a Government of Kuwait request, enforce GOK sovereignty over territorial seas and air space.
 - F-117 "pamphlet demonstration" or covert military activity to demonstrate to Saddam our ability to hurt him and his regime.
 - Move ground forces into position close to the border.
 - Syria and Turkey reinforce their borders.
 - Minefield recce, seeding water with debris, beach survey.

Photocopy from George Bush Presidential Library

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Figure A-3 (continued)⁵

⁵ Military Steps, ID# CF01584-024, WHORM: Working File, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.




Figure A-4. U.S. Assistance by year country charts⁶

⁶ Information to depict these charts is taken directly from the data in Table A-6.

GULF CRISIS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE *
1990 COMMITMENTS AND DISBURSEMENTS
(Millions of U.S. Dollars)

	<u>TOTAL</u>			<u>Egypt</u>			<u>Turkey</u>			<u>Jordan</u>			<u>Unallocated 1/</u>			<u>Other States 2/</u>			<u>GRAND TOTAL</u>		
	Commit.	Disb.	Disb.	Commit.	Disb.	Disb.	Commit.	Disb.	Disb.	Commit.	Disb.	Disb.	Commit.	Disb.	Disb.	Commit.	Disb.	Disb.	Commit.	Disb.	Disb.
	to Date	to Date	to Date	to Date	to Date	to Date	to Date	to Date	to Date	to Date	to Date	to Date	to Date	to Date	to Date	to Date	to Date	to Date	to Date	to Date	to Date
GCC STATES	4785	2790	1995	2683	2248	415	1810	475	1335	0	0	0	312	67	245	2529	2029	500	7314	4819	2495
Saudi Arabia 3/	2848	1363	1485	1888	1268	400	1160	75	1085	0	0	0	0	0	0	1803	1003	500	4351	2366	1985
Kuwait	937	840	97	555	540	15	300	300	0	0	0	0	82	0	82	783	763	0	1700	1603	97
UAE 3/	1000	587	413	420	420	0	350	100	250	0	0	0	230	67	163	263	263	0	1283	850	413
EC	642	490	152	238	173	85	125	86	39	207	159	48	73	73	0	30	0	30	872	490	182
EC Budget	78	78	0	16	16	0	2	2	0	10	10	0	51	51	0	0	0	0	78	78	0
Bilateral: 4/	563	411	152	222	157	85	123	84	39	197	149	48	22	22	0	30	0	30	593	411	182
Belgium	22	7	15	6	6	0	9	0	9	7	1	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	22	7	15
Denmark	9	4	5	5	0	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	0	0	0	0	9	4	5
France 5/	100	0	100	50	0	50	30	0	30	20	0	20	0	0	0	30	0	30	130	0	130
Germany	350	338	12	132	132	0	73	73	0	145	133	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	350	338	12
Italy	24	4	20	10	0	10	0	0	0	14	4	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	24	4	20
Luxembourg	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
Netherlands	43	43	0	18	18	0	11	11	0	11	11	0	3	3	0	0	0	0	43	43	0
Spain	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	9	0	0	0	0	9	9	0
U.K.	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	0	0	0	0	5	5	0
OTHER EUROPE	32	32	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	32	32	0	0	0	0	32	32	0
Austria	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
Sweden	22	22	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	22	22	0	0	0	0	22	22	0
Switzerland	9	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	9	0	0	0	0	9	9	0
JAPAN	775	272	503	347	0	347	231	200	31	175	50	125	22	22	0	0	0	0	775	272	503
CANADA	17	17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	17	0	0	0	0	17	17	0
KOREA	58	0	58	23	0	23	20	0	20	15	0	15	0	0	0	17	0	17	75	0	75
(a) TOTAL COMMITMENTS	6309	3601	2708	3271	2421	850	2186	761	1425	397	209	188	456	211	245	2576	2029	547	8885	5630	3255
(b) EST. EFFECT OF GULF CRISIS 6/	-	-	-	1125	1125	-	1675	1675	-	1365	1365	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DIFFERENCE (a minus b)	-	-	-	2146	1296	-	511	-914	-	-968	-1156	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

* Does not include contributions to the multinational force. Totals may not equal sum of components due to rounding. Based on data submitted to the Coordinating Group. Exchange rates as of New York close on 10/19/90.

1/ Unallocated among Egypt, Jordan, and Turkey. Includes general humanitarian assistance. 2/ GCC financing for other states is for Syria, Morocco, Lebanon, Somalia, and Djibouti.

3/ Grant aid to Turkey: \$1160 million from Saudi Arabia and \$250 million from the UAE. 4/ Other countries will be added as their bilateral disbursements are clarified.

5/ French aid to other states is for Morocco. 6/ IMF/World Bank estimates (oil at \$31/barrel) circulated to Group shown for illustrative purposes. Not intended to represent precise figure of impact.

Photocopy from George Bush Presidential Library

Figure A-5. Financial assistance from Gulf War coalition members⁷

⁷ Gulf Crisis Financial Assistance, 1990 Commitments and Disbursements table, December 19, 1990, ID# CF01584-018, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.




Figure A-6. Public statements by senior leaders in two administrations⁸

⁸ Multiple Sources produced this chart. Source documents include Cheney and Baker Speeches/Persian Gulf, various dates, ID# 03418-003 (004), WHORM: Public Affairs, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Book 1, January-June 2003, <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/index.html>, accessed July 2009; Department of Defense website, <http://www.defenselink.mil>, accessed July 2009; and Department of State website, <http://www.state.gov>, accessed July 2009.




Figure A-7. Total U.S. senior leader rhetoric (2 Aug 90 – 17 Jan 91)⁹

⁹ Multiple Sources produced this chart. Source documents include Cheney and Baker Speeches/Persian Gulf, various dates, ID# 03418-003 (004), WHORM: Public Affairs, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Book 1, January-June 2003, <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/index.html>, accessed July 2009; Department of Defense website, <http://www.defenselink.mil>, accessed July 2009; and Department of State website, <http://www.state.gov>, accessed July 2009.





Figure A-8. President Bush and rhetoric charts (2 Aug 90 – 17 Jan 91)¹⁰

¹⁰ Multiple Sources produced this chart. Source documents include Cheney and Baker Speeches/Persian Gulf, various dates, ID# 03418-003 (004), WHORM: Public Affairs, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Book 1, January-June 2003, <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/index.html>, accessed July 2009; Department of Defense website, <http://www.defenselink.mil>, accessed July 2009; and Department of State website, <http://www.state.gov>, accessed July 2009.





Figure A-8 (continued).¹¹

¹¹ Multiple Sources produced this chart. Source documents include Cheney and Baker Speeches/Persian Gulf, various dates, ID# 03418-003 (004), WHORM: Public Affairs, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library; *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Book 1, January-June 2003, <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/index.html>, accessed July 2009; Department of Defense website, <http://www.defenselink.mil>, accessed July 2009; and Department of State website, <http://www.state.gov>, accessed July 2009.




Figure A-9. A Model for the future¹²

¹² This figure could have been displayed in a number of ways, such as a 2x2 box, but it was decided to use the arrows to show there is a continuum of possibilities for both axes.

Table A-1. Collective Defense Treaties¹³

Treaty	Dates in Effect	Parties
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)	April 4, 1949 – present	Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States
Security Treaty (ANZUS Pact) ¹⁴	September 1, 1951 – September 17, 1986	Australia, New Zealand, United States
U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty	August 30, 1951 – present	Philippines, United States
U.S.-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty	January 19, 1960 – present	Japan, United States
U.S.-Korea Mutual Defense Treaty	October 1, 1953 – present	South Korea, United States
Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO) ¹⁵	September 8, 1954 – June 30, 1977	Australia, France, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States
Rio Treaty	September 2, 1947 – present	Argentina, Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela

¹³ Treaties in Force (TIF) as of January 1, 2009 (Washington, DC: Office of the Legal Advisor, U.S. Dept. of State, 1950).

¹⁴ The TIF (2009) notes that as of September 17, 1986, the US suspended obligations under the treaty between the U.S. and New Zealand but not Australia.

¹⁵ The TIF (2009) notes that by decision of the SEATO Council of September 24, 1975, the organization ceased to exist as of June 30, 1977. However, the collective defense treaty remains in force.

Table A-2. U.N. Resolutions, First Gulf War¹⁶

Resolution #	Date	Purpose	Vote
660	August 2, 1990	Condemn Iraq invasion of Kuwait	14-0, Yemen abstaining
661	August 6, 1990	Outlines economic sanctions on Iraq	13-0, Cuba and Yemen abstaining
662	August 9, 1990	Condemn Iraqi invasion again	15-0
664	August 18, 1990	Concerns Iraqi treatment of foreign nationals	15-0
665	August 25, 1990	Interception of maritime shipping in and out of Iraq	13-0, Cuba and Yemen abstaining
666	September 13, 1990	Concerns humanitarian foodstuffs to Iraq	13-2, Cuba and Yemen opposing
667	September 16, 1990	Concerns Iraqi violence against diplomatic personnel and premises	15-0
669	September 24, 1990	Requests of assistance under Article 50 of U.N. Charter	15-0
670	September 25, 1990	Restrictions on aircraft in and out of Iraq	14-1, Cuba opposed
674	October 29, 1990	Condemning Iraq's use of third nation hostages	13-0, Cuba and Yemen abstaining
677	November 28, 1990	Condemning Iraq's destruction of Kuwait civil records	15-0
678	November 29, 1990	Establishes January 15, 1991, as date for Iraq to comply and authorizes use of all necessary means to uphold and implement Res 660	12-2-1, Cuba and Yemen opposed, China abstaining

¹⁶ United Nations. 2009. "United Nations Resolutions on Desert Storm." *United Nations Resolutions on Desert Storm*, 1(1): 1-17.

Table A-3. Total German contributions to First Gulf War Coalition.¹⁷

Type of German Contribution	Million DM
Military, logistical, and financial support for U.S., U.K., France, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, Israel, and Egypt	15,317
Financial support for other Allied states and international institutions (Syria, Jordan, Tunisia, International Red Cross, U.N.)	587
German share of EC financial support for Turkey, Egypt, and Jordan	326
Extra expenditure for Bundeswehr deployment to Mediterranean and Turkey	308
Extra expenditure for deployment of Bundeswehr minesweepers to Persian Gulf	120
Extra expenditure for maintenance of German equipment during Allied airlift	132
Humanitarian aid to Kurdish refugees	430
Total German contribution	17,220

Note: At the start of the First Gulf War, January 17, 1991, the currency exchange rate was 1 DM = 0.65 U.S. dollars.¹⁸

¹⁷ Bennett, Andrew, Joseph Leggold, and Danny Unger. (1997) Friends in Need: burden sharing in the Persian Gulf War. New York: St. Martin's Press. 169.

¹⁸ This historical exchange rate was found at the OANDA website titled, Historical Exchange Rates, <http://www.oanda.com/currency/historical-rates>, accessed August 2009.

Table A-4. Monetary contributions in the First Gulf War.¹⁹

Country	Commitment (\$ Millions)	Receipts (\$ Millions)		
		Cash	In-Kind	Total
Saudi Arabia	16,839	12,002	4,001	16,003
Kuwait	16,057	16,015	43	16,058
UAE	4,088	3,870	218	4,088
Japan	10,012	9,437	571	10,008
Germany	6,572	5,772	683	6,455
Korea	355	150	101	251
Other	29	7	22	29
Total	53,952	47,254	5,639	52,893

¹⁹ Final Report to Congress. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War. April 1992. Appendix P. Washington DC: U.S. Department of Defense.

Table A-5. First Gulf War coalition notifications²⁰

Country	Forces ²¹	Mode of comm.	By/to whom	When ²²
U.K.	A, N, G, bases	Secure phone	Bush – PM	H-12
Saudi Arabia	A, N, G, bases	Call in	John Major	H-12
Kuwait	A, G	Private channel	Scowcroft – Bandar	H-6
France	A, N, G	Phone	Bush – Pres. Francois Mitterrand	H-2
Turkey	Bases	Phone	Bush – Pres. Turgut Ozal	H-2
Israel		Secure phone	Cheney – Arens Scowcroft – Shovel	H-2
Australia	N	Phone	Bush – PM Hawke	H-2
Bahrain	G, A, bases	Private channel		H-1
Oman	G, A, bases	Private channel		H-1
Qatar	G, A, bases	Private channel		H-1
UAE	G, A, bases	Private channel		H-1
Egypt	G	Phone	Bush – Pres. Mubarak	H-1
Italy	A, N	Private channel		H-1
Canada	A, N	Phone	Bush – PM Mulroney	H-1
Spain	N, bases	Private channel		H-1

²⁰ Coalition Notification Tables, ID# CF01584-018, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

²¹ Forces column designates the type of military contribution being made by the coalition partner: G=ground forces; A=air forces; N=naval forces; Bases=military bases made available for US forces.

²² When column designates the timeline of the notification with H hour the start of hostilities; therefore, H-12 is 12 hours prior to the war beginning.

Table A-5 (continued)²³

Country	Forces ²⁴	Mode of comm.	By/to whom	When ²⁵
Germany		Private channel		H-1
Japan		Private channel		H-1
USSR		Phone	Bush – Pres. Gorbachev	H-1
NATO SecGen		Private channel		H-1
Syria	G	Private channel		H- 30 minutes
Czechoslovakia	G	Cable		H hour
Bangladesh	G	Cable		H hour
Morocco	G	Cable		H hour
Niger	G	Cable		H hour
Senegal	G	Cable		H hour
Pakistan	G	Cable		H hour
Belgium	N	Cable		H hour
Denmark	N	Cable		H hour
Greece	N	Cable		H hour
Netherlands	N	Cable		H hour
Norway	N	Cable		H hour
Argentina	N	Cable		H hour
Korea	A	Cable		H hour
New Zealand	N	Cable		H hour
China		Cable		H hour

²³ Coalition Notification Tables, ID# CF01584-018, WHORM: Working Files, Bush Presidential Records, George Bush Presidential Library.

²⁴ Forces column designates the type of military contribution being made by the coalition partner: G=ground forces; A=air forces; N=naval forces; Bases=military bases made available for US forces.

²⁵ When column designates the timeline of the notification with H hour the start of hostilities; therefore, H-12 is 12 hours prior to the war beginning.

Table A-6. U.S. Assistance by year (\$ millions)²⁶

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993
Argentina	0.4	1.1	1.7	6.2	9.2	20.6
Australia						
Bahrain					1.10	0.60
Bangladesh	109.60	181.00	125.80	162.60	129.10	112.40
Belgium					0.30	0.30
Canada						
Czechoslovakia						2.60
Denmark						
Egypt	2,174.90	2,269.70	2,389.30	2,299.80	2,234.80	2,055.80
France	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Greece	344.10	350.70	349.10	350.60	350.30	332.50
Italy						
Kuwait				0.10	0.30	
Morocco	140.30	146.00	126.50	130.10	115.50	113.10
Netherlands						
New Zealand						
Niger	40.40	31.70	28.30	39.70	38.40	21.70
Norway						
Oman	13.20	15.10	12.70	18.70	30.50	1.20
Pakistan	726.60	583.00	542.40	101.30	23.90	52.70
Poland	6.80	3.30	86.20	3.80	30.10	33.10
Qatar						
Saudi Arabia						
Senegal	38.30	59.70	49.20	36.80	74.90	40.70
Spain	5.60	2.10	2.00	1.50	0.90	0.20
Syria						1.20
United Arab Emirates						
United Kingdom						
Total	3,600.20	3,643.40	3,713.20	3,151.20	3,039.30	2,788.70

²⁶ USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services website titled, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, U.S. Bureau of Census (BUCEN) International Database, <http://quesdb.usaid.gov/gbk/>, accessed August 2009.

Table A-7. Summation of findings, salience of argument across cases

	Traditional Allies	Foreign assistance	Rhetoric
First Gulf War	+	—	+
Second Gulf War	—	+	+

Note: + = evidence for that hypothesis, - = absence of strong evidence or that there was evidence to the contrary.

Table A-8. Notional paired comparison of states²⁷

Alliance type	State	First Gulf War coalition member	Second Gulf War coalition member
Traditional ally	United Kingdom	Yes	Yes
Traditional ally	France	Yes	No
Non-traditional ally	Ukraine	No	Yes
Non-traditional Ally	Jordan	No	No

²⁷ The challenge is to find comparable states that show variation in the outcome. That is, whether or not the state joined or did not join a U.S.-led coalition. In two cases (U.K., France), the states joined the First Gulf War while the other pair (Ukraine, Jordan) did not. In two cases (U.K., Ukraine), the states joined the Second Gulf War while the other pair (France, Jordan) did not.

Table A-9. Largest recipients of U.S. total economic and military assistance, 1946-2007, in constant 2007 dollars (deflated) in \$U.S. millions²⁸

Rank	Country	Total 1946-2007
1	Israel	169,972.300
2	Vietnam	108,937.700
3	Egypt	104,062.900
4	Korea, South	70,740.610
5	United Kingdom	65,685.460
6	Turkey	60,150.210
7	India	59,797.840
8	France	58,736.220
9	Pakistan	44,828.280
10	Iraq	41,101.080
11	Italy	40,484.460
12	Greece	40,391.720
13	China (Taiwan)	39,181.490
14	Germany	36,738.260
15	Japan	26,372.890
16	Philippines	25,429.250
17	Serbia and Montenegro, Former	19,970.650
18	Afghanistan	19,446.870
19	Indonesia	18,512.210
20	Jordan	18,327.340

²⁸ USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services website titled, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, Obligations and Loan Authorizations (Greenbook), <http://gbk.eads.usaidallnet.gov/>, accessed December 2009.

APPENDIX B
SECOND GULF WAR DOCUMENTATION




Figure B-1. Coalition integration process¹

¹ Coalition Integration Process, slide undated, Coalition Coordinating Cell Working File, United States Central Command, Tampa, Florida, accessed May 2009.




Figure B-2. Non-U.S. multinational forces in Iraq²

² U.S. Central Command chart, Coalition Coordinating Cell Working File, United States Central Command, Tampa, Florida, accessed March 2009.




Figure B-3. Executive summary of coalition partners (OEF/OIF)³

³ Executive Summary of Coalition Partners, March 30, 2005, Coalition Coordinating Cell Working File, United States Central Command, Tampa, Florida, accessed March 2009.




Figure B-4. Security incidents in Iraq.⁴

⁴ Security Incidents in Iraq, January 24, 2009, Coalition Coordinating Cell Working File, United States Central Command, Tampa, Florida, accessed May 2009.




Figure B-5. Prominent terrorist incidents, 1991-2003⁵

⁵ U.S. Central Command presentation titled Coalition Operations, slide not dated, Coalition Coordinating Cell Working File, United States Central Command, Tampa, Florida, accessed May 2009.





Figure B-6. Charts - U.S. assistance by year, 2001-2007⁶

⁶ U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), U.S. Bureau of Census (BUCEN) International Database, USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services, <http://quesdb.usaid.gov/gbk>, accessed August 2009, and U.S. Department of State, International Affairs Account Tables, <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/iab/index.htm>, accessed August 2009.





Figure B-6 (continued)⁷

⁷ U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), U.S. Bureau of Census (BUCEN) International Database, USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services, <http://quesdb.usaid.gov/gbk>, accessed August 2009, and U.S. Department of State, International Affairs Account Tables, <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/iab/index.htm>, accessed August 2009.





Figure B-7. Foreign assistance summary⁸

⁸ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development website titled, Donor Aid Charts, http://www.oecd.org/countrylist/0,3349,en_2649_34447_1783495_1_1_1_1,00.html, accessed August 2009.





Figure B-8. Combined U.S. aid and coalition troop data charts (2002-2006)





Figure B-8 (continued).

State	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Egypt	1,715.6	2,202.2	2,226.1	1,957.6	1,563.2	1,787.2	1,972.1
Turkey	6.5	278.3	1,028.6	50.3	53.6	23.4	29.7
Jordan	271.9	339.1	1,697.3	638.3	682.7	562.0	560.3




Figure B-9. Total U.S. foreign assistance, 2001-2007 (\$ millions)⁹

⁹ U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), U.S. Bureau of Census (BUCEN) International Database, USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services, <http://quesdb.usaid.gov/gbk>, accessed August 2009, and U.S. Department of State, International Affairs Account Tables, <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/iab/index.htm>, accessed August 2009, and U.S. Central Command, Tampa, FL.

Date	Jan 03	Feb 03	Mar 03	Apr 03	May 03	Jun 03	Totals
Terror	92	148	153	86	283	155	917
Hitler	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
Dictator	11	24	38	37	33	11	154
Weapon	155	224	179	79	89	59	785
Aggression	3	3	6	1	0	1	14
Total	271	422	387	203	405	226	1914




Figure B-10. U.S. senior leader rhetoric (Jan 1 – Jun 30, 2003)¹⁰

¹⁰ Data for table and figure are taken from multiple sources: Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Book 1, January-June 2003, <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/index.html>, accessed July 2009 and Department of Defense website, <http://www.defenselink.mil>, accessed July 2009; and Department of State website, <http://www.state.gov>, accessed July 2009.




Figure B-11. Bush administration rhetoric (Jan 1 – Jun 30, 2003)¹¹

¹¹ Data for these charts are from multiple sources: Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Book 1, January-June 2003, <http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/index.html>, accessed July 2009; Department of

Table B-1. List of elite interviews

Name	Government Position(s)
General (ret.) Colin Powell	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Secretary of State (01-05) • Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (89-93)
Ambassador Marc Grossman	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (01-05) • Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (97-00) • U.S. Ambassador to Turkey (94-97)
Ambassador Victoria Nuland	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National War College faculty (current) • U.S. Perm Rep to NATO (2005-2008) • Principal Deputy National Security Advisor to Vice President Cheney (2003-2005)
Ambassador Lincoln Bloomfield	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • State Department's Envoy for Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) Threat Reduction (current) • Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs (2001-2005)
Ms. Debra Cagan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy, NDU (current) • Deputy Assistant, Acting, for Coalition, Peacekeeping and Multinational Cooperation for OSD (2006) • Senior Counselor for Coalition Affairs for OSD (2005) • Political Advisor to Supreme Allied Commander Transformation and U.S. Joint Forces Command (2003) • DOS lead for international coalition for OIF (2002)
Air Vice-Marshal Harwood, U.K. RAF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • U.K. Defense Attaché, British Embassy, Washington DC (current) • Deployed Operating Base Commander in Kuwait (2003)
Air Commodore Graham Wright, U.K. RAF	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chief of the Defense Staff Liaison Officer to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington (current) • Commander, RAF Coltishall (2007)
Mr. Gregory Suchan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Deputy Assistant Secretary in the State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (2000-2007)
Mr. Leo Michel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies (current) • Director for NATO Policy within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) (2002)
Mr. Edward Stafford	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Director, PolMil Office, Iraqi Affairs, U.S. Dept of State (current) • Foreign Service Officer
Mr. Chris Davy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Political-Military officer, European Security and Political Affairs, Department of State (current)

Defense website, <http://www.defenselink.mil>, accessed July 2009; and Department of State website, <http://www.state.gov>, accessed July 2009.

Table B-2. Troop-contributing coalition partners (2003-2006)¹²

STATE / YEAR COALITION	2003		2004		2005		2006	
	IRQ	AFG	IRQ	AFG	IRQ	AFG	IRQ	AFG
ALBANIA	72	0	73	0	127	1	123	2
ARMENIA	0	0	0	0	46	0	46	0
AUSTRALIA	284	2	359	4	743	215	1,273	1
AZERBAIJAN	151	0	151	0	154	0	98	0
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA	0	0	0	0	36	0	36	0
BULGARIA	471	20	476	7	457	0	157	0
CZECH REPUBLIC	271	0	98	1	108	0	98	1
DENMARK	539	0	539	0	498	276	490	1
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	303	0	414	0	0	0	0	0
EL SALVADOR	360	0	381	0	381	0	381	0
ESTONIA	43	10	58	5	47	0	41	0
GEORGIA	69	0	205	0	856	0	850	0
HONDURUS	371	0	373	0	0	0	0	0
HUNGARY	296	0	272	0	0	0	0	0
ITALY	2,519	1	3,436	8	3,347	1	3,305	91
JAPAN	0	0	584	0	624	0	582	0
KAZAKHSTAN	29	0	30	0	29	0	29	0
LATVIA	179	0	132	0	137	0	132	0
LITHUANIA	150	3	133	39	115	2	113	0
MACEDONIA	31	0	33	0	39	0	46	0
MOLDOVA	56	0	33	0	12	0	11	0
MONGOLIA	173	13	132	17	132	0	131	21
NETHERLANDS	1,080	2	1,480	0	1,555	249	0	2
NEW ZEALAND	58	174	41	2	0	182	0	3
NICARUAGA	113	0	113	0	0	0	0	0
NORWAY	135	0	152	1	10	85	0	9
PHILIPPINES	87	0	54	0	0	0	0	0
POLAND	2,479	95	2,557	0	2,460	0	1,719	0
PORTUGAL	133	0	133	99	133	102	0	0
ROMANIA	732	432	746	0	879	0	858	0
SLOVAKIA	82	40	103	49	107	40	107	5
SOUTH KOREA	684	205	2,801	211	3,197	211	3,325	212
SPAIN	1,098	0	1,286	0	0	0	0	0
THAILAND	447	0	451	0	0	0	0	0
TONGA	0	0	44	0	0	0	0	0
UKRAINE	1,650	0	1,633	0	1,573	0	0	0
UNITED KINGDOM	10,040	103	9,177	19	8,220	248	7,517	179
TOTAL	25,582	1,395	29,730	1,245	27,114	2,388	21,949	888

¹² U.S. Central Command, Coalition Coordinating Cell Working File, United States Central Command, Tampa, Florida, accessed March 2009.

Table B-3. Troop-contributing coalition partners in Iraq¹³

Country	Mission	Unit Description	OIF History	Contributions
United Kingdom	Stability/Peacekeeping Operations	7th Armored Brigade (MND-SE)	Joined in 2003 with U.S., Poland, and Australia – left Jul 09	Largest non-U.S. troop contributor. Royal AF aircraft
Italy	Peacekeeping Operation	Sassari Mechanized Brigade	Joined in Mar 03 – left in Sep 06	Security patrols, humanitarian aid and projects, mine clearing
South Korea	Civil Military Operations, Reconstruction Support	Infantry Division	Joined in Apr 03 and left in Dec 08	Middle Ring security, airlift support, opened a hospital in Nov 05
Poland	Peacekeeping Operations	Division Headquarters and Brigade	Joined with U.S., U.K., and Australia, in 2003; left in Oct 08	Provides training and stabilization operations.
Ukraine	Police and border transition team	Tactical group	Joined in Apr 03 and left in Dec 05	Police and border training
Netherlands	Peacekeeping and Police	Marines, police unit, logistics team, commando squad	Joined in Apr 03 and left in Mar 05	Provided maneuver battalion
Spain	Peacekeeping Operations	Brigade size force	Joined in Sep 03 and left in May 04	Served with Poles in central-south sector
Australia	Peacekeeping Operations and training	Training Teams, Protective Security Group, and staff	Joined in 2003 with U.S., U.K., and Poland – left in Jul 09	Air traffic control, force protection, civil-military projects
Georgia	Peacekeeping Operations	Light Infantry Battalion	Joined in Mar 03 and left in Aug 08.	Middle Ring security
Romania	Peacekeeping Operations	Various unit types	Joined in Apr 03 and left in Jul 09	Civil-Military projects, Iraqi police training
Japan	Civil-Military Operations and Reconstruction Support	Reconstruction Group	Joined in Jan 04 and left in Jul 06	Civil-military missions. Donated over 1,100 vehicles
Denmark	Peacekeeping Operations	Mechanized Infantry Battalion	Joined in May 03 and left in Dec 07	Civil-Military projects
Bulgaria	Security	Security Company	Joined coalition in 2003 and left in Dec 08	Security patrols
Thailand	Humanitarian	Engineers	Joined coalition in Sep 03 and left in Dec 04	Served with Poles in Karbala

¹³ Current Coalition Summary Iraq, Coalition Coordinating Cell Working File, United States Central Command, Tampa, Florida, accessed March 2006.

Table B-3 (continued).¹⁴

Country	Mission	Unit Description	OIF History	Contribution
Dominican Republic	Security	Infantry Battalion	Joined coalition in Aug 03 and left in Jun 04	Served under Spanish brigade
El Salvador	Civil-Military and Reconstruction	Infantry Battalion	Joined coalition in May 03 and left in Jan 09	Security patrols
Honduras	Reconstruction	Infantry Battalion	Joined coalition in Aug 03 and left in Jul 04	Served under Spanish brigade
Hungary	Transportation	Infantry Battalion	Joined coalition in Aug 03 and left in Dec 04	Served under Polish command
Norway	Explosive Ordinance Disposal	Engineers and Mine clearing	Joined coalition in Oct 03 and left in Mar 05	Clears unexploded ordinance
Azerbaijan	Base force protection and security	Peacekeeping company	Joined coalition in Jun 03 and left in Dec 08	Provides security of Iraqi dam
Lithuania	Peacekeeping operations	Infantry platoon	Joined coalition in Apr 03 and left in Aug 08	Convoy escort and guard force
Portugal	Security	Gendarme force	Joined coalition in Sep 03 and left in Feb 05	Provide security and training
Latvia	Peacekeeping operations	Infantry Company	Joined coalition in Mar 03 and left in Nov 08	Provides security and training
Mongolia	Base security	Infantry Company	Joined coalition in Jun 03 and left in Sep 08	Force protection mission
Nicaragua	Demining/Humanitarian	De-mining team	Joined coalition in Oct 03 and left in Jul 04	Clears unexploded ordinance
Slovakia	Explosive Ordinance	Engineer Company	Joined coalition in Apr 03 and left in Jan 07	Destruction of explosives
Czech Republic	Military police training and support	Military police company	Joined coalition in Apr 03 and left in Dec 08	Police training instruction
Albania	Security of Mosul Airfield	Commando Company	Joined coalition in Mar 03 and left in Dec 08	Force protection mission
Estonia	Peacekeeping operations	Infantry platoon	Joined coalition in Jun 03 and left in Feb 09	Offensive combat operations
Philippines	Reconstruction	Medics, engineers, and drivers	Joined coalition in Dec 03 and left in Jul 04	Humanitarian and civic projects

¹⁴ Current Coalition Summary Iraq, Coalition Coordinating Cell Working File, United States Central Command, Tampa, Florida, March 2006.

Table B-3 (continued).¹⁵

Country	Mission	Unit Description	OIF History	Contribution
Armenia	Transportation support and de-mining	Transportation company and de-mining team	Joined coalition in Jan 05 and left in Oct 08	Transportation missions and convoy escorts
Tonga	Security	Royal Marines	Joined coalition in Jun 04 and left in Dec 04	Guard duty – returned in 2007/2008
New Zealand	Reconstruction	Engineers	Joined coalition in Sep 03 and left in Sep 04	Served under U.K. in Basra
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Explosive Ordinance Disposal	EOD Platoon	Joined coalition in May 05 and left in Nov 08	Clears unexploded ordinance
Macedonia	Peacekeeping operations	Special operations platoon	Joined coalition in Apr 03 and left in Nov 08	Patrols in raids, ambushes, and cordon/search
Moldova	Explosive Ordinance Disposal	De-mining team and staff	Joined coalition in Sep 03 and left in Oct 08	Clears unexploded ordinance
Kazakhstan	Explosive Ordinance Disposal	EOD Platoon	Joined coalition in May 03 and left in Oct 08	Clears unexploded ordinance

¹⁵ Current Coalition Summary Iraq, Coalition Coordinating Cell Working File, United States Central Command, Tampa, Florida, March 2006.

Table B-4. U.S. Assistance by year, 2001-2007 (\$ millions)¹⁶

State	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Albania	65.3	46	50.5	63.5	48.5	59.2	37.8
Armenia	100.9	99.7	110.1	88.6	91.9	323.9	74.1
Australia	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.1
Azerbaijan	44.5	58.3	70.6	68.5	62.4	67.5	57.5
Bosnia & Herzegovina	158.2	100.4	79.5	97.8	63.2	64.2	53.4
Bulgaria	58.6	59.4	55.2	46.9	48.6	44.0	34.7
Czech Republic	10.6	14.2	29.2	10.2	8.4	14.0	32.3
Denmark	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Dominican Republic	45.4	35.1	37.1	44.0	35.6	43.9	57.4
El Salvador	118.0	134.2	62.1	70.3	58.9	68.1	513.6
Estonia	8	8	11.3	9.4	7.4	9	5.1
Georgia	117.3	101.0	108.2	116.1	114.1	409.7	98.4
Honduras	51.0	48.1	68.2	63.8	284.9	84.2	59.0
Hungary	13.4	14.3	23.1	13.1	13.6	7.3	9.8
Italy	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.1
Japan	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Kazakhstan	52.8	63.15	64.3	72.7	56.3	104.7	97.3
Korea, South	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.4	0.1	13.5
Latvia	6.9	9.3	12.5	10.4	6.7	11.8	15.6
Lithuania	8.4	8.8	14.0	11.3	8.5	6.9	9.9
Macedonia	60.8	74.0	72.3	53.4	50.1	45.6	38.3
Moldova	60.4	44.3	49.9	38.2	30.6	23.9	46.6
Mongolia	17.4	25.8	23.2	31.1	17.2	15.4	16.8
Netherlands	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	1.5
New Zealand	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2
Nicaragua	62.1	53.7	66.8	60.1	94.8	245.3	59.1
Norway	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Philippines	154.8	207.8	232.7	180.9	151.9	195.2	155.6
Poland	17.5	43.9	32.1	36.7	92.7	33.8	32.1
Portugal	0.7	0.7	0.9	3.4	1.0	0.8	0.8

¹⁶ U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), U.S. Bureau of Census (BUCEN) International Database, USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services, <http://quesdb.usaid.gov/gbk>, accessed August 2009, and checked against U.S. Department of State, International Affairs Account Tables, <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/iab/index.htm>, accessed August 2009, for supplementals. The total amount of U.S. foreign assistance that includes Economic Assistance, Development Assistance (DA), Economic Support Funds (ESF), Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States (SEED), Assistance for the Independent States of the Former Soviet Union (FSA); International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), International Military Education and Training (IMET), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO).

Table B-4 (continued).

State	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Romania	66.9	56.0	66.6	48.9	63.7	53.2	38.2
Slovakia	15.4	11.4	17.0	8.0	13.2	5.8	5.8
Spain	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	2.6
Thailand	34.3	31.1	33.9	21.9	49.7	52.2	50.0
Tonga	1.3	1.2	1.2	1.7	1.3	1.4	1.5
Ukraine	218.1	212.8	166.5	121.7	182.2	127.8	192.8
United Kingdom	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.3	0.1	20.3
Total	1,569.6	1,562.9	1,559.0	1,392.7	1,661.5	2,119.2	1,831.8

Table B-5. Combined U.S. aid and troop contribution by year, 2002-2006¹⁷

		2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Albania	Aid	41.5	50.8	58.8	42.9	53.6
	Troops		72	73	127	123
Armenia	Aid	82	75.5	79.9	76.5	321
	Troops		0	0	46	46
Australia	Aid	0	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.20
	Troops		284	359	743	1,273
Azerbaijan	Aid	53.8	57.70	60.00	64.00	56.00
	Troops		151	151	154	98
BIH	Aid	78.7	76.70	85.50	47.30	53.40
	Troops		0	0	36	36
Bulgaria	Aid	54.9	55.30	43.30	44.20	39.50
	Troops		471	476	457	157
Czech Republic	Aid	14.2	29.30	10.20	8.30	14.00
	Troops		271	98	108	98
Denmark	Aid	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Troops		539	539	498	490
Dominican Rep	Aid	35.1	38.80	45.30	36.20	47.20
	Troops		303	414	0	0
El Salvador	Aid	145.3	62.40	70.50	59.20	68.40
	Troops		360	381	381	381
Estonia	Aid	7.9	11.30	9.40	7.60	9.00
	Troops		43	58	47	41
Georgia	Aid	190.2	91.80	124.50	105.20	408.60
	Troops		69	205	856	850
Honduras	Aid	49.9	71.00	66.00	285.20	88.10
	Troops		371	373	0	0
Hungary	Aid	14.3	23.00	13.20	13.50	7.30
	Troops		296	272	0	0
Italy	Aid	0	0.00	0.00	0.10	0.00
	Troops		2,519	3,436	3,347	3,305
Japan	Aid	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Troops		0	584	624	582

¹⁷ U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), U.S. Bureau of Census (BUCEN) International Database, USAID Economic Analysis and Data Services, <http://quesdb.usaid.gov/gbk>, accessed August 2009, and U.S. Department of State, International Affairs Account Tables, <http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/iab/index.htm>, accessed August 2009, and U.S. Central Command, Tampa, FL.

Table B-5 (continued).

		2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Kazakhstan	Aid	66	61.30	77.50	65.60	109.90
	Troops		29	30	29	29
Latvia	Aid	9.3	12.40	11.00	7.30	11.90
	Troops		179	132	137	132
Lithuania	Aid	8.9	14.00	11.30	9.20	6.80
	Troops		150	133	115	113
Macedonia	Aid	77.4	67.80	49.80	47.80	45.00
	Troops		31	33	39	46
Moldova	Aid	39.4	39.20	47.30	31.90	27.00
	Troops		56	33	12	11
Mongolia	Aid	25.8	23.10	32.10	19.30	15.30
	Troops		173	132	132	131
Netherlands	Aid	0	0.00	0.10	0.10	0.00
	Troops		1,080	1,480	1,555	0
New Zealand	Aid	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Troops		58	41	0	0
Nicaragua	Aid	54.5	67.40	61.80	95.40	247.70
	Troops		113	113	0	0
Norway	Aid	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Troops		135	152	10	0
Philippines	Aid	207.8	224.60	238.30	166.50	212.50
	Troops		87	54	0	0
Poland	Aid	43.9	32.00	37.20	92.70	33.80
	Troops		2,479	2,557	2,460	1,719
Portugal	Aid	0.72	0.85	3.40	1.00	0.80
	Troops		133	133	133	0
Romania	Aid	56	66.80	48.80	62.60	53.30
	Troops		732	746	879	858
Slovakia	Aid	11.9	17.00	8.00	13.20	5.80
	Troops		82	103	107	107
South Korea	Aid	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Troops		684	2,801	3,197	3,325
Spain	Aid	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Troops		1,098	1,286	0	0
Thailand	Aid	34.9	35.00	23.00	55.60	51.30
	Troops		447	451	0	0

Table B-5 (continued).

		2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Tonga	Aid	0.12	0.12	1.70	1.30	1.40
	Troops		0	44	0	0
Ukraine	Aid	170.4	89.70	131.50	149.30	153.70
	Troops		1,650	1,633	1,573	0
United Kingdom	Aid	0	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	Troops		10,040	9,177	8,220	7,517
Total	Aid	1,576.20	1,396.10	1,449.40	1,612.90	2,142.70
	Troops		25,185	28,683	26,022	13,951

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Colonel Pete McCabe, USAF, is a member of the International Security Studies faculty of the Air War College. He has served in a variety of operational and staff assignments, accumulating more than 2500 flight hours in the B-52. He graduated in 1983 from Kent State University in Kent, Ohio with a Bachelor of Science degree in physics and received his commission from Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps. Colonel McCabe earned his wings from Undergraduate Navigator Training at Mather AFB, CA in May 1984. He has completed numerous operational B-52 tours and has flown 25 combat sorties. Additionally, Colonel McCabe has held staff positions at Headquarters Air Combat Command, Headquarters Air Force, and Headquarters U.S. European Command. Colonel McCabe earned a Master of Science degree (1990) in aeronautical science from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University and a Master of Arts degree (2002) in National Security Strategy from the National War College. He also has a Master of Arts degree (2008) in political science from the University of Florida.